Abstract
This article argues that the United States deterrence-by-denial strategy is insufficient to deter China from attempting forcible unification with Taiwan, due to its neglect of ideological and psychological drivers in the Chinese Communist Party’s decision-making calculus. Unlike existing military-centric models, it introduces a hybrid deterrence framework that integrates denial and punishment across domains, coordinated by a Joint Interagency Organization. The article offers a practical model for deterring ideologically motivated adversaries through synchronized, multidomain planning based on coercion theory, behavioral deterrence literature, and strategic documents from US and Chinese sources.
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
10.55540/0031-1723.3366
Recommended Citation
Lucas Ziller, "A Hybrid Deterrence Model for Countering China," Parameters 55, no. 4 (2025), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3366.