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  Recalibrating the U.S.-Republic of Korea Alliance

  Andrew Scobell Dr., Donald W. Boose COL, Balbina Y. Hwang Ms., and Patrick Morgan Dr.

  On October 18-20, 2001, the 16th Annual Conference of the Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies was held in Washington, DC. Created in 1985 by retired generals Richard Stilwell of the United States and Sun Yup Paik of the Republic of Korea, the Council's aim was to initiate a conference that would bring together top scholars and practitioners on the most important issues facing the two countries and their important bilateral alliance. Since then, the Council has successfully hosted an annual conference, alternating every other year between meetings in Seoul and Washington. Because of the unexpected attacks on the World Trade Center in New York just 1 month prior to the conference, the papers did not capture adequately an assessment of the actual and potential impact of the terrorist attack on U.S. foreign policy, its implications for the two Koreas, and its probable effects on China and Russia. There were suggestions that the attack would have major effects, but few details about what those would be, which was understandable with so little time having elapsed since the attack. On the other hand, several authors stressed that in important ways much had not changed: U.S. commitments had not been shifted or weakened; the U.S. ability to militarily uphold its commitments had not been affected; and the solidarity of the ROK-U.S. alliance again had been demonstrated through South Korea's strong support for the war on terrorism.

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  Recalibrating the U.S.-Republic of Korea Alliance

  Andrew Scobell Dr., Donald W. Boose COL, Balbina Y. Hwang Ms., and Patrick Morgan Dr.

  On October 18-20, 2001, the 16th Annual Conference of the Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies was held in Washington, DC. Created in 1985 by retired generals Richard Stilwell of the United States and Sun Yup Paik of the Republic of Korea, the Council's aim was to initiate a conference that would bring together top scholars and practitioners on the most important issues facing the two countries and their important bilateral alliance. Since then, the Council has successfully hosted an annual conference, alternating every other year between meetings in Seoul and Washington. Because of the unexpected attacks on the World Trade Center in New York just 1 month prior to the conference, the papers did not capture adequately an assessment of the actual and potential impact of the terrorist attack on U.S. foreign policy, its implications for the two Koreas, and its probable effects on China and Russia. There were suggestions that the attack would have major effects, but few details about what those would be, which was understandable with so little time having elapsed since the attack. On the other hand, several authors stressed that in important ways much had not changed: U.S. commitments had not been shifted or weakened; the U.S. ability to militarily uphold its commitments had not been affected; and the solidarity of the ROK-U.S. alliance again had been demonstrated through South Korea's strong support for the war on terrorism.

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  The United States and Colombia: The Journey from Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity

  Gabriel Marcella Dr.

  American strategy towards Colombia has shifted from a counternarcotics focus to more comprehensive support for that nation's security. This shift recognizes that Colombia's problems are deeply rooted and go beyond illegal narcotics. In the last year the Bush administration committed the United States to help Colombia defend democracy and to defeat the illegal armed groups of the left and right, doing so by promising to help that nation extend effective sovereignty over national territory and provide basic security to the people. The author identifies the strategic challenge of Colombia within the framework of the weak state and ungoverned space, made more complicated by the violence and corruption generated by the international organized criminals sustained by illegal drugs. He argues that the lessons learned in dealing with the security challenges that Colombia faces will have powerful consequences for the adaptation of American strategy to the conflict paradigm of the 21st century.

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  Future War/Future Battlespace: The Strategic Role of American Landpower

  Steven Metz Dr. and Raymond A. Millen LTC

  The authors examine the trends in the strategic environment in their development of the Future War/Future Battlespace. One fact is clear. Traditional warfighting has changed in the post 9-11 era. The U.S. military must adapt or fail. There is no other recourse. The authors have superbly framed the strategic environment into four strategic battlespaces and have examined the ways future adversaries will operate within them to thwart U.S. strategic initiatives. In this context, these variables influence the path that Transformation must take.

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  Globalization and the Nature of War

  Antulio J. Echevarria II

  The author explores the nature of war, and how it has changed as a result of globalization. He uses the Clausewitzian model of war's trinity (political guidance, chance, and enmity) as a framework for understanding the nature of war, a concept that has been only vaguely represented in defense literature. He then analyses the global war on terrorism via that framework. He concludes that the Clausewitzian trinity is alive and well. Globalization is strengthening the role that political guidance is playing in war, it may well increase the elements of chance and uncertainty, and it is clearly exacerbating basic feelings of enmity among different cultures. It is this last area that the author sees as the most critical in the war on terrorism. If there is a center of gravity in this conflict, it is in the ideas that have fueled radical Islam.

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  Mapping Colombia: The Correlation between Land Data and Strategy

  Geoffrey Demarest Dr.

  The mapping of Colombian national territory, however, is fundamental to the problem of control of national territory. As a threshold matter, policy, strategy, and military asset management in contemporary conflict in virtually any unstable part of the world must deal with the problem of governance in "lawless areas." Unless a central government such as that in Colombia can exert legitimate control and governance in the 60+ percent of the municipalities not under its control, there can be no effective judicial system and rule of law; no effective legal crop substitution programs; no effective democratic processes; and, only very little military or police action to bring law and order into unknown and difficult terrain. Indeed, control of the national territory is a strategic paradigm for 21st century conflict. The state is under assault by a powerful combination of state weaknesses, "lawless areas," and insurgent and criminal terrorism. All these contributors to instability and violence have a powerful effect on local, regional, national, and international security. Colombia and other states experiencing conflicts that range from criminal anarchy to virtual civil war must understand that putting treasure and blood into a conflict situation without first establishing the strategic foundations of success only result in ad hoc, piece-meal, disjointed, and ineffective reactions to truly inconsequential problems.

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  Strategic Effects of Conflict with Iraq: Australia and New Zealand

  Andrew Scobell Dr.

  The author has been asked to analyze four issues: the position that key states in their region are taking on U.S. military action against Iraq; the role of America in the region after the war with Iraq; the nature of security partnerships in the region after the war with Iraq; and the effect that war with Iraq will have on the war on terrorism in the region. Conclusions reached are: Australia is one of the staunchest supporters of U.S.-led military action against Iraq. Canberra has been very willing to provide combat troops to fight alongside U.S. forces. Australia supports the U.S. action with or without U.N. approval, although significant unease and dissent are also evident in the country. Australia is confident about the strength of its security relationship with the United States. New Zealand is one of the most circumspect countries in the world regarding the merits of a war with Iraq. New Zealand is willing to contribute noncombat military and humanitarian support in the closing stages of a conflict or after a conflict only if the U.N. sanctions the war. New Zealand remains ambivalent about its security ties with the United States.

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  Strategic Effects of Conflict with Iraq: Europe

  Raymond A. Millen LTC

  War with Iraq signals the beginning of a new era in American national security policy and alters strategic balances and relationships around the world. The specific effects of the war, though, will vary from region to region. The author has been asked to analyze four issues: the position that key states in their region are taking on U.S. military action against Iraq; the role of America in the region after the war with Iraq; the nature of security partnerships in the region after the war with Iraq; and the effect that war with Iraq will have on the war on terrorism in the region. The vast majority of European states will contribute to the peacekeeping mission in Iraq if asked bilaterally. Four conclusions have been reached. 1. Given its proximity, the European Union can provide substantial economic and diplomatic resources for stabilizing the region. 2. The European Union will seize upon the opportunities of greater regional democratization to practice diplomacy and crisis resolution. 3. The post-Iraqi war era provides an opportunity for NATO to reorient towards the Middle East. 4. European active participation on the global war on terrorism is predicated on clear success in the Middle East. Failure will result in a period of European isolationism.

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  Strategic Effects of Conflict with Iraq: Latin America

  Max G. Manwaring Dr.

  The author has been asked to analyze four issues: the position that key states in their region are taking on U.S. military action against Iraq; the role of America in the region after the war with Iraq; the nature of security partnerships in the region after the war with Iraq; and the effect that war with Iraq will have on the war on terrorism in the region.

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  Strategic Effects of Conflict with Iraq: Post-Soviet States

  Stephen J. Blank Dr.

  The author has been asked to analyze four issues: the position that key states in their region are taking on U.S. military action against Iraq; the role of America in the region after the war with Iraq; the nature of security partnerships in the region after the war with Iraq; and the effect that war with Iraq will have on the war on terrorism in the region. Conclusions reached are: Ashort war with rapid decisive victory minimizes future risks connected with Iraq to our force stationed in the former Soviet Union. However, it does not eliminate existing threats or allow for reduction in force unless we prosecute the war in Afghanistan much more intensively and accelerate the rebuilding of that state. No feasible scenario allows for immediate reduction of troops in the Transcaucasus or Central Asia, but many conceivable scenarios of a war gone wrong in Iraq could lead to the need to send more forces into these theaters.

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  Strategic Effects of Conflict with Iraq: South Asia

  Amit Gupta Dr.

  The author has been asked to analyze four issues: the position that key states in their region are taking on U.S. military action against Iraq; the role of America in the region after the war with Iraq; the nature of security partnerships in the region after the war with Iraq; and the effect that war with Iraq will have on the war on terrorism in the region.

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  Strategic Effects of Conflict with Iraq: Southeast Asia

  Anthony L. Smith Dr.

  The author has been asked to analyze four issues: the position that key states in their region are taking on U.S. military action against Iraq; the role of America in the region after the war with Iraq; the nature of security partnerships in the region after the war with Iraq; and the effect that war with Iraq will have on the war on terrorism in the region.

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  Strategic Effects of Conflict with Iraq: The Middle East, North Africa, and Turkey

  W. Andrew Terrill Dr.

  War with Iraq signals the beginning of a new era in American national security policy and alters strategic balances and relationships around the world. The specific effects of the war, though, will vary from region to region. The author offers the following conclusions regarding this region of the world. A U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq will place popular pressure on a number of moderate Arab states to reduce high profile military cooperation with the United States. Following a war, Saudi Arabia will probably seek to reduce substantially or eliminate the U.S. military presence in the kingdom due to a more limited regional threat and the domestic difficulties with a U.S. presence. Other Arab nations may continue to cooperate with the U.S. militarily but seek to do so with reduced visibility following an Iraq war. Radical Middle Eastern states are deeply concerned about a U.S. presence in Iraq but will probably be constrained from opposing it through subversion due to fear they may become a future target in the war on terrorism. The politically powerful Turkish military will seek to ensure that U.S.-Turkish ties will remain intact despite disagreements over Iraq. Israel will consider using an invasion of Iraq to expel Palestinian Authority (PA) officials, increasing Arab speculation about U.S.-Israeli coordination against the Arab world. The likelihood of Israel expelling PA leaders will depend upon how the Israelis perceive Washington will respond to such an act.

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  Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario

  W. Andrew Terrill Dr. and Conrad C. Crane Dr.

  
  In October 2002, the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, in coordination with the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff/G-3, initiated a study to analyze how American and coalition forces can best address the requirements that will necessarily follow operational victory in a war with Iraq. The objectives of the project were to determine and analyze probable missions for military forces in a post-Saddam Iraq; examine associated challenges; and formulate strategic recommendations for transferring responsibilities to coalition partners or civilian organizations, mitigating local animosity, and facilitating overall mission accomplishment in the war against terrorism. The study has much to offer planners and executors of operations to occupy and reconstruct Iraq, but also has many insights that will apply to achieving strategic objectives in any conflict after hostilities are concluded. The current war against terrorism has highlighted the danger posed by failed and struggling states. If this nation and its coalition partners decide to undertake the mission to remove Saddam Hussein, they will also have to be prepared to dedicate considerable time, manpower, and money to the effort to reconstruct Iraq after the fighting is over. Otherwise, the success of military operations will be ephemeral, and the problems they were designed to eliminate could return or be replaced by new and more virulent difficulties.

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  Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya: Military Strategic Culture and the Paradoxes of Asymmetric Conflict

  Robert M. Cassidy Major

  The author uses a detailed assessment of the Russian experience in Afghanistan and Chechnya to draw important conclusions about asymmetric warfare. He then uses this to provide recommendations for the U.S. military, particularly the Army. Major Cassidy points out that small wars are difficult for every great power, yet are the most common kind. Even in this era of asymmetry, the U.S. Army exhibits a cultural preference for the "big war" paradigm. He suggests that the U.S. military in general, including the Army, needs a cultural transformation to master the challenge of asymmetry fully. From this will grow doctrine and organizational change.

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  Waging Ancient War: Limits on Preemptive Force

  D. Robert Worley Dr.

  The author addresses the ways that the age of terrorism is affecting American grand strategy. He contends that terrorism has made many of the basic concepts of international relations and national security obsolete. Declaring war on a tactic—terrorism—erodes the clarity necessary for coherent strategy. Dr. Worley then develops what he calls a "guerra strategy" more appropriate for dealing with terrorism and other nonstate threats.

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  Plan Colombia: Reality of the Colombian Crisis and Implications for Hemispheric Security

  Luz E. Nagle Dr.

  The author analyzes Colombia's problems and makes recommendations regarding what it will take to achieve stated U.S. and Colombian objectives in that crisis situation. She also examines the concomitant issue of "spillover" from the Colombian crisis into the rest of the Latin American region. The results and recommendations of this analysis go well beyond prescribing a simple military solution to the complex political-economic-social-moral-security issues of this 50-year-old war. In these terms, it becomes clear that the military in general and the U.S. Army in particular must change in order to operate more effectively in the full spectrum of current and future conflict.

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  Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy

  Stephen D. Biddle Dr.

  America's novel use of special forces, precision weapons, and indigenous allies has attracted widespread attention since its debut in Northern Afghanistan last fall. It has proven both influential and controversial. Many think it caused the Taliban's sudden collapse. For them, this "Afghan Model" represents warfare's future, and should become the new template for US defense planning. Critics, however, see Afghanistan as an anomaly - a non-repeatable product of local conditions. This briefing examines the Afghan Model's actual role in the fall of the Taliban using evidence collected from a combination of 45 participant interviews, terrain inspection in Afghanistan, and written documentation from both official and unofficial sources. The results suggest that neither of the main current interpretations is sound: Afghanistan offers important clues to warfare's future, but not the ones most people think. The campaign of 2001-2 was a surprisingly orthodox air-ground theater campaign in which heavy fire support decided a contest between two significant land armies. Of course, some elements were quite new. Precision firepower was available in unprecedented quantity and proved crucial for success; special operations forces served as the main effort in a theater of war. In an important sense, though, the differences were less salient than the continuities: the key to success in both Afghanistan and traditional joint warfare was the close interaction of fire and maneuver, neither of which was sufficient alone and neither of which could succeed without sizeable ground forces trained and equipped at least as well as their opponents. In Afghanistan, our allies provided these ground forces for us; where others can do so, the Afghan Model can be expected to prevail. Hence Afghanistan is not unique. But not all future allies have armies trained and equipped to their enemies' standards. Without this, neither the bravery of our special forces nor the sophistication of our PGMs can ensure an Afghan-like collapse in a resolute opponent—and this implies a very different set of policies for the armed forces and the Nation than many of those now prominent in the public debate on the war.

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  European Adaptation to Expeditionary Warfare: Implications for the U.S. Army

  Andrew M. Dorman Dr.

  The author briefly examines the European response to the changing security environment and the opportunities presented by the European Security and Defense Policy Expeditionary Force. As he correctly observes, the establishment of a European expeditionary force will be no easy matter, will require substantial investment, and will take years to complete. However, it is the right course for Europe to take. The European Union (EU) cannot manage emerging security issues using Cold War legacy forces because they are too ponderous to deploy. A lighter, more nimble expeditionary force is critical to EU policy. The author also points out that the United States must remain involved in the EU initiatives. Europe cannot go it alone and will need advice and perhaps even material support if it is to realize its ambitious agenda.

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  South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances

  Michael R. Chambers Dr.

  This volume consists of revised versions of papers presented at conference sponsored by the Asia/Pacific Research Center and the Center for International Security and Cooperation of Stanford University, and the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute on January 4-5, 2002. While there are numerous ways to approach the question of "whither South Asia?" the conference organizers decided to focus on the future of strategic balances and alliances in the region, with 2020 as the target date. This choice of topic allowed the conference participants to talk not only about the patterns of amity and enmity within the region, but also about the role of extraregional powers and issues such as social and economic trends, domestic political conditions, strategic culture, and the role of nuclear weapons. These factors can affect the relative power of countries as well as their relations of friendship and hostility.

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  South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances

  Michael R. Chambers Dr.

  This volume consists of revised versions of papers presented at conference sponsored by the Asia/Pacific Research Center and the Center for International Security and Cooperation of Stanford University, and the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute on January 4-5, 2002. While there are numerous ways to approach the question of "whither South Asia?" the conference organizers decided to focus on the future of strategic balances and alliances in the region, with 2020 as the target date. This choice of topic allowed the conference participants to talk not only about the patterns of amity and enmity within the region, but also about the role of extraregional powers and issues such as social and economic trends, domestic political conditions, strategic culture, and the role of nuclear weapons. These factors can affect the relative power of countries as well as their relations of friendship and hostility.

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  Colombia's Conflicts: The Spillover Effects of a Wider War

  Richard Millett Mr.

  This monograph is the first in a new Special Series of monographs that stems from the February 2001 and the March 2002 conferences--co-sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center of the University of Miami--that dealt with the "Implementation of Plan Colombia." It provides a careful examination of the so-called "spillover" problems generated by Colombia's three simultaneous wars against illegal drug traffickers, insurgents, and self-appointed paramilitary groups. All seek, in one way or another, violently to change or depose the state. All use the uncontrolled "gray areas" in Colombia and its neighboring states to sustain, conduct, and replenish their nefarious operations without risk of significant interference. And, all these violent illegal entities constitute threats to stability and security that extend beyond Colombia and Latin America to Europe and the United States. Colombia is therefore a paradigm of the failing state that has enormous implications for U.S. foreign policy and military asset management for now and into the future.

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  Dragon on Terrorism: Assessing China's Tactical Gains and Strategic Losses Post-September 11

  Mohan Malik Dr.

  The U.S. relationship with China and the global war on terrorism are the two most significant strategic challenges faced by the Bush administration. Both are vital and complex; the way the administration manages them will shape American security for many years. While there is a growing literature on both key strategic issues, little analysis has been done on the intersection of the two. This monograph fills the gap as the author assesses how the war on terrorism has affected China. He concludes that the war on terrorism radically altered the Asian strategic environment in ways that negated China's foreign policy gains of the last decade and undermined its image as Asia's only great power. He then offers a range of recommendations for a more stable relationship with China.

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  Growing U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia

  Elizabeth Wishnick Dr.

  The author assesses U.S. security interests and military activities in Central Asia. She notes that strengthening the Central Asian states against terrorism and assisting their transition to stable and prosperous nations are difficult and fraught with danger. In particular, there is the risk that the U.S. military presence in the region and security assistance to repressive regimes might taint America. If not astutely managed, this strategy could have the opposite of the intended results and generate increased instability, spark anti-Americanism, and antagonize Russia and China. To avoid this, Dr. Wishnick advocates a multilateral strategy that integrates the military, political, and economic elements of national power and prods the Central Asian regimes toward reform.

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  Avoiding Vietnam: The U.S. Army's Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia

  Conrad C. Crane Dr.

  As American operations against terrorism spread around the globe to places like Afghanistan and the Philippines, an increasing tendency has been for commentators to draw parallels with past experience in Vietnam. Even soldiers on the ground have begun to speak in such terms. The author analyzes the Army's response to that defeat in Southeast Asia and its long-term impact. Contrary to the accepted wisdom that nations which lose wars tend to learn best how to correct their mistakes, he argues that Americans tried to forget the unhappy experience with counterinsurgency by refocusing on conventional wars. While that process eventually produced the powerful force that won the Persian Gulf War, it left an Army with force structure, doctrine, and attitudes that are much less applicable to the peace operations and counterterrorism campaign it now faces. The author asserts that the Army must change in order to operate effectively in the full spectrum of future requirements, and it is time to reexamine the war in Vietnam. He also draws attention to the service's "Lessons Learned" process, and provides insights as to how the experience gained in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM should be analyzed and applied.