Books, Monographs & Collaborative Studies

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Victories are Not Enough

Samuel J. Newland Dr.

Since the early stages of World War II, militaries in general, and the U.S. Army in particular, have studied the German way of war, specifically as practiced in the 20th century. While acknowledging that Germany—and before that nation came into existence, Prussia—produced some excellent armies, major problems with the German way of war must not be ignored. Despite the military prowess of Germany, it lost both of the major wars of the 20th century. The author explores the reasons why a nation with such a strong military reputation was unable to win its wars and achieve its goals. He emphasizes that military power, tactical and operational brilliance, and victories in the field can easily be squandered if a nation has failed to set achievable goals and develop strategies to reach them. This failure should not be lost on modern nations as they proceed into the 21st century.
Coup D'Oeil: Strategic Intuition in Army Planning

William Duggan Dr.

Dr. William Duggan shows how to reconcile analytical and intuitive methods of decisionmaking, by drawing on recent scientific research that brings the two together. He applies this new research to the Army's core methods of analytical decisionmaking as found in FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production. The result is "strategic intuition," which bears remarkable resemblance to von Clausewitz's idea of coup d'oeil in his classic work, On War. Dr. Duggan's study provides a theoretical overview of strategic intuition and practical suggestions for amending FM 5-0 to take it into account.
Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths

Antulio J. Echevarria Dr.

Fourth Generation War (4GW) emerged in the late 1980s, but has become popular due to recent twists in the war in Iraq, and terrorist attacks worldwide. In brief, the theory holds that warfare has evolved through four generations: 1) the use of massed manpower, 2) firepower, 3) maneuver, and now 4) an evolved form of insurgency that employs all available networks—political, economic, social, military—to convince an opponent's decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly. Further, the theory contends that this last form characterizes the terrorists' way of fighting today. Despite reinventing itself several times, the theory has several fundamental flaws that need to be exposed before it influences U.S. operational and strategic thinking. A critique of 4GW is both timely and important because examining the theory's assumptions exposes significant faults in other popular notions, such as the idea of nontrinitarian war, that might exert damaging influence over U.S. strategy and military doctrine. What we are really seeing in the war on terror and the campaign in Iraq and elsewhere is that the increased "dispersion and democratization of technology, information, and finance" brought about by globalization has given terrorist groups greater mobility and access worldwide. At this point, globalization seems to aid the nonstate actor more than the state, but states still play a central role in the support or defeat of terrorist groups or insurgencies. We would do well to abandon the theory of 4GW altogether, since it sheds very little, if any, light on this phenomenon.
Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran

Henry D. Sokolski Mr. and Patrick Clawson Mr.

As Iran edges closer to acquiring a nuclear bomb and its missiles extend an ever darker diplomatic shadow over the Middle East and Europe, Iran is likely to pose three threats. First, Iran could dramatically up the price of oil by interfering with the free passage of vessels in and through the Persian Gulf as it did during the l980s or by threatening to use terrorist proxies to target other states' oil facilities. Second, it could diminish American influence in the Gulf and Middle East by increasing the pace and scope of terrorist activities against Iraq, Saudi Arabia, other Gulf states, Israel, and other perceived supporters of the United States. Finally, it could become a nuclear proliferation model for the world and its neighbors (including many states that otherwise would be more dependent on the United States for their security) by continuing to insist that it has a right to make nuclear fuel under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and then withdrawing once it decides to get a bomb. To contain and deter Iran from posing such threats, the United States and its friends could take a number of steps: increasing military cooperation (particularly in the naval sphere) to deter Iranian naval interference; reducing the vulnerability of oil facilities in the Gulf outside of Iran to terrorist attacks, building and completing pipelines in the lower Gulf region that would allow most of the non-Iranian oil and gas in the Gulf to be exported without having to transit the Straits of Hormuz; diplomatically isolating Iran by calling for the demilitarization of the Straits and adjacent islands, creating country-neutral rules against Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty state members who are suspected of violating the treaty from getting nuclear assistance from other state members and making withdrawal from the treaty more difficult; encouraging Israel to set the pace of nuclear restraint in the region by freezing its large reactor at Dimona and calling on all other states that have large nuclear reactors to follow suit; and getting the Europeans to back targeted economic sanctions against Iran if it fails to shut down its most sensitive nuclear activities.
Going to War With the Allies You Have: Allies, Counterinsurgency, and the War on Terrorism

Daniel Byman Dr.

Washington must recognize that its allies, including those in the security forces, are often the source of counterinsurgency problems as well as the heart of any solution. The author argues that the ally's structural problems and distinct interests have daunting implications for successful U.S. counterinsurgency efforts. The nature of regimes and of societies feeds an insurgency, but the United States is often hostage to its narrow goals with regard to counterinsurgency and thus becomes complicit in the host-nation's self-defeating behavior. Unfortunately, U.S. influence often is limited as the allies recognize that America's vital interests with regard to fighting al-Qa'ida-linked groups are likely to outweigh any temporary disgust or anger at an ally's brutality or failure to institute reforms. Training, military-to-military contacts, education programs, and other efforts to shape their COIN capabilities are beneficial, but the effects are likely to be limited at best.
Chinese National Security: Decisionmaking Under Stress

Andrew Scobell Dr. and Larry M. Wortzel Dr.

This volume represents the fruits of a conference held at the U.S. Army War College in September 2005 on the theme of "Chinese Crisis Management." One of the major debates that emerged among participants was whether all the case studies under examination constituted crises in the eyes of China's leaders. The consensus was that not all of those incidents were perceived as crises. As a result the rubric of "decision making under stress" was adopted as presenters revised their papers for publication.
Chinese National Security: Decisionmaking Under Stress

Andrew Scobell Dr. and Larry M. Wortzel Dr.

This volume represents the fruits of a conference held at the U.S. Army War College in September 2005 on the theme of "Chinese Crisis Management." One of the major debates that emerged among participants was whether all the case studies under examination constituted crises in the eyes of China's leaders. The consensus was that not all of those incidents were perceived as crises. As a result the rubric of "decision making under stress" was adopted as presenters revised their papers for publication.
Natural Allies? Regional Security in Asia and Prospects for Indo-American Strategic Cooperation

Stephen J. Blank Dr.

One of the hallmarks of the two Bush administrations' foreign and defense policies has been a growing rapprochement with India. Indeed, in June 2005 the U.S. Government signed a defense agreement with that country. In part, this rapprochement is driven by and coincides with India's increasingly visible role as a major Asian power. This monograph seeks to illuminate India's rising power and capabilities with regard to the key regions on its periphery: the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. The author also considers the major issues pertaining to India's bilateral defense agenda with the United States. By revealing the dimensions of India's growing capabilities and interests, he also provides a strategic rationale for the development of the partnership to date and for its further evolution. Numerous analyses of current global trends point to the rise of India as a major transformation in world politics.
Precedents, Variables, and Options in Planning a U.S. Military Disengagement Strategy from Iraq

W. Andrew Terrill Dr. and Conrad C. Crane Dr.

The questions of how to empower the Iraqis most effectively and then progressively withdraw non-Iraqi forces from that country is one of the most important policy problems currently facing the United States. The authors seek to present the U.S. situation in Iraq in all of its complexity and ambiguity, with policy recommendations for how that withdrawal strategy might be most effectively implemented. They consider previous instances of U.S. military occupation of foreign countries and the difficulty of maintaining domestic support for such operations. The authors view the empowerment of a viable Iraqi central government and a security force to defend its authority as vital to the future of that country, but also suggest that there are severe constraints on the potential for the United States to sustain its military presence in that country at the current level. They conclude that the United States must be prepared to withdraw from Iraq under non-optimal conditions and that the chief U.S. goals should be to devise an exit strategy for Iraq that focuses on bolstering Iraqi government legitimacy even if this does not involve creating a Western style democracy. The authors strongly reject the idea withdrawing from Iraq by the use of a formal timetable, and call for the U.S. to continue its policy of renouncing permanent Iraqi bases.
Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare

Max G. Manwaring Dr.

¿Habla español?
Military Review translated this study to Spanish. View the translated study. The author answers questions regarding "Who is Hugo Chavez?" "How can the innumerable charges and countercharges between the Venezuelan and U.S. governments be interpreted?" "What are the implications for democracy and stability in Latin America?" In an attempt to answer these and related questions, the analysis centers on the contemporary geopolitical conflict context of current Venezuelan "Bolivarian" (bolivarianismo) policy. To accomplish this, a basic understanding of the political-historical context within which Venezuelan national security policy is generated is an essential first step toward understanding the situation as a whole. The second step requires an introductory understanding of Chavez's concept of 21st century socialism, and the political-psychological-military ways he envisions to achieve it. Then, a levels of analysis approach will provide a systematic understanding of the geopolitical conflict options that have a critical influence on the logic that determines how such a policy as bolivarianismo might continue to be implemented by Venezuela or any other country in the contemporary world security arena. At the same time, this analysis provides an understanding of how other countries in the Western Hemisphere and elsewhere might begin to respond to bolivarianismo's possible threats. Finally, this is the point from which one can generate strategic-level recommendations for maintaining and enhancing stability in Latin America.
Balik Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf

Zachary Abuza Dr.

The author warns that despite the regeneration of the ASG as a bonafide terrorist organization, the primary security threat confronting the GRP comes from the Communist Party of the Philippines and their armed wing, the New People's Army. To that end, the GRP will focus on the ASG and MILF in as much as they expect it to garner U.S. materiel support and assistance. He advises U.S. Defense department and policymakers regarding institutional frailties of the GRP and institutional corruption within the Philippine armed forces. While the author suggests that training continue, he cautions about being drawn into a quagmire. Despite the MILF's ties to the ASG and JIO, he also suggests that the U.S. should continue to support the peace process and to try to wean the MILF off their relationship with terrorist organizations.
Contractors on Deployed Military Operations: United Kingdom Policy and Doctrine

Matthew Uttley Professor

Department of Defense (DoD) initiatives to use contractors on deployed military operations remains a contentious issue in U.S. military transformation. Despite the intense debates surrounding the benefits and costs of DoD outsourcing, little attention has focused on similar Ministry of Defence (MoD) initiatives underway in the United Kingdom (UK). Since the UK and United States are likely to remain close allies in future expeditionary deployments, the MoD's approach to contractor support is a salient case study for the DoD and U.S. armed services. The author examines the controversies surrounding deployed contractor support, the ways that the MoD has harnessed private sector capacity, and the lessons this provides for U.S. policymakers and military planners. In doing so, he provides important insights into a significant theme in contemporary defense and security policy.
Appeasement Reconsidered: Investigating the Mythology of the 1930s

Jeffrey Record Dr.

U.S. use of force since 1945 has been significantly influenced by the perceived consequences of appeasing Hitler in the 1930s, and from the mid-1970s to 2001 by the chilling effect of the Vietnam War. As the United States approached its second war with Iraq, proponents cited the Munich analogy to justify the war, whereas opponents argued that the United States was risking another Vietnam. Though reasoning by historical analogies is inherently dangerous, an examination of the threat parallels between Hitler and Saddam Hussein, and between the Vietnam War and the situation the United States has confronted in post-Baathist Iraq, reveals that the Munich analogy was misused as an argument for war, whereas the American dilemma in Iraq bears some important analogies to the Vietnam conflict, especially with respect to the challenges state-building and sustaining domestic public support for an unpopular protracted war.
2005 Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL)

Antulio J. Echevarria Dr.

Half a decade into the new millennium, the strategic environment continues to change rapidly, and in important ways. Some of those changes, of course, challenge U.S. interests, while others advance them. And the challenges assume regular and, increasingly now, irregular forms. Yet, while the causes of change are many, the discernable patterns are few. It is all the more important, therefore, that the U.S. Army maintain a strategic perspective—that it take advantage of the collective insights of scholars and senior-level students both within the defense community and beyond. The Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL), developed at the U.S. Army War College by the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), helps the Army identify and bring together those insights. SSI develops the draft list, based on input from its expert researchers, and vets it with the rest of the Army War College, the Army Staff, Army Major Commands, Army Component Commands, the Combatant Commands, and the Joint Staff. The various topic recommendations and comments SSI receives are worked into the final document, either for inclusion in the general topic areas or as part of agency-specific concerns found in the Expanded KSIL. The Key Strategic Issues portion of the KSIL identifies research topics considered essential to the Armand to the role of landpower in general; many are broad enough to encompass different research approaches, and to allow researchers to modify or expand the issues as appropriate. Similarly, the Expanded KSIL enables researchers to focus on the concerns of, or to benefit from the perspectives of, individual KSIL sponsors. The KSIL is meant tube extensive, but not exhaustive. No list could capture every issue of potential concern, particularly given the identified dynamic nature of today's strategic environment. The SSI points of contact herein maintain general oversight of their topic areas, and thus can recommend individual sponsors or subject matter experts.
After Two Wars: Reflections on the American Strategic Revolution in Central Asia

Stephen J. Blank Dr.

The author explains how this newly won access to the Transcaspian has come about and describes why it will remain important to the United States. He then offers analysis and recommendations as to how we might retain access to deal with future contingencies and examines intersecting geopolitical and strategic trends.
Democratization Vs. Liberalization in the Arab World: Dilemmas and Challenges for U.S. Foreign Policy

Daniel Brumberg Dr.

The author looks at the political origins and dynamics of "liberalized autocracy" in the Arab world. Liberalized autocracy is a system of rule that allows for a measure of political openness and competition in the electoral, party, and press arenas, while ultimately ensuring that power rests in the hands of ruling regimes. This mix of control and openness has not only benefited ruling elites, but oppositions as well. It gives them room to "let off steam," to criticize regimes, and occasionally to affect public policy. Moreover, given the absence of consensus in many Arab states over national identity, liberalized autocracy has provided an umbrella by which competing groups--Islamists, secularists, Kurds, and Berbers--can achieve a measure of peaceful coexistence precisely because no group actually wields power. The United States largely has supported such hybrid systems, a fact of political life that has not changed dramatically under the Bush administration despite its rhetorical commitment to democracy. Whether the gap between words and deeds should or can be closed or narrowed is a complex question, since a sudden move from state-managed liberalization to democracy could open the door to Islamist power.
Law vs. War: Competing Approaches to Fighting Terrorism

Shawn Boyne Ms., Michael German Mr., Paul R. Pillar Dr., and Dallas D. Owens Dr.

The authors address one of the fundamental assumptions underlying the conduct of the War on Terrorism - the nature of our enemy, whether perpetrators of terrorist activities are criminals or soldiers (combatants). Although the United States recognizes that terrorist acts are certainly illegal, it has chosen to treat perpetrators as combatants; but much of the world, including many of our traditional allies, have opted for a purely legalistic approach. Disagreement about assumptions is not the only basis for divergent policies for confronting terrorism, but certainly explains much of our inability to agree on strategies to overcome what we recognize as a serious common and persistent international problem. Their insights into how our respective cultures and histories influence our definitions, assumptions, and subsequent policy decisions can assist us to respect and learn from competing strategies. They correctly surmise that our current international struggle is too important for us to ignore assumptions underlying our own and competing ideas.
North Korea's Strategic Intentions

Andrew Scobell Dr.

Dr. Andrew Scobell examines the topic of Pyongyang's strategic intentions. He first identifies a broad spectrum of expert views and distills this wisdom into three "packages" of possible strategic intentions. He then sets out to test which package appears to reflect actual North Korean policy. While he opines that one is more likely than the others, he concludes that it is impossible to say with certainty which package most closely resembles reality. As a result, he suggests that further probing of Pyongyang's intentions is advisable.
Sustainability of Colombian Military/Strategic Support for "Democratic Security"

Thomas A. Marks Dr.

For the first time in 40 years, cautious optimism pervades discussions of Bogota's seemingly intractable situation. Drugs, terrorism, and insurgency continue in their explosive mix, but the current government of President Alvaro Uribe has fashioned a counterinsurgency approach that holds the strategic initiative and has a chance of negating a long-standing security threat to the state. Colombia has become synonymous in the popular mind with an intractable war waged against narco-terrorists. Not as understood is the strategic setting, wherein the illegal drug trade is not just linked to terrorism but rather is an integral part of a left-wing insurgency that continues to talk the language of the Cold War. This insurgency is the greatest threat to Bogota and to Washington's interests in the region. Thus it is of particular moment to see an indigenously generated response succeed in turning the tide. What has been particularly remarkable has been a military reform movement engineered by Colombian officers committed to strengthening military professionalism and accountability to civilian authority.
U.S. Defense Strategy After Saddam

Michael E. O'Hanlon Dr.

In this defense strategy and budget book, Michael O'Hanlon argues that America's large defense budget cannot be pared realistically in the years ahead. But given the extreme demands of the Iraq mission, particularly on the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, he suggests how reductions in various weapons modernization programs and other economies might free up enough funds to add at least 40,000 more ground troops to today's military. He also reviews the military lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq, the Bush administration's new overseas basing plan, and the arguments for and against a draft. O'Hanlon also addresses the important question of how the United States might encourage and help other countries to share more of the global military burden in areas such as Africa. Finally, he sketches several possible new conflict scenarios that could occupy the American military--or at least its force planners--in the years and decades ahead.
Who Stays and Who Goes: Army Enlisted Reserve and National Guard Retention

Clayton K. S. Chun Dr.

The U.S. Army faces global challenges that have required it to use its reserve components in a manner unseen since World War II and the Korean War. Today, there are many questions and concerns about the future of the Army Reserve and National Guard due to the unprecedented, continued mobilization of these reserve components and problems involving retention. Without adequate retention of personnel, valuable experience and unit readiness is at risk. The Army would have to spend its limited resources to replace many seasoned Soldiers with junior personnel or use more contractors that may not be as effective or efficient.
Budget Policy, Deficits, and Defense: A Fiscal Framework for Defense Planning

Dennis S. Ippolito Dr.

The author focuses on the spending policy, deficit and debt, and retirement and healthcare entitlement dynamics that will make it difficult, if not impossible, to fund current defense plans. Transformational strategies, he concludes, must be adjusted to lower and more volatile future spending levels. The most important adjustment is to shift spending priorities to readiness and traditional modernization needs that are more urgent in terms of capabilities than transformational technologies, as well as more predictable and controllable in terms of costs.
Pseudo Operations and Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Other Countries

Lawrence E. Cline Dr.

The author examines the role of pseudo operations in several foreign counterinsurgency campaigns. Pseudo operations are those in which government forces disguised as guerrillas, normally along with guerrilla defectors, operate as teams to infiltrate insurgent areas. This technique has been used by the security forces of several other countries in their operations, and typically it has been very successful. A number of factors must be taken into account before attempting pseudo operations, especially their role in the intelligence and operational systems. Although it is likely that most insurgent movements have become more sophisticated, many of the lessons learned from previous pseudo operations suggest their continued usefulness in counterinsurgency campaigns.
The Strategic Implications of the Rise of Populism in Europe and South America

Steve C. Ropp Dr.

This monograph takes a fresh look at the contemporary populist phenomenon in Europe and the Americas. It describes populism, discusses the global context in which it is emerging, and then paints a picture of its general characteristics in four sub-regions in Europe and South America. It concludes with four recommendations for strategic planners as to how best to deal with it and with its potential consequences.
U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America

R. Evan Ellis Dr.

Ultimately, this monograph argues that increasing Chinese engagement with Latin America will make the nation both a powerful competitor and a potential partner for the United States in the Western Hemisphere. On one hand, China with major investments in Latin America and dependence on its material flows is likely to be a nation interested in reducing political instability, armed groups, and criminal activity in the region—rather than fueling radical populism and insurgency. On the other hand, the United States needs to consider to what degree it is willing to accept a China that has increasing leverage in its strategic neighborhood and its major trading area. Investment and trade presence leads to growing interest in the political course of the region, and now is the time for the United States to begin to consider how to constructively engage the Chinese in the Western Hemisphere.