Books, Monographs & Collaborative Studies

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  Extremist Migration: A Foreign Jihadist Fighter Threat Assessment

  Shima D. Keene Dr.

  
  This monograph provides an assessment of the emerging threat posed by foreign jihadist fighters following the reduction in territory controlled by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and recommends ways that the U.S. Army should address the issues highlighted.

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  An Unnatural Partnership? The Future of U.S.-India Strategic Cooperation

  Samit Ganguly and M. Chris Mason

  As global competition with an increasingly assertive Chinese Government expands, the strategic relationship between India and the United States is assuming ever-greater importance. From a superficial perspective, a strategic partnership seems to make a great deal of sense for both countries. Yet, enormous political, cultural, and structural obstacles remain between them, which continue to slow the progress in security cooperation to a crawl, relative to China’s economic and military advances. The authors explore these impediments frankly and suggest practical ways to build trust and establish confidence.

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  Maneuver and Manipulation: On the Military Strategy of Online Information Warfare

  Tim Hwang Mr.

  
  How should the defense community best organize to combat modern campaigns of propaganda and disinformation? Without a broader strategic concept of the nature of the challenge posed by these techniques, current efforts and investments run the risk of simply chasing the latest tactics without establishing enduring security. This monograph offers a way forward, proposing a cohesive strategic framework for thinking about modern information warfare and its effective conduct.

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  A Whole-of-Government Approach to Gray Zone Warfare

  Elzabeth G. Troeder

  Gray zone warfare has increasingly been the strategy selected by states that are determined to influence change without the risk of major escalation to outright military war. It is a significant concern today, threatening U.S. national security as well as the security of U.S. allies and partners. Although warfare is traditionally led by the Department of Defense (DoD), as the use of gray zone warfare increases and evolves, a whole-of-government approach that incorporates the unique capabilities of Federal departments and agencies for this fight is needed.

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  Grand Strategy is Attrition: The Logic of Integrating Various Forms of Power in Conflict

  Lukas Milevski Dr.

  
  In this monograph, Dr. Lukas Milevski examines the logic of grand strategy in practice, defined by its most basic building block—combining military and non-military power in war. He lays out competing visions of how to define grand strategy and why the aforementioned building block is the most fundamental. The monograph establishes the essential logic of military power through annihilation and exhaustion or attrition as well as through control of the opponent’s freedom of action. This baseline understanding of strategic action and effect in war allows an exploration of how the utility and meaning of non-military instruments change between peacetime and wartime and how they may contribute to the strategic effort and includes discussion of specific examples such as the U.S. interwar war plans and the Stuxnet cyberattack on Iranian nuclear facilities. The author also links this combination to present-day Russian and Chinese attempts at mixing military and non-military power.

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  Command Decision: Ethical Leadership in the Information Environment

  Keir Giles Mr.

  This monograph considers how a classical challenge that commanders face in war—namely, making critical decisions on the basis of limited and often unreliable information—has been exacerbated in the era of big data. Data overload complicates the intelligence community’s efforts to identify and exclude disinformation, misinformation, and deception, and thus hampers its ability to deliver reliable intelligence to inform decision-makers in a timely manner. The military commander remains responsible for making a final decision, yet the great wealth of data now available through the intelligence cycle amplifies the risk of decision paralysis. With this in mind, technological solutions tend to be considered the most appropriate response for managing data overload and disinformation. While these remain relevant, they alone may be insufficient to equip the military commander with the necessary insight to guide decisions through the uncertainty of the big data environment. Rather, the military commander must cultivate a range of new behaviors in order to avoid decision paralysis and fulfill the distinct leadership roles a commander must play at the various stages of the intelligence process

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  Air Power and Warfare: A Century of Theory and History

  Tami Davis Biddle Dr.

  
  In this monograph, Tami Davis Biddle analyzes the historical record of air power over the past 100 years. Her monograph, designed for the student of strategy, is intended to provide both a concise introduction to the topic and a framework for thinking intelligently about air power, particularly aerial bombing. Her primary aim is to discern the distinction between what has been expected of air power by theorists and military institutions, and what it has produced in the crucible of war. Aerial bombing, Biddle argues, is a coercive activity in which an attacker seeks to structure the enemy’s incentives—using threats and actions to shape and constrain the enemy’s options, both perceived and real. It is an important and much-utilized military instrument for both deterrence and compellence. In addition, it is a powerful tool in the arsenal of the joint warfighter. Its ability to achieve anticipated results, however, varies with circumstances. Students of strategy must be able to discern and understand the conditions under which aerial bombing is more or less likely to achieve the results expected of it by those who employ it.

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  Deterring Russia in the Gray Zone

  Michael C. McCarthy Lieutenant Colonel, Matthew A. Moyer Commander, and Brett H. Venable Colonel

  
  The United States lacks a cohesive strategy to deter Russian aggression. Despite being militarily and economically inferior, Russia has undermined the United States and its allies by exploiting the “gray zone,” or the conceptual space between war and peace where nations compete to advance their national interests. In dealing with Russia, the United States must shift its strategic framework from a predominantly military-centric model to one that comprises a whole-of-government approach. The holistic approach must leverage a combination of diplomacy, information, military, and economic (DIME) measures. In this timely and prescient monograph, three active duty military officers and national security fellows from the Harvard Kennedy School look to address this contemporary and complex problem. Through extensive research and consultation with some of the nation’s and academia’s foremost experts, the authors offer policymakers a menu of strategic options to deter Russia in the gray zone and protect vital U.S. national security interests.

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  The Army Role in Achieving Deterrence in Cyberspace

  Jeffrey L. Caton

  
  In 2015, the Department of Defense (DoD) released the DoD Cyber Strategy which explicitly calls for a comprehensive strategy to provide credible deterrence in cyberspace against threats from key state and nonstate actors. To be effective, such activities must be coordinated with ongoing deterrence efforts in the physical realm, especially those of near-peers impacting critical global regions such as China in the Asia-Pacific region and Russia in Europe. It is important for the U.S. Army to identify and plan for any unique roles that they may provide to these endeavors. This study explores the evolving concept of deterrence in cyberspace in three major areas:
  
  • First, the monograph addresses the question: What is the current U.S. deterrence posture for cyberspace? The discussion includes an assessment of relevant current national and DoD policies and concepts as well as an examination of key issues for cyber deterrence found in professional literature.
  
  • Second, it examines the question: What are the Army’s roles in cyberspace deterrence? This section provides background information on how Army cyber forces operate and examines the potential contributions of these forces to the deterrence efforts in cyberspace as well as in the broader context of strategic deterrence. The section also addresses how the priority of these contributions may change with escalating levels of conflict.
  
  • Third, the monograph provides recommendations for changing or adapting the DoD and Army responsibilities to better define and implement the evolving concepts and actions supporting deterrence in the dynamic domain of cyberspace.

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  Conventional Deterrence and Landpower in Northeastern Europe

  Alexander Lanoszka Dr. and Michael A. Hunzeker Dr.

  
  The United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) face daunting challenges in the Baltic region. Russia is behaving aggressively. Its military is more capable than it has been at any point since the end of the Cold War. More importantly, Russia is finding creative ways to subvert the status quo and to sow discord without triggering Article 5 of NATO, which declares that an attack against one member is an attack against all.

  These problems are formidable, but we have reason to be optimistic. Far from shattering NATO’s cohesion and undermining its resolve, Russian aggression has reinvigorated the alliance. Nor is Russia an unstoppable adversary. It has many weaknesses. Indeed, Russian fears over those vulnerabilities might be driving its aggressive foreign policy. Even if this is not the case and Russia is indeed a relentless predator, it is nevertheless a vulnerable one.

  The United States and its NATO allies can take advantage of these vulnerabilities. After assessing Russian intentions, capabilities, and limitation, this monograph recommends a hedging strategy to improve early detection capabilities, enhance deterrence in unprovocative ways, and improve regional defenses against a hybrid threat. Achieving these goals should help the United States deter Russia and reassure regional allies more effectively while managing our own worst fears.

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  What Next for Russia’s Front-Line States?

  Keir Giles Mr.

  
  Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, alarmed not only Western-leaning states in Central Europe and the Baltic but also Moscow’s traditional allies. These events signaled that Moscow is now willing and capable of using direct military force against perceived strategic threats in its self-proclaimed region of vested interests. With the exception of Ukraine and the Baltic States, this Letort Paper examines how Russia’s front-line states have adjusted their foreign policy posture since 2014. Belarus, Moldova, the states of Central Asia and the South Caucasus calculate the benefits and risks in their relationship with Moscow and either make concessions or strengthen their defenses accordingly to avoid triggering a Russian reaction. This Letort Paper provides a range of policy recommendations intended to maximize the opportunities of a new alignment with the West for these states while minimizing the risk of Russia, using again, those capabilities it has demonstrated in Ukraine and Syria.

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  Implications of Service Cyberspace Component Commands for Army Cyberspace Operations

  Jeffrey L. Caton

  
  The first 7 years of U.S. Cyber Command operations are paved with milestones that mark the steady operationalization of modern cyberspace as the newest domain of military conflict as well as a realm of international power. The creation of the Cyber Mission Force and Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber are significant steps toward improving the timeliness and effectiveness of cyberspace operations that directly support combatant commands and the whole-of-government responses to cyberspace threats. It focuses on the central question: “What is the context in which different military services approach cyberspace component operations internally as well as with the Department of Defense?”

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  Contemporary Chemical Weapons Use in Syria and Iraq by the Assad Regime and the Islamic State

  Robert J. Bunker Dr.

  This monograph focuses on an understudied, but yet a critically important and timely component of land warfare, related to the battlefield use of chemical weapons by contemporary threat forces. It will do so by focusing on two case studies related to chemical weapons use in Syria and Iraq by the Assad regime and the Islamic State. Initially, the monograph provides an overview of the chemical warfare capabilities of these two entities; discusses selected incidents of chemical weapons use each has perpetrated; provides analysis and lessons learned concerning these chemical weapons incidents, their programs, and the capabilities of the Assad regime and the Islamic State; and then presents U.S. Army policy and planning considerations on this topical areas of focus. Ultimately, such considerations must be considered vis-à-vis U.S. Army support of Joint Force implementation of National Command Authority guidance.

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  Examining the Roles of Army Reserve Component Forces in Military Cyberspace Operations

  Jeffrey L. Caton

  
  Cyberspace operations have become pervasive in the United States, and they enable many aspects of modern life for the average citizen, such as entertainment, communication, education, transportation, banking, and voting. The continuing development of the U.S. Army and Department of Defense (DoD) Reserve component cyberspace units can leverage the capabilities and experience of industry and academia to help protect critical information infrastructure and enhance national security. What opportunities and challenges surround the integration of these forces into a still-evolving joint cyberspace force?

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  Scenario Planning and Strategy in the Pentagon

  Michael Fitzsimmons Dr.

  Scenario planning should be one of the Pentagon’s most important tools for developing strategy for an uncertain future. However, the formalized joint scenario planning process to support strategy and force development—Support for Strategic Analysis—has faced many challenges over the past 2 decades, and has ultimately proven less influential than intended on strategic decision-making. Explaining why is the main purpose of this monograph. It argues that scenario analysis has been most effective in supporting capability and program development, while it has fallen short in shaping strategy and force structure. The reasons for this are numerous and are rooted in intrinsic, structural characteristics of decision-making in large organizations. The monograph concludes with several recommendations for rejuvenating scenario planning in the Pentagon.

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  The U.S. Army in the Iraq War – Volume 1: Invasion – Insurgency – Civil War, 2003-2006

  Joel D. Rayburn COL and Frank K. Sobchak COL

  The Iraq War has been the costliest U.S. conflict since the Vietnam War. To date, few official studies have been conducted to review what happened, why it happened, and what lessons should be drawn. The U.S. Army in the Iraq War is the Army’s initial operational level analysis of this conflict, written in narrative format, with assessments and lessons embedded throughout the work. This study reviews the conflict from a Landpower perspective and includes the contributions of coalition allies, the U.S. Marine Corps, and special operations forces. Presented principally from the point of view of the commanders in Baghdad, the narrative examines the interaction of the operational and strategic levels, as well as the creation of theater level strategy and its implementation at the tactical level. Volume 1 begins in the truce tent at Safwan Airfield in southern Iraq at the end of Operation DESERT STORM and briefly examines actions by U.S. and Iraqi forces during the interwar years. The narrative continues by examining the road to war, the initially successful invasion, and the rise of Iraqi insurgent groups before exploring the country’s slide toward civil war. This volume concludes with a review of the decision by the George W. Bush administration to “surge” additional forces to Iraq, placing the conduct of the “surge” and its aftermath in the second volume.

  This study was constructed over a span of 4 years and relied on nearly 30,000 pages of hand-picked declassified documents, hundreds of hours of original interviews, and thousands of hours of previously unavailable interviews. Original interviews conducted by the team included President George W. Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretaries of Defense Leon Panetta and Robert Gates, Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and every theater commander for the war, among many others. With its release, this publication, The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, represents the U.S. Government’s longest and most detailed study of the Iraq conflict thus far.

  NOTICE: Due to the high cost of printing, only a limited numbers of hard copies of The U.S. Army in the Iraq War will be produced. These copies will be distributed primarily to military educational institutions across the Joint force. Hardcopies of the study can be acquired through the Government Printing Office Bookstore. Organizations and individuals will be able to order printed copies. Both volumes of The U.S. Army in the Iraq War are available for pre-order through the GPO Bookstore. Volume 1 can be found here. And Volume 2 can be found here.

  ADDENDUM: The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center (USAHEC) has no archive of declassified documents except for the declassified documents from U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) posted online here. USAHEC does not have the authority to declassify or to review OIF sources for release.

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  US Army in the Iraq War Volume 2 Surge and Withdrawal

  Jeanne F. Godfroy, James S. Powell, Matthew D. Morton, and Matthew M. Zais Joel D. Rayburn and Frank K. Sobchak

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  Maneuvering the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry in the Middle East: How the United States Can Preserve and Protect Its Long-Term Interests in the Region

  Gregory Aftandilian Mr.

  This monograph examines the conflicts in the Middle East region between Saudi Arabia and Iran and the so-called proxy wars that are being fought between them, and discusses ways that the United States needs to maneuver carefully in this struggle to preserve its long-term interests in the area. Although Washington has political, economic, and strategic equities with Riyadh, it needs to think carefully about being perceived as engaging in sectarian strife that would alienate Shia allies in Iraq, show bias in its human rights policy, and anger millions of Iranian young people who want better relations with the United States.

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  Creating Great Expectations: Strategic Communications and American Airpower

  Conrad C. Crane Dr.

  Americans have always been uniquely attracted to airpower, a fact that has been successfully exploited by generations of U.S. Air Force leaders in information campaigns. But as a result, the nation has often entered conflicts with exorbitant expectations about what airpower could actually accomplish, creating unique challenges in strategic communications when promises did not match reality, especially in recent conflicts. Adaptive enemies have also become very adept at using their own carefully crafted information campaigns to counter what is America’s greatest asymmetric advantage on the battlefield.

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  Silent Partners: Organized Crime, Irregular Groups, and Nation-States

  Shima D. Keene Dr.

  The U.S. Army increasingly faces adversaries that are difficult to define. The threat landscape is further complicated by the silent partnership between criminal organizations, irregular groups, and nation-states. This collaboration, whatever its exact nature, is problematic, because it confounds understanding of the adversary, making existing countermeasures less effective, and thus directly challenging U.S. national security interests. Military action taken without full appreciation of the dynamics of the nature of these relationships is likely to be ineffective at best or suffer unintended consequences. This monograph provides a comprehensive assessment of the threat to U.S. national security interests posed by the silent partners, as well as how the vulnerabilities of the relationships could be exploited to the advantage of the U.S. Army.

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  Assessing the Collective Security Treaty Organization: Capabilities and Vulnerabilities

  Richard Weitz Dr.

  
  Russia has strengthened its military position in Central Asia and the South Caucasus through a combination of bilateral and multilateral initiatives. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has become the most important multilateral defense structure in the former Soviet Union and is an essential instrument in Russia’s resurgence. The CSTO has expanded its missions, authorities, and capabilities. However, it faces both internal and external challenges, especially debilitating divisions among its members.

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  Maintaining Information Dominance in Complex Environments

  John A. S. Ardis Dr. and Shima D. Keene Dr.

  There are many risks to the U.S. Army’s command and control (C2) operations and to its intelligence and information warfare (IW) capabilities. The challenges include: significant uncertainty; sudden unexpected events; high noise and clutter levels in intelligence pictures; basic and complex deceptions exercised through a variety of channels; the actions of hidden malign actors; and novel forms of attack on U.S. and allied command, control, communications, computers, information/intelligence, surveillance, targeting acquisition, and reconnaissance (C4ISTAR) systems. If the U.S. Army is to secure and maintain information dominance in all environments, it must exploit complexity and uncertainty in the battlespace and not simply seek to overcome it. Innovation requires that new ideas are considered, and that old ideas should be robustly challenged. To achieve and maintain information dominance, the U.S. Army will also require a significant injection of innovation, a robust and resilient C2 and intelligence capability, novel technologies and an accelerated information operations capability development program that is broad, deep, sustained and well-coordinated. Furthermore, once information dominance is achieved, maintaining it will demand continuous change and development.

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  The Relevance of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for the United States in the 21st Century

  Joel R. Hillison Dr.

  The “America First” approach to foreign policy seems to call into question the value of institutions like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). However, in a more competitive and uncertain strategic environment, NATO and the EU remain vital to promoting U.S. interests.

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  Exit Strategy: Rule of Law and the U.S. Army

  Shima D. Keene Dr.

  Establishing the rule of law is a key goal and end state in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and is a critical aspect of securing peace and preventing future conflict. However, recent experience in theaters such as Afghanistan has shown that establishing effective rule of law institutions and practices is not a straightforward task. Consequently, considerations as to how and when rule of law institutions can start to be developed and integrated into the stability transition process must not only be planned in advance, but also form part of the U.S. Army’s strategy from the start of any military intervention. The analysis provided in this monograph will assist the U.S. Army, and more broadly the Departments of Defense and State, in better facilitating a seamless rebalancing from military to police functions in post-conflict environments, and to ensure that sustainable and effective rule of law interventions are delivered as part of an exit strategy.

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  The Dual-System Problem in Complex Conflicts

  Robert D. Lamb Dr. and Melissa R. Gregg Ms.

  Conflict and fragile environments are increasingly complex and unpredictable, but the U.S. policy system itself is much more complex and unpredictable than most leaders appreciate. In this monograph, the authors argue that until we get a grasp on this “dual-system problem,” the United States will fall further and further behind in its strategic ambitions.