Abstract
This article argues that the 2021 US withdrawal from Afghanistan was not a discrete event but part of a broader trajectory of strategic retrenchment whose compressed implementation generated operational, institutional, and humanitarian costs. Unlike analyses centered primarily on diplomatic failure or the Taliban’s victory, it connects domestic politics and bureaucratic bargaining to the employment and withdrawal of US landpower. Using qualitative process tracing, it examines the Doha Agreement, official US reports, policy documents, and scholarly research from 2018 to 2025. The findings offer military and policy practitioners practical guidance for conditions-based withdrawal, partner-force support, evacuation planning, interagency coordination, and post-withdrawal engagement.
©2026 Suliman Paris and Ali Maksum
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
10.55540/0031-1723.3422
Recommended Citation
Suliman Paris & Ali Maksum, "From Doha to Afghanistan: A Case Study of US Foreign Policy Shifts Toward Afghanistan (2018–25)," Parameters 56, no. 4 (2026), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3422.
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