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The Lessons of History: The Chinese people's Liberation Army at 75
Laurie Burkitt Ms., Larry M. Wortzel Dr., and Andrew Scobell Dr.
With the armed forces of the People's Republic of China (PLA) celebrating its 75th anniversary on August 1, 2002, it only seemed appropriate and timely to take stock of the world's largest military. The PLA has officially been in existence for three-quarters of a century, and its history is one filled with turmoil and warfare. One weekend in the September 2002, a group of PLA specialists gathered at Carlisle Barracks, the home of the U.S. Army War College, to assess what lessons China's soldiers had drawn from the history of their own armed forces. This volume constitutes the final product of months of extensive research by the individual authors and hours of intense discussion at the 3-day conference by approximately 50 participants. The conference was sponsored jointly by the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and the U.S. Army War College.
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The Lessons of History: The Chinese people's Liberation Army at 75
Laurie Burkitt Ms., Larry M. Wortzel Dr., and Andrew Scobell Dr.
With the armed forces of the People's Republic of China (PLA) celebrating its 75th anniversary on August 1, 2002, it only seemed appropriate and timely to take stock of the world's largest military. The PLA has officially been in existence for three-quarters of a century, and its history is one filled with turmoil and warfare. One weekend in the September 2002, a group of PLA specialists gathered at Carlisle Barracks, the home of the U.S. Army War College, to assess what lessons China's soldiers had drawn from the history of their own armed forces. This volume constitutes the final product of months of extensive research by the individual authors and hours of intense discussion at the 3-day conference by approximately 50 participants. The conference was sponsored jointly by the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and the U.S. Army War College.
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Why They Fight: Combat Motivation in the Iraq War
Thomas A. Kolditz COL, Leonard Wong Dr., Raymond A. Millen LTC, and Terrence M. Potter COL
With the recent lightning swift combat successes of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, there may be a tendency to view with awe the lethality of U.S. technology and training. The researchers, however, argue that the true strength of America's military might lies not in its hardware or high-tech equipment, but in its soldiers. Dr. Leonard Wong and his colleagues traveled to Iraq to see what motivated soldiers to continue in battle, to face extreme danger, and to risk their lives in accomplishing the mission. As a means of comparison, they began by interviewing Iraqi Regular Army prisoners of war to examine their combat motivation and unit dynamics. The researchers then interviewed U.S. combat troops fresh from the fields of battle to examine their views. What they found was that today's U.S. soldiers, much like soldiers of the past, fight for each other. Unit cohesion is alive and well in today's Army. Yet, Dr. Wong and his fellow researchers also found that soldiers cited ideological reasons such as liberation, freedom, and democracy as important factors in combat motivation. Today's soldiers trust each other, they trust their leaders, they trust the Army, and they also understand the moral dimensions of war. This year marks the 30th anniversary of the all-volunteer Army. This monograph is a celebration of the success of that radical idea and the transformation of the U.S. Army from a demoralized draft army, to a struggling all-volunteer force, to a truly professional Army.
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Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff's Leadership Using the Joint Strategic Planning System in the 1990s: Recommendations for Strategic Leaders
Richard M. Meinhart Dr.
The Joint Strategic Planning System has been considered the primary formal means by which the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff executed his statutory responsibilities specified by Congress in Title 10 of the U.S. Code. Yet little has been written about this strategic planning system itself, although some of its products such as the varied National Military Strategies and Joint Visions have been thoroughly reviewed. One can gain great insight into the Chairman's formal leadership since the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act by understanding how this system evolved, reviewing its processes, and examining all of its products. The author examines how three Chairmen--Generals Powell, Shalikashvili, and Shelton--adapted and used strategic planning to provide direction and shape the military in the rapidly changing strategic environment of the 1990s. He identifies five broad recommendations relevant to future leaders on how to use a strategic planning system to transform their organizations. These historic-based recommendations evolve around enduring strategic leadership competencies such as revolutionary versus evolutionary change, vision, flexibility versus bureaucracy, interpersonal relationships, and moral courage.
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Recalibrating the U.S.-Republic of Korea Alliance
Andrew Scobell Dr., Donald W. Boose COL, Balbina Y. Hwang Ms., and Patrick Morgan Dr.
On October 18-20, 2001, the 16th Annual Conference of the Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies was held in Washington, DC. Created in 1985 by retired generals Richard Stilwell of the United States and Sun Yup Paik of the Republic of Korea, the Council's aim was to initiate a conference that would bring together top scholars and practitioners on the most important issues facing the two countries and their important bilateral alliance. Since then, the Council has successfully hosted an annual conference, alternating every other year between meetings in Seoul and Washington. Because of the unexpected attacks on the World Trade Center in New York just 1 month prior to the conference, the papers did not capture adequately an assessment of the actual and potential impact of the terrorist attack on U.S. foreign policy, its implications for the two Koreas, and its probable effects on China and Russia. There were suggestions that the attack would have major effects, but few details about what those would be, which was understandable with so little time having elapsed since the attack. On the other hand, several authors stressed that in important ways much had not changed: U.S. commitments had not been shifted or weakened; the U.S. ability to militarily uphold its commitments had not been affected; and the solidarity of the ROK-U.S. alliance again had been demonstrated through South Korea's strong support for the war on terrorism.
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Recalibrating the U.S.-Republic of Korea Alliance
Andrew Scobell Dr., Donald W. Boose COL, Balbina Y. Hwang Ms., and Patrick Morgan Dr.
On October 18-20, 2001, the 16th Annual Conference of the Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies was held in Washington, DC. Created in 1985 by retired generals Richard Stilwell of the United States and Sun Yup Paik of the Republic of Korea, the Council's aim was to initiate a conference that would bring together top scholars and practitioners on the most important issues facing the two countries and their important bilateral alliance. Since then, the Council has successfully hosted an annual conference, alternating every other year between meetings in Seoul and Washington. Because of the unexpected attacks on the World Trade Center in New York just 1 month prior to the conference, the papers did not capture adequately an assessment of the actual and potential impact of the terrorist attack on U.S. foreign policy, its implications for the two Koreas, and its probable effects on China and Russia. There were suggestions that the attack would have major effects, but few details about what those would be, which was understandable with so little time having elapsed since the attack. On the other hand, several authors stressed that in important ways much had not changed: U.S. commitments had not been shifted or weakened; the U.S. ability to militarily uphold its commitments had not been affected; and the solidarity of the ROK-U.S. alliance again had been demonstrated through South Korea's strong support for the war on terrorism.
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The United States and Colombia: The Journey from Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity
Gabriel Marcella Dr.
American strategy towards Colombia has shifted from a counternarcotics focus to more comprehensive support for that nation's security. This shift recognizes that Colombia's problems are deeply rooted and go beyond illegal narcotics. In the last year the Bush administration committed the United States to help Colombia defend democracy and to defeat the illegal armed groups of the left and right, doing so by promising to help that nation extend effective sovereignty over national territory and provide basic security to the people. The author identifies the strategic challenge of Colombia within the framework of the weak state and ungoverned space, made more complicated by the violence and corruption generated by the international organized criminals sustained by illegal drugs. He argues that the lessons learned in dealing with the security challenges that Colombia faces will have powerful consequences for the adaptation of American strategy to the conflict paradigm of the 21st century.
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Future War/Future Battlespace: The Strategic Role of American Landpower
Steven Metz Dr. and Raymond A. Millen LTC
The authors examine the trends in the strategic environment in their development of the Future War/Future Battlespace. One fact is clear. Traditional warfighting has changed in the post 9-11 era. The U.S. military must adapt or fail. There is no other recourse. The authors have superbly framed the strategic environment into four strategic battlespaces and have examined the ways future adversaries will operate within them to thwart U.S. strategic initiatives. In this context, these variables influence the path that Transformation must take.
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Globalization and the Nature of War
Antulio J. Echevarria II
The author explores the nature of war, and how it has changed as a result of globalization. He uses the Clausewitzian model of war's trinity (political guidance, chance, and enmity) as a framework for understanding the nature of war, a concept that has been only vaguely represented in defense literature. He then analyses the global war on terrorism via that framework. He concludes that the Clausewitzian trinity is alive and well. Globalization is strengthening the role that political guidance is playing in war, it may well increase the elements of chance and uncertainty, and it is clearly exacerbating basic feelings of enmity among different cultures. It is this last area that the author sees as the most critical in the war on terrorism. If there is a center of gravity in this conflict, it is in the ideas that have fueled radical Islam.
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Mapping Colombia: The Correlation between Land Data and Strategy
Geoffrey Demarest Dr.
The mapping of Colombian national territory, however, is fundamental to the problem of control of national territory. As a threshold matter, policy, strategy, and military asset management in contemporary conflict in virtually any unstable part of the world must deal with the problem of governance in "lawless areas." Unless a central government such as that in Colombia can exert legitimate control and governance in the 60+ percent of the municipalities not under its control, there can be no effective judicial system and rule of law; no effective legal crop substitution programs; no effective democratic processes; and, only very little military or police action to bring law and order into unknown and difficult terrain. Indeed, control of the national territory is a strategic paradigm for 21st century conflict. The state is under assault by a powerful combination of state weaknesses, "lawless areas," and insurgent and criminal terrorism. All these contributors to instability and violence have a powerful effect on local, regional, national, and international security. Colombia and other states experiencing conflicts that range from criminal anarchy to virtual civil war must understand that putting treasure and blood into a conflict situation without first establishing the strategic foundations of success only result in ad hoc, piece-meal, disjointed, and ineffective reactions to truly inconsequential problems.
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Strategic Effects of Conflict with Iraq: Australia and New Zealand
Andrew Scobell Dr.
The author has been asked to analyze four issues: the position that key states in their region are taking on U.S. military action against Iraq; the role of America in the region after the war with Iraq; the nature of security partnerships in the region after the war with Iraq; and the effect that war with Iraq will have on the war on terrorism in the region. Conclusions reached are: Australia is one of the staunchest supporters of U.S.-led military action against Iraq. Canberra has been very willing to provide combat troops to fight alongside U.S. forces. Australia supports the U.S. action with or without U.N. approval, although significant unease and dissent are also evident in the country. Australia is confident about the strength of its security relationship with the United States. New Zealand is one of the most circumspect countries in the world regarding the merits of a war with Iraq. New Zealand is willing to contribute noncombat military and humanitarian support in the closing stages of a conflict or after a conflict only if the U.N. sanctions the war. New Zealand remains ambivalent about its security ties with the United States.
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Strategic Effects of Conflict with Iraq: Europe
Raymond A. Millen LTC
War with Iraq signals the beginning of a new era in American national security policy and alters strategic balances and relationships around the world. The specific effects of the war, though, will vary from region to region. The author has been asked to analyze four issues: the position that key states in their region are taking on U.S. military action against Iraq; the role of America in the region after the war with Iraq; the nature of security partnerships in the region after the war with Iraq; and the effect that war with Iraq will have on the war on terrorism in the region. The vast majority of European states will contribute to the peacekeeping mission in Iraq if asked bilaterally. Four conclusions have been reached. 1. Given its proximity, the European Union can provide substantial economic and diplomatic resources for stabilizing the region. 2. The European Union will seize upon the opportunities of greater regional democratization to practice diplomacy and crisis resolution. 3. The post-Iraqi war era provides an opportunity for NATO to reorient towards the Middle East. 4. European active participation on the global war on terrorism is predicated on clear success in the Middle East. Failure will result in a period of European isolationism.
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Strategic Effects of Conflict with Iraq: Latin America
Max G. Manwaring Dr.
The author has been asked to analyze four issues: the position that key states in their region are taking on U.S. military action against Iraq; the role of America in the region after the war with Iraq; the nature of security partnerships in the region after the war with Iraq; and the effect that war with Iraq will have on the war on terrorism in the region.
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Strategic Effects of Conflict with Iraq: Post-Soviet States
Stephen J. Blank Dr.
The author has been asked to analyze four issues: the position that key states in their region are taking on U.S. military action against Iraq; the role of America in the region after the war with Iraq; the nature of security partnerships in the region after the war with Iraq; and the effect that war with Iraq will have on the war on terrorism in the region. Conclusions reached are: Ashort war with rapid decisive victory minimizes future risks connected with Iraq to our force stationed in the former Soviet Union. However, it does not eliminate existing threats or allow for reduction in force unless we prosecute the war in Afghanistan much more intensively and accelerate the rebuilding of that state. No feasible scenario allows for immediate reduction of troops in the Transcaucasus or Central Asia, but many conceivable scenarios of a war gone wrong in Iraq could lead to the need to send more forces into these theaters.
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Strategic Effects of Conflict with Iraq: South Asia
Amit Gupta Dr.
The author has been asked to analyze four issues: the position that key states in their region are taking on U.S. military action against Iraq; the role of America in the region after the war with Iraq; the nature of security partnerships in the region after the war with Iraq; and the effect that war with Iraq will have on the war on terrorism in the region.
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Strategic Effects of Conflict with Iraq: Southeast Asia
Anthony L. Smith Dr.
The author has been asked to analyze four issues: the position that key states in their region are taking on U.S. military action against Iraq; the role of America in the region after the war with Iraq; the nature of security partnerships in the region after the war with Iraq; and the effect that war with Iraq will have on the war on terrorism in the region.
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Strategic Effects of Conflict with Iraq: The Middle East, North Africa, and Turkey
W. Andrew Terrill Dr.
War with Iraq signals the beginning of a new era in American national security policy and alters strategic balances and relationships around the world. The specific effects of the war, though, will vary from region to region. The author offers the following conclusions regarding this region of the world. A U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq will place popular pressure on a number of moderate Arab states to reduce high profile military cooperation with the United States. Following a war, Saudi Arabia will probably seek to reduce substantially or eliminate the U.S. military presence in the kingdom due to a more limited regional threat and the domestic difficulties with a U.S. presence. Other Arab nations may continue to cooperate with the U.S. militarily but seek to do so with reduced visibility following an Iraq war. Radical Middle Eastern states are deeply concerned about a U.S. presence in Iraq but will probably be constrained from opposing it through subversion due to fear they may become a future target in the war on terrorism. The politically powerful Turkish military will seek to ensure that U.S.-Turkish ties will remain intact despite disagreements over Iraq. Israel will consider using an invasion of Iraq to expel Palestinian Authority (PA) officials, increasing Arab speculation about U.S.-Israeli coordination against the Arab world. The likelihood of Israel expelling PA leaders will depend upon how the Israelis perceive Washington will respond to such an act.
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Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario
W. Andrew Terrill Dr. and Conrad C. Crane Dr.
In October 2002, the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, in coordination with the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff/G-3, initiated a study to analyze how American and coalition forces can best address the requirements that will necessarily follow operational victory in a war with Iraq. The objectives of the project were to determine and analyze probable missions for military forces in a post-Saddam Iraq; examine associated challenges; and formulate strategic recommendations for transferring responsibilities to coalition partners or civilian organizations, mitigating local animosity, and facilitating overall mission accomplishment in the war against terrorism. The study has much to offer planners and executors of operations to occupy and reconstruct Iraq, but also has many insights that will apply to achieving strategic objectives in any conflict after hostilities are concluded. The current war against terrorism has highlighted the danger posed by failed and struggling states. If this nation and its coalition partners decide to undertake the mission to remove Saddam Hussein, they will also have to be prepared to dedicate considerable time, manpower, and money to the effort to reconstruct Iraq after the fighting is over. Otherwise, the success of military operations will be ephemeral, and the problems they were designed to eliminate could return or be replaced by new and more virulent difficulties. -
Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya: Military Strategic Culture and the Paradoxes of Asymmetric Conflict
Robert M. Cassidy Major
The author uses a detailed assessment of the Russian experience in Afghanistan and Chechnya to draw important conclusions about asymmetric warfare. He then uses this to provide recommendations for the U.S. military, particularly the Army. Major Cassidy points out that small wars are difficult for every great power, yet are the most common kind. Even in this era of asymmetry, the U.S. Army exhibits a cultural preference for the "big war" paradigm. He suggests that the U.S. military in general, including the Army, needs a cultural transformation to master the challenge of asymmetry fully. From this will grow doctrine and organizational change.
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Waging Ancient War: Limits on Preemptive Force
D. Robert Worley Dr.
The author addresses the ways that the age of terrorism is affecting American grand strategy. He contends that terrorism has made many of the basic concepts of international relations and national security obsolete. Declaring war on a tactic—terrorism—erodes the clarity necessary for coherent strategy. Dr. Worley then develops what he calls a "guerra strategy" more appropriate for dealing with terrorism and other nonstate threats.
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Plan Colombia: Reality of the Colombian Crisis and Implications for Hemispheric Security
Luz E. Nagle Dr.
The author analyzes Colombia's problems and makes recommendations regarding what it will take to achieve stated U.S. and Colombian objectives in that crisis situation. She also examines the concomitant issue of "spillover" from the Colombian crisis into the rest of the Latin American region. The results and recommendations of this analysis go well beyond prescribing a simple military solution to the complex political-economic-social-moral-security issues of this 50-year-old war. In these terms, it becomes clear that the military in general and the U.S. Army in particular must change in order to operate more effectively in the full spectrum of current and future conflict.
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Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy
Stephen D. Biddle Dr.
America's novel use of special forces, precision weapons, and indigenous allies has attracted widespread attention since its debut in Northern Afghanistan last fall. It has proven both influential and controversial. Many think it caused the Taliban's sudden collapse. For them, this "Afghan Model" represents warfare's future, and should become the new template for US defense planning. Critics, however, see Afghanistan as an anomaly - a non-repeatable product of local conditions. This briefing examines the Afghan Model's actual role in the fall of the Taliban using evidence collected from a combination of 45 participant interviews, terrain inspection in Afghanistan, and written documentation from both official and unofficial sources. The results suggest that neither of the main current interpretations is sound: Afghanistan offers important clues to warfare's future, but not the ones most people think. The campaign of 2001-2 was a surprisingly orthodox air-ground theater campaign in which heavy fire support decided a contest between two significant land armies. Of course, some elements were quite new. Precision firepower was available in unprecedented quantity and proved crucial for success; special operations forces served as the main effort in a theater of war. In an important sense, though, the differences were less salient than the continuities: the key to success in both Afghanistan and traditional joint warfare was the close interaction of fire and maneuver, neither of which was sufficient alone and neither of which could succeed without sizeable ground forces trained and equipped at least as well as their opponents. In Afghanistan, our allies provided these ground forces for us; where others can do so, the Afghan Model can be expected to prevail. Hence Afghanistan is not unique. But not all future allies have armies trained and equipped to their enemies' standards. Without this, neither the bravery of our special forces nor the sophistication of our PGMs can ensure an Afghan-like collapse in a resolute opponent—and this implies a very different set of policies for the armed forces and the Nation than many of those now prominent in the public debate on the war.
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European Adaptation to Expeditionary Warfare: Implications for the U.S. Army
Andrew M. Dorman Dr.
The author briefly examines the European response to the changing security environment and the opportunities presented by the European Security and Defense Policy Expeditionary Force. As he correctly observes, the establishment of a European expeditionary force will be no easy matter, will require substantial investment, and will take years to complete. However, it is the right course for Europe to take. The European Union (EU) cannot manage emerging security issues using Cold War legacy forces because they are too ponderous to deploy. A lighter, more nimble expeditionary force is critical to EU policy. The author also points out that the United States must remain involved in the EU initiatives. Europe cannot go it alone and will need advice and perhaps even material support if it is to realize its ambitious agenda.
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South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances
Michael R. Chambers Dr.
This volume consists of revised versions of papers presented at conference sponsored by the Asia/Pacific Research Center and the Center for International Security and Cooperation of Stanford University, and the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute on January 4-5, 2002. While there are numerous ways to approach the question of "whither South Asia?" the conference organizers decided to focus on the future of strategic balances and alliances in the region, with 2020 as the target date. This choice of topic allowed the conference participants to talk not only about the patterns of amity and enmity within the region, but also about the role of extraregional powers and issues such as social and economic trends, domestic political conditions, strategic culture, and the role of nuclear weapons. These factors can affect the relative power of countries as well as their relations of friendship and hostility.
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South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances
Michael R. Chambers Dr.
This volume consists of revised versions of papers presented at conference sponsored by the Asia/Pacific Research Center and the Center for International Security and Cooperation of Stanford University, and the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute on January 4-5, 2002. While there are numerous ways to approach the question of "whither South Asia?" the conference organizers decided to focus on the future of strategic balances and alliances in the region, with 2020 as the target date. This choice of topic allowed the conference participants to talk not only about the patterns of amity and enmity within the region, but also about the role of extraregional powers and issues such as social and economic trends, domestic political conditions, strategic culture, and the role of nuclear weapons. These factors can affect the relative power of countries as well as their relations of friendship and hostility.
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