Books, Monographs & Collaborative Studies

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International Politics in Northeast Asia: The China-Japan-United States Strategic Triangle

Thomas L. Wilborn Dr.

The United States has vital security and economic interests in Northeast Asia, one of the most dynamic regions of the world. This monograph focuses on the three bilateral relationships, those connecting China, Japan, and the United States to each other, which will dominate the future of the region. Dr. Thomas Wilborn analyzes these relations, taking into account key issues involving Taiwan and North Korea, and offers insights regarding their future course. He also reviews U.S. engagement policy and assesses the value of U.S. military presence for regional stability. Dr. Wilborn suggests that in the short range, Washington should avoid significant changes of policy. However, in the long range, the United States will have to establish machinery which provides ways for the major states, especially China and Japan, to assert greater initiative commensurate with their economic power, yet within a stable political context. Multilateral operational structures to supplement existing bilateral relations in Northeast Asia may provide a means for the United States to influence long-range trends and protect U.S. interests.
The Future of American Landpower: Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century Army

William T. Johnsen Dr., Douglas V. Johnson Dr., Douglas C. Lovelace Professor, and Steven Metz Dr.

Armies historically have been criticized for preparing for the last war. Since the early 1980s, however, the U.S. Army has broken this pattern and created a force capable of winning the next war. But, in an era characterized by a volatile international security environment, accelerating technological advances (particularly in acquiring, processing, and disseminating information), the emergence of what some are calling a "revolution in military affairs," and forecasts of increasingly constrained fiscal resources, it seems ill-advised to plan only for the "next Army." The purpose of this monograph, therefore, is to begin the debate on the "Army After Next." Initiating such a discussion requires positing the outlines of future security conditions and the Army's role in that environment. This also means challenging convictions that provide much of the basis for the "current Army," as well as some of the assumptions that undergird planning for the "next Army." The authors recognize that not all will agree with their assumptions, analysis, or conclusions. Their efforts, however, are not intended to antagonize. Rather, they seek to explore the premises which will shape thinking about the "Army After Next." The ensuing exchange of ideas, they hope, will help create a force that can continue to be called upon to serve the interests of the Nation in an as yet uncertain future.
Federal Budget Policy and Defense Strategy

Dennis S. Ippolito Dr.

Defense economist Dennis S. Ippolito dissects Federal budget practices over the past several decades, with a particular focus on sources and trends in our national deficit spending syndrome. Underlying his message is an unsettling truth, that no matter how the current debate over balancing the budget turns out, future cases for the Army Budget are going to have to be made in an even more challenging spending environment as discretionary spending margins shrink. Army professionals, now more than ever, need to be articulate advocates of landpower for the 21st century. But before articulate and reasoned arguments can be made for the kind of force that will ensure that the nation does, indeed, build and maintain the world's best Army (or Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps), one must take into account the realities of the Federal budget.
The Strategist and the Web: Guide to Internet Resources

James Kievit LTC and Steven Metz Dr.

Lieutenant Colonel James Kievit and Dr. Steven Metz begin the effort to construct guideposts for strategists to follow. They provide basic information explaining the most important features of the Internet, and a critical review of more than a hundred of the electronic sites most likely to be of interest to research analysts or military planners. While the authors conclude that the Internet today "is not a solution to the analyst's need for relevant, timely information," they argue that individuals and organizations must prepare themselves now for the day in the not-so-distant future when "an analyst's collection of Internet 'bookmarks' will be nearly as valuable as a rolodex of personal contacts is now."
World View: The 1996 Strategic Assessment from the Strategic Studies Institute

Earl H. Tilford Dr.

The analysts at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) annually assess the strategic equation for their particular area of interest. This year they were asked to consider not only the next 12-18 months, but also to look 10 years ahead and to think about the future as it might affect both the nation and the Army. From the strategic context that they envision, SSI is producing its 1996 Study Program. This process provides the transition from the general strategic context to individual studies. These 1996 strategic assessments are crucial for two reasons. First, the post-Cold War world remains complex. These complexities present the nation and the Army with diverse and potentially perilous challenges. To remain the world's best Army in the 21st century, we must define clearly today the strategic challenges we may face tomorrow. Second, the Army is addressing this strategic context at a crucial juncture when it has nearly completed its planned downsizing and has begun to transform its vision of the future into modernization requirements through the Force XXI process. That transformation is threatened by continued pressures to reduce Army spending.
Armies and Democracy in the New Africa: Lessons from Nigeria and South Africa

Steven Metz Dr. and Kent Hughes Butts Dr.

In October 1994, the Strategic Studies Institute sponsored a roundtable on democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa. Particular attention was paid to the role the U.S. military and Department of Defense played in democracy support. This study developed from a paper presented at the roundtable. Dr. Butts and Dr. Metz reject the notion that the political culture of African states allows or even encourages military intervention in politics. Drawing on case studies from Nigeria and South Africa, they contend that if the fragile democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa are to be sustained, African militaries must be extricated from politics and take decisive steps toward the type of military professionalism seen in stable democracies around the world. U.S. national interests in Sub-Saharan Africa are so limited that the region will receive only a very small proportion of the human, political, military, and economic resources devoted to American national security strategy. This makes efficiency imperative. Dr. Butts and Dr. Metz argue that if U.S. strategic resources are used wisely in Africa, they can have the desired effect. In particular, the U.S. military can play an important part in helping African militaries professionalize. They close with concrete proposals through which the U.S. Department of Defense and the Army could more effectively support African democratization.
Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy

William T. Johnsen Dr.

After having been fueled by the events of the distant and recent past, the current wars in the former Yugoslavia finally may be grinding to a halt. An understanding of that past, and of how history and myth combine to influence the present and help to define the future in the Balkans, is no less relevant today than it was two years ago when the original version of this monograph was published. Events of the intervening years have largely validated the insights and conclusions offered in the initial report. That said, strategic conditions have evolved, and two years of additional study and analysis provide a greater understanding of the long-term roots of conflict in the Balkans, as well as a firmer grasp of the proximate historical factors that contributed to the outbreak of violence.

In this revised monograph, the first four chapters that provide the historical examination of the Balkan enigma remain substantially unchanged. Details have been added, and interpretations modified attenuated or accentuated as the author's understanding of events has matured. The last chapter of the original version has been expanded into three chapters. Chapter 5 first offers insights that are drawn from the first portion of the report. Because the passage of time has foreclosed some alternatives, and the changed strategic conditions have created the possibility for new options to be examined, the policy assessments that are now Chapter 6 have been substantially rewritten. Similarly, a new Chapter 7, "Conclusions", contains revised reflections on the preceding analysis. Despite the revisions, the focus of the monograph remains on the tangled history of the region, and how policy options fit into the larger historical context that has influenced, and will continue to affect, the course of events in the Balkans.
Strategic Implications for the United states and Latin America of the 1995 Ecuador-Peru War

Gabriel Marcella Dr.

One of the more serious dangers to peace and security in Latin America is the territorial dispute between Ecuador and Peru, which broke out into warfare in February-March 1995. In this monograph, Dr. Gabriel Marcella explores the critical historical and strategic dimensions of the conflict. He argues that unless this age-old dispute is settled amicably and soon, it could very well generate a more disastrous war in the future. Dr. Marcella proposes a basis for settlement and provides specific policy recommendations for the United States and the inter-American community.
Strategic Art: The New Discipline for 21st Century Leaders

Richard A. Chilcoat Lieutenant General (USA, Ret)

This essay develops a simple, yet comprehensive definition of strategic art. Strategic art entails the orchestration of all the instruments of national power to yield specific, well-defined end states. Desired end states and strategic outcomes derive from the national interests and are variously defined in terms of physical security, economic well-being, and the promotion of values. Strategic art, broadly defined, is therefore: The skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends (objectives), ways (courses of action), and means (supporting resources) to promote and defend the national interests.
Strategic Plans, Joint Doctrine and Antipodean Insights

Douglas C. Lovelace Professor and Thomas-Durell Young Dr.

This is the second in an analytical series on joint issues. It follows the authors' U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus, in which they articulated the need for more formal joint strategic plans. This essay examines the effect such plans would have on joint doctrine development and illustrates the potential benefits evident in Australian defense planning. Doctrine and planning share an iterative development process. The common view is that doctrine persists over a broader time frame than planning and that the latter draws on the former for context, syntax, even format. In truth the very process of planning shapes new ways of military action. As the environment for that action changes, planners address new challenges, and create the demand for better methods of organizing, employing and supporting forces. Evolutionary, occasionally revolutionary, doctrinal changes result. The authors explore the relationship between strategic planning and doctrine at the joint level. They enter the current debate over the scope and authority of joint doctrine from a joint strategic planning perspective. In their view, joint doctrine must have roots, and those roots have to be planted firmly in the strategic concepts and plans developed to carry out the National Military Strategy. Without the fertile groundwork of strategic plans, the body of joint doctrine will struggle for viability.
Yugoslavia's Wars: The Problem from Hell

Stephen J. Blank Dr.

The continuing warfare in the former Yugoslavia looms as one of the most intractable problems in contemporary world politics. For four years the international community has struggled merely to contain this fire and prevent it from inflaming a general European crisis. Only now does there seem a real chance of extinguishing it. By late 1994, it was apparent that the danger of continued fighting could fracture the NATO Alliance and lead to the spread of the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Bearing this possibility in mind, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), U.S. Army War College, convened its second annual roundtable on the subject on January 30, 1995. SSI asked the specialists published in this volume to assess how we have gotten to the present situation, to define its parameters, and, finally, to suggest where we should and might be going in the future. Because of the continuing urgency and intensity of the crisis these wars have caused, SSI offers the analysis and information herein to specialists, policymakers, and laymen alike with a goal of helping to clarify the issues at stake in former Yugoslavia.
A Theory of Fundamentalism: An Inquiry into the Origin and Development of the Movement

Stephen C. Pelletiere Dr.

Islamic fundamentalism is growing at such a rapid rate that many believe it threatens to take over the Middle East. To prevent this, enormous resources have been summoned, not only from within the region, but in the West as well. Yet, for all the efforts to contain, if not turn back the fundamentalists, the movement appears likely to pose a security challenge well into the next century. Dr. Stephen Pelletiere points out that containment of fundamentalism depends first and foremost on accurate information about the nature of the movement. He examines the origins of the various fundamentalist groups that are challenging the area's governments, and explains why they were able to grow in the face of official repression by some of the most sophisticated and well-equipped security services in the world. The author concludes by building a theory about fundamentalism, which implies a need to redirect policy for coping with it. Dr. Pelletiere maintains that the solution is not to try to crush the movement—that has been attempted numerous times and consistently has failed. Rather, the way to proceed is to locate and act on the basic split within the movement between its socially constructive and other more violent elements.
Mexico and the Future

Donald E. Schulz Dr.

The recent traumatic developments in Mexico caught both the Mexican and U.S. governments, as well as most academic observers, by surprise. Until the Zapatista National Liberation Army burst onto the scene in January 1994, Mexico s future seemed assured. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) had just been ratified by the U.S. Congress, and there was a widespread expectation that Mexico would take off economically and would, within the reasonably near future, join the ranks of the developed countries. And while the outlook for democracy seemed more problematic, few questioned the essential stability of the political system. Since then, much has changed. What happened and why are explored by Donald Schulz in an earlier SSI study, Mexico in Crisis. Dr. Schulz goes beyond that preliminary assessment to look at the prospects for democratization, socioeconomic development, political stability, U.S.-Mexican relations, and the national security implications for both countries. His findings are unsettling, and so are some of his policy recommendations, for they cut at the heart of many of the assumptions U.S. and Mexican leaders have made about the effects of current policies and where Mexico and the U.S.-Mexican relationship are headed.
U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus

Douglas C. Lovelace Professor and Thomas-Durell Young Dr.

The authors define a formal strategic plan: one that contains specific strategic objectives, offers a clear and executable strategy for achieving objectives, illuminates force capability requirements, and is harmonized with the Future Years Defense Program. They discuss the reasons why a strategic plan is needed and the value it would have in coherently connecting the guidance provided by the National Command Authorities to the integrated activities of the unified commands, the Services, and other components of DoD. They conclude by examining three alternatives to improve the strategic planning processes and to facilitate efficient development of strategic plans. They settle on a set of recommendations that they believe would comprehensively link the major elements of current strategic planning, albeit modified in some cases, and establish a clearer military foundation for DoD resource decisions.
Russian Defense Legislation and Russian Democracy

Stephen J. Blank Dr.

As recent events demonstrate, Russia's political system has yet to stabilize. This is particularly the case with civil-military relations for, as the course of the Chechnya invasion reveals, control by the government over the military is erratic and the military is all too often politicized. In this vein, legislation on civilian control of the military and on peacemaking operations in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a particularly important barometer of the course of Russia's democratization and stabilization. Dr. Stephen Blank dissects that legislation and finds that it reflects and contributes to the drift away from democratic rule towards a form of presidential power that is unaccountable to either legal or parliamentary institutions. Furthermore, these laws will also politicize the military still further and promote the use of Russian armed forces in so-called peacemaking operations that actually contribute to Moscow's openly proclaimed program to reintegrate the CIS around it. Therefore, these draft laws should arouse considerable concern among those charged with, or interested in, monitoring Russia's troubled evolution to democracy.
The Principles of War in the 21st Century: Strategic Considerations

Steven Metz Dr., Douglas C. Lovelace Professor, Douglas V. Johnson Dr., and William T. Johnsen Dr.

For nearly two centuries, the principles of war have guided practitioners of the military art. During the last 55 years the principles of war have been a key element of U.S. Army doctrine, and recently they have been incorporated into other Service and Joint doctrines. The turn of the 21st century and the dawn of what some herald as the "Information Age," however, may call into question whether principles originally derived in the 19th century and based on the experience of "Industrial Age" armed forces still hold. Moreover, despite their long existence, the applicability of the principles of war at the strategic level of warfare has not been the subject of detailed analysis or assessment. The purpose of this study is to stimulate a debate on the importance of the principles of war at the strategic level of warfare and on their continued relevancy in the Information Age. To this end, the study proposes a revised set of the nine principles of war that may be applied at the strategic level of warfare and are believed to conform to the conditions and demands of the 21st century.
U.S. Policy in the Balkans: A Hobson's Choice

Stephen J. Blank Dr., William T. Johnsen Dr., and Earl H. Tilford Dr.

At this writing, the strategic balance may have shifted in the ongoing war in the former Yugoslavia, and the region could be on the verge of a settlement. But, the "window of opportunity" may be fleeting, and the failures and frustrations of the past four years temper any optimism that conflict in the former Yugoslavia will end quickly or completely. If this opening passes without an end to the fighting, the United States may have to reassess its fundamental policy objectives and the ways and means to achieve them if peace is to be effected in the Balkans. The intent of this report, therefore, is to analyze and assess existing policies, to identify any conflicts or contradictions that may stymie U.S. efforts to bring about a peaceful resolution of the crisis, and to offer potential solutions. The report does not offer an ambitious criticism of policy or an "expert's" solution to an intractable problem. Its more modest goal is to examine current policy within a context that fits Bosnia into the larger pattern of U.S. interests and policy. In this manner, the report offers a broader framework for the strategic decisions that may face the United States in the not so distant future.
Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs: From Theory to Policy

James Kievit LTC and Steven Metz Dr.

A small band of "RMA" analysts has emerged in the military and Department of Defense, in the academic strategic studies community, and in defense-related think-tanks and consulting firms. To these analysts, the Gulf War provided a vision of a potential revolution in military affairs (RMA) in which Information Age technology would be combined with appropriate doctrine and training to allow a small but very advanced U.S. military to protect national interests with unprecedented efficiency. The authors examine the open-source literature on the RMA that has resulted. They find that much of it has concentrated on defining and describing military revolutions and that, despite the efforts of some of the finest minds in the defense analytical community, it has not offered either comprehensive basic theories or broad policy choices and implications. The authors believe that in order to master a RMA rather than be dragged along by it, Americans must debate its theoretical underpinnings, strategic implications, core assumptions, and normative choices. As a step in that direction they provide a set of hypotheses regarding the configuration and process of revolutions in military affairs, and examine some of their potential policy implications.
The Fog of Peace: The Military Dimensions of the Concert of Europe

Daniel Moran Dr.

Last April the Army War College held its Sixth Annual Strategy Conference. The theme of this year's Conference, "Strategy During the Lean Years: Learning From the Past and the Present," brought together scholars, serving and retired officers, and civilian defense officials from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom to discuss strategy formulation in times of penury from Tacitus to Force XXI.

Professor Daniel Moran of the Naval Postgraduate School is well known for his scholarship on Carl von Clausewitz. In his discussion of the 19th century, Professor Moran made the point that while it was a time of small wars and big riots, Europeans enjoyed the benefits of economic growth, increasingly integrated markets, and cultural interaction due to higher literacy rates and more convenient and affordable means of travel. Additionally, a large and healthy bourgeoisie and working class gradually assumed power from aristocratic elites. The Concert of Europe, established in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, was the entity which fostered this century of relative peace and progress. Its goals were twofold: to suppress violent political revolution and to avoid general war. To a great extent, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 notwithstanding, it succeeded until 1914 when war burst forth to engulf Europe and bring down the very order the Concert was established to preserve. Professor Moran asserts that, in the final analysis, the dominant strategic challenge is not simply how much military strength a nation can muster from available resources, rather the more pressing challenge is to maintain military and political control over existing strength. Prior to 1914, conventional wisdom among military strategists was that the integration of technologically advanced weaponry into their armies and navies would make the next war bloody but short. They were tragically wrong.
The Revolution in Military Affairs: Prospects and Cautions

Earl H. Tilford Dr.

The current Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is taking place against the background of a larger historical watershed involving the end of the Cold War and the advent of what Alvin and Heidi Toffler have termed "the Information Age." In this essay, Dr. Earl Tilford argues that RMAs are driven by more than breakthrough technologies, and that while the technological component is important, a true revolution in the way military institutions organize, equip and train for war, and in the way war is itself conducted, depends on the confluence of political, social, and technological factors. After an overview of the dynamics of the RMA, Dr. Tilford makes the case that interservice rivalry and a reintroduction of the managerial ethos, this time under the guise of total quality management (TQM), may be the consequences of this revolution. In the final analysis, warfare is quintessentially a human endeavor. Technology and technologically sophisticated weapons are only means to an end. The U.S. Army, along with the other services, is embracing the RMA as it downsizes and restructures itself into Force XXI. Warfare, even on the digitized battlefield, is likely to remain unpredictable, bloody, and horrific. Military professionals cannot afford to be anything other than well-prepared for whatever challenges lie ahead, be it war with an Information Age peer competitor, a force of guerrillas out of the Agrarian Age, or a band of terrorists using the latest in high-tech weaponry. While Dr. Tilford is optimistic about the prospects for Force XXI, what follows is not an unqualified endorsement of the RMA or of the Army's transition to an Information Age force. By examining issues and problems that were attendant to previous RMAs, Dr. Tilford raises questions that ought to be asked by the Army as it moves toward Force XXI.
The Technological Fix: Weapons and the Cost of War

Alex Roland Dr.

In April 1995, the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute held its annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme was 'Strategy During the Lean Years: Learning From the Past and the Present.' Professor Alex Roland, Professor of History at Duke University and a Visiting Professor at the Dibner Institute for the History of Science and Technology, presented this paper as a part of a panel examining Technology and Fiscal Constraints. He makes the point that historically, technology and war have operated together. Indirectly, any military institute operates within its technology context. The Army of today is, for instance, in a period of technological transition from an Industrial Age army to an Information Age army. Directly, armies either use technology to their advantage or seek ways of lessening the impact of the other side's technology.

A tremendous faith in technology is an abiding American characteristic. The idea that technology can be leveraged to make up for shortfalls in numbers be those numbers of troops, weapons, or dollars is as appealing as it is traditional. Dr. Roland examines three instances in which states turned to technology to drive military strategy: chariot warfare in the second millennium B.C., Greek fire in the first millennium A.D., and submarine warfare in the early 19th century. These cases, distinct in time, provide a fresh perspective on issues facing the Army as it molds itself into Force XXI.
Time's Cycle and National Military Strategy: The Case for Continuity in a Time of Change

David Jablonsky Dr.

Every April the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute hosts its Annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme, "Strategy During the Lean Years: Learning from the Past and the Present," brought together scholars, serving and retired officers, and civilian defense officials from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom to discuss strategy formulation during times of penury from Tacitus to Force XXI.

Dr. David Jablonsky, Professor of National Security Affairs at the Army War College, posits that the current challenge is to understand the role of both change and continuity in the dual aftermath of the end of the Cold War and a great military victory in the Persian Gulf War. The seeming end to the threat posed by the East-West confrontation of the past fifty years notwithstanding, the international community still looks to the United States, the world s only superpower, for leadership. But, argues Dr. Jablonsky, the U.S. military is caught between having to trim its size and force structure on the one hand, while preparing for a plethora of nontraditional missions on the other. Dr. Jablonsky makes the case that despite the vastly changed world order, basic principles of international relations still apply, and the United States would be ill-served by abandoning those principles. The current U.S. national security strategy and its derivative national military strategy are, indeed, products of change and continuity resulting from the dynamics established in inter-state relations over the past fifty years as well as by the end of the Cold War. For whatever else may have changed, national security remains the primary duty of the nation-state and the responsibility for achieving that mission still belongs to the military.
Canada, Getting It Right This Time the 1994 Defence White Paper

Joel J. Sokolsky Dr.

In April the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute hosted its Annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme, "Strategy During the Lean Years: Learning From the Past and the Present," brought together scholars, serving and retired military officers, and civilian defense officials from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom to discuss strategy formulation during times of penury from Tactitus to Force XXI.

Dr. Joel J. Sokolsky of the Royal Military College of Canada made the point that for Canada defense policy and strategy traditionally have been made in times of penury. During the Cold War, Canadian policy was one of a strategy of commitment. Since the end of the Cold War, Ottawa has adopted a strategy of choice derived from Canadian national interests. The document upon which Canada bases its defense policy is the 1994 Canadian White Paper. Dr. Sokolsky argues that the current defense policy acknowledges the problems endemic to peacekeeping, but that the rising tide of peacekeeping operations may have passed. Fortunately, Dr. Sokolsky maintains, the current White Paper also allows for a general commitment to multilateral approaches to security. Canada and the United States have stood together for more than half a century; allies and partners in war and peace. As the Canadian Defence Forces and the U.S. Army seek to shape change rather than to be shaped by it, they cannot help but profit from an open debate of the difficult issues that confront them.
Making Do with Less, or Coping with Upton's Ghost

Eliot A. Cohen Dr.

Each April the Strategic Studies Institute hosts a conference that addresses key strategic issues facing the Armed Forces and the Nation. This year's theme, "Strategy During the Lean Years: Learning from the Past and the Present," brought together scholars, serving and retired military officers, and civilian defense officials from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom to discuss strategy formulation in times of penury from Tacitus to Force XXI.

Professor Eliot A. Cohen of Johns Hopkins University urges the Army to draw on lessons from its own history. More than one generation of American military professionals have inherited and perpetuated Civil War Major General Emory Upton s distrust of and disdain for civilians in general and politically elected or appointed civilian leaders in particular. As Professor Cohen indicates, the uncertainties of downsizing and reorganization coincide with the need to accommodate new technologies that could help the Army cope with the diverse threats that are part of what is still a very dangerous world. He cautions that in coping with this enormous challenge, the Army must be careful not to engage in the kind of introspection that may foster an institutionalized isolation from the nation it is sworn to defend. Professor Cohen suggests there are ways to keep America s Army truly the Army of the nation and its people. The way soldiers and leaders are recruited, trained, educated, and promoted must, he asserts, change to bring more and not less civilian influence into the Army. Professor Cohen urges the Army to go forward into Force XXI and to do so with both enhanced technologies and with an enhanced understanding of who and what it serves: the American people and the defense of their Constitution.
Mexico in Crisis

Donald E. Schulz Dr.

This is the first of a two-part report on the causes and nature of the crisis in Mexico, the prospects for the future, and the implications for the United States. In this initial study, the author analyzes the crisis as it has developed over the past decade-and-a-half, with the primary focus being on the 6-year term of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and the first few months of his successor, President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon. Contrasting the euphoric hopes generated by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the explosive events of 1994 and early 1995, he explains how a country with such seemingly bright prospects went so wrong. He argues that the United States has few foreign policy concerns more profoundly consequential for its national interests including its security interests than the political stability and general welfare of Mexico. For that reason, it is especially important that we understand what has happened and why.

Dr. Schulz s preliminary findings are sobering. Despite some promising moves by the new administration with regard to judicial and police reform and a more cooperative approach to the political opposition, he questions President Zedillo's willingness to challenge the Partido Revolucionario Institutional (PRI) elite and the narcotraffickers. The fundamental problem, he suggests, is that Mexico s political economy is dominated by an oligarchy that has grown accustomed to borrowing from foreigners to enrich itself. If he is correct, then there is likely to be trouble ahead, for the current bailout will only perpetuate the system, virtually assuring that there will be another crisis down the road.