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  The Technological Fix: Weapons and the Cost of War

  Alex Roland Dr.

  In April 1995, the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute held its annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme was 'Strategy During the Lean Years: Learning From the Past and the Present.' Professor Alex Roland, Professor of History at Duke University and a Visiting Professor at the Dibner Institute for the History of Science and Technology, presented this paper as a part of a panel examining Technology and Fiscal Constraints. He makes the point that historically, technology and war have operated together. Indirectly, any military institute operates within its technology context. The Army of today is, for instance, in a period of technological transition from an Industrial Age army to an Information Age army. Directly, armies either use technology to their advantage or seek ways of lessening the impact of the other side's technology.
  
  A tremendous faith in technology is an abiding American characteristic. The idea that technology can be leveraged to make up for shortfalls in numbers be those numbers of troops, weapons, or dollars is as appealing as it is traditional. Dr. Roland examines three instances in which states turned to technology to drive military strategy: chariot warfare in the second millennium B.C., Greek fire in the first millennium A.D., and submarine warfare in the early 19th century. These cases, distinct in time, provide a fresh perspective on issues facing the Army as it molds itself into Force XXI.

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  Time's Cycle and National Military Strategy: The Case for Continuity in a Time of Change

  David Jablonsky Dr.

  Every April the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute hosts its Annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme, "Strategy During the Lean Years: Learning from the Past and the Present," brought together scholars, serving and retired officers, and civilian defense officials from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom to discuss strategy formulation during times of penury from Tacitus to Force XXI.
  
  Dr. David Jablonsky, Professor of National Security Affairs at the Army War College, posits that the current challenge is to understand the role of both change and continuity in the dual aftermath of the end of the Cold War and a great military victory in the Persian Gulf War. The seeming end to the threat posed by the East-West confrontation of the past fifty years notwithstanding, the international community still looks to the United States, the world s only superpower, for leadership. But, argues Dr. Jablonsky, the U.S. military is caught between having to trim its size and force structure on the one hand, while preparing for a plethora of nontraditional missions on the other. Dr. Jablonsky makes the case that despite the vastly changed world order, basic principles of international relations still apply, and the United States would be ill-served by abandoning those principles. The current U.S. national security strategy and its derivative national military strategy are, indeed, products of change and continuity resulting from the dynamics established in inter-state relations over the past fifty years as well as by the end of the Cold War. For whatever else may have changed, national security remains the primary duty of the nation-state and the responsibility for achieving that mission still belongs to the military.

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  Canada, Getting It Right This Time the 1994 Defence White Paper

  Joel J. Sokolsky Dr.

  In April the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute hosted its Annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme, "Strategy During the Lean Years: Learning From the Past and the Present," brought together scholars, serving and retired military officers, and civilian defense officials from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom to discuss strategy formulation during times of penury from Tactitus to Force XXI.
  
  Dr. Joel J. Sokolsky of the Royal Military College of Canada made the point that for Canada defense policy and strategy traditionally have been made in times of penury. During the Cold War, Canadian policy was one of a strategy of commitment. Since the end of the Cold War, Ottawa has adopted a strategy of choice derived from Canadian national interests. The document upon which Canada bases its defense policy is the 1994 Canadian White Paper. Dr. Sokolsky argues that the current defense policy acknowledges the problems endemic to peacekeeping, but that the rising tide of peacekeeping operations may have passed. Fortunately, Dr. Sokolsky maintains, the current White Paper also allows for a general commitment to multilateral approaches to security. Canada and the United States have stood together for more than half a century; allies and partners in war and peace. As the Canadian Defence Forces and the U.S. Army seek to shape change rather than to be shaped by it, they cannot help but profit from an open debate of the difficult issues that confront them.

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  Making Do with Less, or Coping with Upton's Ghost

  Eliot A. Cohen Dr.

  Each April the Strategic Studies Institute hosts a conference that addresses key strategic issues facing the Armed Forces and the Nation. This year's theme, "Strategy During the Lean Years: Learning from the Past and the Present," brought together scholars, serving and retired military officers, and civilian defense officials from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom to discuss strategy formulation in times of penury from Tacitus to Force XXI.
  
  Professor Eliot A. Cohen of Johns Hopkins University urges the Army to draw on lessons from its own history. More than one generation of American military professionals have inherited and perpetuated Civil War Major General Emory Upton s distrust of and disdain for civilians in general and politically elected or appointed civilian leaders in particular. As Professor Cohen indicates, the uncertainties of downsizing and reorganization coincide with the need to accommodate new technologies that could help the Army cope with the diverse threats that are part of what is still a very dangerous world. He cautions that in coping with this enormous challenge, the Army must be careful not to engage in the kind of introspection that may foster an institutionalized isolation from the nation it is sworn to defend. Professor Cohen suggests there are ways to keep America s Army truly the Army of the nation and its people. The way soldiers and leaders are recruited, trained, educated, and promoted must, he asserts, change to bring more and not less civilian influence into the Army. Professor Cohen urges the Army to go forward into Force XXI and to do so with both enhanced technologies and with an enhanced understanding of who and what it serves: the American people and the defense of their Constitution.

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  Mexico in Crisis

  Donald E. Schulz Dr.

  This is the first of a two-part report on the causes and nature of the crisis in Mexico, the prospects for the future, and the implications for the United States. In this initial study, the author analyzes the crisis as it has developed over the past decade-and-a-half, with the primary focus being on the 6-year term of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and the first few months of his successor, President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon. Contrasting the euphoric hopes generated by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the explosive events of 1994 and early 1995, he explains how a country with such seemingly bright prospects went so wrong. He argues that the United States has few foreign policy concerns more profoundly consequential for its national interests including its security interests than the political stability and general welfare of Mexico. For that reason, it is especially important that we understand what has happened and why.
  
  Dr. Schulz s preliminary findings are sobering. Despite some promising moves by the new administration with regard to judicial and police reform and a more cooperative approach to the political opposition, he questions President Zedillo's willingness to challenge the Partido Revolucionario Institutional (PRI) elite and the narcotraffickers. The fundamental problem, he suggests, is that Mexico s political economy is dominated by an oligarchy that has grown accustomed to borrowing from foreigners to enrich itself. If he is correct, then there is likely to be trouble ahead, for the current bailout will only perpetuate the system, virtually assuring that there will be another crisis down the road.

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  NATO Strategy in the 1990s: Reaping the Peace Dividend or the Whirlwind?

  William T. Johnsen Dr.

  Each April the Strategic Studies Institute hosts a conference that addresses key strategic issues facing the Armed Forces and the Nation. This year's theme, "Strategy During the Lean Years: Learning from the Past and the Present," brought together scholars, serving and retired military officers, and civilian defense officials from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom to discuss strategy formulation in times of penury from Tacitus to Force XXI.
  
  Dr. William T. Johnsen, Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies at the U.S. Army War College and a former NATO staff officer, examines The Alliance's New Strategic Concept. Released in November 1991, the Strategic Concept represents NATO's response to the dramatically changed security environment in Europe, and the intense desire to reap the resultant "peace dividend." Dr. Johnsen argues that a close reading of the strategy and subsequent implementing initiatives refutes critics who claim that NATO has failed to respond adequately to Europe's new security conditions. The Strategic Concept dramatically expands the scope of the Alliance's security objectives and functions, takes NATO "out of area," and lays the foundation for massive forces cuts, as well as for a fundamental restructuring of Alliance military forces and command structures. In Dr. Johnsen's opinion, however, the Alliance has been less than successful in the practical implementation of its Strategic Concept. These difficulties stem predominately from confusion within the Alliance over NATO's ultimate function: Should it remain a collective defense organization or should it evolve into a collective security body? Dr. Johnsen argues that for the foreseeable future NATO must remain focused on collective defense. This recommendation has a number of consequences for the Alliance, most notably for the pace of expanding its membership, NATO's future role in crisis management and conflict resolution.

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  Terrorism: National Security Policy and the Home Front

  Stephen C. Pelletiere Dr.

  The recent bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma has highlighted the complexity of the phenomenon of political extremism. Until this occurred, inside the United States foreign terrorists were the focus of attention, particularly the so-called Islamic fundamentalists. Undue emphasis on the "foreign connection" can make it appear that only Middle Eastern terror is of consequence. The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) has long resisted this approach. We view terrorism as a universal phenomenon, one that can erupt anywhere. As part of our continuing investigation of this problem, SSI held a conference last November at Georgia Tech, at which a number of terrorist-related issues were considered. The emphasis was on international terror, but the threat of domestic extremism also was examined. Included in this volume are three papers presented at the conference two are related to international terror, while one is concerned with the domestic variety and a concluding chapter.
  
  In the first chapter, Dr. Kenneth Katzman, an analyst with the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, uncovers important facts about Hizbollah, considered by many the most lethal of the Islamic fundamentalist groups. Based on his findings, Dr. Katzman ventures to predict what the group's likely future course of action will be. Dr. Lew Ware's contribution in the second chapter is equally important. A professor of Mid-East studies at the Air Command and Staff College, he has painstakingly, and with impressive scholarship, detailed the differences between Sunni and Shia ideas of jihad, a concept crucial to understanding a range of Middle Eastern fundamentalist organizations. Analysts who are less serious than Dr. Ware profess to see no difference between the Shias and Sunnis on this point. However, as Dr. Ware shows, a world of difference exists on this and other matters relating to the fundamentalists' modus operandi.

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  The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy: Central issues . . . Key Players

  Fraser Cameron Dr., Roy Ginsberg Prof., and Josef Janning Mr.

  The role of the European Union (EU) as a key international economic player is both highly developed and widely recognized. The Union's profile as an international political actor is much more limited, even though its activities are considerable. One of the principal objectives of the workshop on "The Common Foreign and Security Policy [CFSP] of the European Union: Germany's Dual Role as Architect and Constrictor" was to familiarize American policy and research communities with the realities of the structure, practice and limits of this policy initiative. The workshop, held on May 10, 1995, and sponsored by the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, the U.S. Army War College, and the Delegation of the European Commission to the United States, also highlighted the special role Germany has played in the development of the CFSP, while considering, as well, the contributions of France and the United Kingdom. The future course of the CFSP matters to the United States as it raises questions about the nature of sovereign decision making on the part of principal American allies. Will these allies increasingly come to the table with singular collective positions? Will such a development enhance European stability? Will greater European unity diminish U.S. influence? How will NATO accommodate the change? The resolution of these issues in the early years of the coming century will have a profound impact on U.S. European relations and gives added salience to this report.
  
  The workshop involved presentations by Fraser Cameron (European Commission, Brussels), Roy Ginsberg (Skidmore College and Center for Strategic and International Studies), Josef Janning, (Forschungsgruppe Europa, Universitaet Mainz), whose papers are reproduced in this volume; commentary by Daniel Hamilton (U.S. Department of State), Philip Thomas (British Embassy), Lily Gardner Feldman (American Institute for Contemporary German Studies), Gerd Wagner (Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany), Karen Donfried (Congressional Research Service), Pierre Buhler (Embassy of France); and extended discussion with the audience. Mr Stuart Mackintosh has provided a superb summary of the discussions.

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  American Civil-Military Relations: New Issues, Enduring Problems

  Douglas V. Johnson Dr. and Steven Metz Dr.

  The authors were invited to prepare a paper for a conference on Civil-Military Relations in the fall, 1994. That paper was translated into an article for the Winter, 1995 edition of The Washington Quarterly under the title "Civil-Military Relations in the United States: The State of the Debate." Although the intensity of interest in this subject has fallen from the front pages of the newspapers, the authors have here suggested that the debate needs to continue and that it should start with identification of the right questions. The basic issues are inherent in the structure and beliefs of American political society, but the questions may be changing as the nature of that society and the manner in which it talks to itself and what it sees its responsibilities to be are also changing. While the authors do not see a current crisis in the relationship, they attempt to explain many of the basic features of that relationship, providing some of its history along the way. They have pointed out several conditions which put the relationship under particular strain and suggest that the Secretary of Defense is, by virtue of several institutional peculiarities, at the nexus of the relationship. It is the author's intent that this study lead to sustained debate within the military and civilian policy-making communities.

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  Ready For What and Modernized Against Whom?: A Strategic Perspective on Readiness and Modernization

  Jeffrey Record Dr.

  Every April the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute hosts its Annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme, "Strategy During the Lean Years: Learning from the Past and the Present," brings together scholars, serving and retired military officers, and civilian defense officials from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and France to discuss strategy formulation in times of penury from Tacitus to Force XXI.
  
  Dr. Jeffrey Record, a renowned military historian and former staff member of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, states that while maintaining a capacity to engage in large-scale interstate conventional combat is indispensable, historically the unconventional and subnational conflicts have presented U.S. forces with their greatest challenges. He argues that the United States is entering an era in which small and unconventional wars will be the dominant form of conflict. Additionally, there will be pressure to participate in operations other than war, especially peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and nation-building efforts. Modernization, Dr. Record argues, should be approached cautiously. Since the pace of technological change is so rapid, the United States must be much more discriminating in deciding what technologies to pursue from conceptualization through development and prototyping to production and deployment. While we can build a great many different technologically advanced weapons, the challenge is to decide which ones are necessary. The Army believes institutions are better prepared for change if there is a vigorous and informed debate about the direction and dynamics of that change.

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  Strategic Implications of the U.S.-DPRK Framework Agreement

  Thomas L. Wilborn Dr.

  The United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) signed an unprecedented framework agreement in October 1994 to halt the latter's nuclear weapons program, establish low-level diplomatic contacts between Washington and Pyongyang, and reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula. In this study, the author argues that it also places the United States, South Korea's historic ally and partner with South Korea in the Combined Forces Command, in a new and unfamiliar role as mediator of conflict on the peninsula. The author contends that the responsibility for implementing this complicated agreement, which involves sensitive political issues for all nations involved, falls primarily on the United States. He contends that U.S. performance of its responsibilities under the agreement will profoundly affect the strategic environment of Northeast Asia.

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  Counterforce and Theater Missile Defense: Can the Army Use an ASW Approach to the SCUD Hunt?

  James J. Wirtz Dr.

  The Gulf War demonstrated that theater missile defense (TMD) will be an important mission for the U.S. Army and its Patriot defense system in the years ahead. The author suggests that Army planners should view TMD not just as a simple tactical problem, but as an exercise that has important political and strategic ramifications that cut to the core of U.S. efforts to create and maintain international coalitions. A factor that will shape the political and military effectiveness of TMD is the resolution of the strategic problem of integrating counterforce options, active defenses and passive defenses. He argues that instead of developing strategy on an ad hoc basis, the philosophy that influences the U.S. Navy s approach to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) might serve as a guide to counterforce operations against mobile missiles. Counterforce attacks would reduce the tactical problem faced by Patriot crews, improving the overall performance of TMD. He also notes that an ASW approach to counterforce should help the United States achieve its political objectives of alliance formation and deterrence in the face of regional aggression.

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  Energy, Economics, and Security in Central Asia: Russia and Its Rivals

  Stephen J. Blank Dr.

  The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to the creation of five new states in Central Asia. These states: Kazkahstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan, have become both the object of international rivalries in Central Asia and the sources of new political forces as they act to enlarge their independence in world politics. This monograph attempts to trace the importance of the new forces unleashed by the advent of these states by focusing on the struggle around energy and security issues involving them. These issues will have significant impact upon the security of the Middle East; the Commonwealth of Independent States, especially Russia; South Asia; and even China. Already the impact of these new states is making itself felt in international politics in these regions.

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  The Army in the Information Age

  Gordon R. Sullivan General and Anthony M. Coroalles Lieutenant Colonel

  Two earlier monographs in this series by General Gordon R. Sullivan and Colonel James M. Dubik, Land Warfare in the 21st Century and War in the Information Age, provided a general concept of what land warfare might portend in the post-Cold War and post-Information Age environment. This monograph, by General Sullivan and Lieutenant Colonel Anthony M. Coroalles, brings into focus several areas where the future will differ most from the past. They provide insights into three critical areas: the operational environment; the emergence of simultaneity as a unifying concept in Information Age warfare; and, changes that must take place in the planning environment.
  
  When history is at a watershed, people, institutions, and nations have three choices. One choice is to live in the past; relishing triumphs, elaborating on myths, and eventually becoming a part of the past. The second choice is to fight change. Indeed, all change is not for the better. In times of uncertainty, like those the Army faces today, individuals, institutions, and nations are susceptible to what can be facile, transitory, and faddish. The Army would do well to recall the "pentomic divisions" plan of 1956. The third alternative is for individuals, institutions and nations to embrace the future with all of its uncertainties. It is better to transform rather than to be transformed by the future.

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  The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision Second Edition

  Don M. Snider Dr.

  The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act requires the President to submit an annual report on the National Security Strategy. In theory, a formal presentation of grand strategy was intended to lend coherence to the budgeting process; a clear statement of interests, objectives, and concepts for achieving them gave Congress a clear idea of the resources required to support the President's strategy. The problem with such documents is that they often create the false impression that strategy formulation is a rational and systemic process. In fact, strategy formulation both within the executive branch and between the executive branch and Congress is an intensely political process from which national strategy emerges after protracted bargaining and compromise. Key personalities do what they can agree to do. Don Snider, as an Army colonel, participated in this process at the National Security Council, and prepared the 1988 Report on National Security Strategy. This study is his account of the strategy formulation process as viewed from the White House.

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  Assad and the Peace Process: The Pivotal Role of Lebanon

  Stephen C. Pelletiere Dr.

  The world is waiting for peace in the Middle East. At present the possibility of a settlement is delayed by differences between Israel and Syria. The two are far apart on how to solve one of the thornier problems of the negotiations--the eventual status of the Golan Heights. That Syria's President Assad and Israel's Prime Minister Rabin should find themselves in disagreement is not unusual--Israel and Syria have been enemies for years. But that Assad should be able to hold out against Israeli power is quite extraordinary. Assad has played an extremely astute game of diplomatic intrigue against the Israelis, with successes far beyond anything one might have imagined. This study shows how the Syrian was able to improve his originally weak position in the peace talks by exploiting crisis conditions in Lebanon. Assad's major weapon against the Israelis has been the guerrilla group Hizbollah. The author claims that the fact that a small group of guerrillas could have such an enormous impact in this international drama reveals changed power relations in the strategic Middle East.

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  Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability

  Steven Metz Dr.

  Dr. Steven Metz argues that the way the Department of Defense and U.S. military spend the time when counterinsurgency support is not an important part of American national security strategy determines how quickly and easily they react when policymakers commit the nation to such activity. If analysis and debate continues, at least at a low level, the military is better prepared for the reconstitution of capabilities. If it ignores global developments in insurgency and counterinsurgency, the reconstitution of capabilities would be more difficult.

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  The CFE Treaty: A Cold War Anachronism?

  Jeffrey D. McCausland Dr.

  On November 19, 1990, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty was signed in Paris following the successful completion of 20 months of negotiations between the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization. At its completion President Bush hailed the agreement as ending the" . . . military confrontation that has cursed Europe for decades." Despite the dramatic nature of this document, the large scale reduction required of all signatories, and the complex inspection regime it established; the completion of the treaty was overshadowed by the ongoing deterioration of the Warsaw Pact, end of the Berlin Wall, and impending conflict in the Persian Gulf between Iraq and the coalition headed by the United States. Even these events paled to insignificance in comparison to the dissolution of the Soviet Union roughly 1 year later. In this study, the author examines the viability of this agreement in the post-Cold War era. He describes the scope of the treaty, how it was adapted to meet many of the changes that have occurred, and how it has moved towards final implementation in November 1995.

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  World View: The 1995 Strategic Assessment from the Strategic Studies Institute

  Earl H. Tilford Dr.

  Every year the analysts at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) prepare current assessments for their particular areas of interest. These assessments become the bedrock of the annual SSI Study Program. This year's assessments are crucial given the complexities of the post-Cold War world. Russia remains an enigma wrapped in a riddle with Russian national interests very much paramount in the Kremlin's thinking. As 1995 begins, Russian troops are heavily engaged in putting down a rebellion in the secessionist republic of Chechnya. The implications for the future of Russian democracy may be significant. The world of 1995 is very much one of continuity and change. Accordingly, old hatreds are very much a part of the equation. In the Middle East, Syria, Israel, and the Palestine Liberation Organization work toward a just and lasting peace. However, new hot spots, like Algeria, will emerge unexpectedly. In the Far East, North Korea and the United States are attempting to decrease tensions while Washington and Hanoi are moving much more rapidly toward better relations. China continues to modernize its military forces while Japan and the United States are seeking areas for economic cooperation. In Africa, the ravages of war and nature were part of the story in 1994. However, bright spots did occur, to include the peaceful transition to black majority rule in South Africa. In 1995 there will be reasons for optimism, like continued economic growth in Botswana and Namibia. On the other hand, corrupt governments, infectious diseases, and high population growth continue as areas for concern. South America, like Africa, is a continent beset with challenges and opportunities in the coming year. Rapidly expanding population and continuing poverty will frustrate proponents of democratic change in countries like Venezuela. While illegal migration from Central America has abated, in the Caribbean the potential for increased migration may grow in 1995.

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  Russia's Invasion of Chechnya: A Preliminary Assessment

  Stephen J. Blank Dr. and Earl H. Tilford Dr.

  On December 11, 1994, Russia invaded the secessionist republic of Chechnya in the North Caucasus. The aim was to suppress the republic's government, led by General Dzhokar Dudayev, compel it to accept Moscow's authority, and to force it to renounce its bid for independence and sovereignty. This invasion, which quickly turned into a military quagmire for Russia's troops, triggered a firestorm of domestic opposition, even within the higher levels of the Ministry of Defense. As a result, the invasion has the most profound and troubling possible consequences for the stability of the Russian government, Russian democracy, and the future political-military relationship. This special report, based on what is already known, attempts to assess the discernible consequences of this invasion and provide a framework within which future developments can be assessed.

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  Pandora's Box Reopened: Ethnic Conflict in Europe and Its Implications

  William T. Johnsen Dr.

  The resurgence of ethnic animosities in Europe has substantial consequences for the United States, which has a vital interest in maintaining peace and stability in Europe. Because ethnic conflict potentially represents a significant threat to those national objectives, a strong likelihood exists that the United States will continue to be involved in efforts to prevent or resolve ethnically motivated violence. The purpose of this study is to help prepare soldiers, policymakers, and statesmen for future U.S. involvement in ethnic conflict in Europe. The study offers a brief explanation of the strategic significance of ethnic conflict in Europe. It next provides a primer on ethnicity, and then acquaints policymakers with the historical and proximate sources of ethnic conflict in Europe. The report next identifies and analyzes the spectrum, patterns, and special characteristics of ethnic conflict. The difficulties inherent in crafting policy options, to include strategic objectives and political and military concepts, are then addressed. The study next assesses the implications of ethnic conflict in Europe for the U.S. Army. Brief recommendations for policymakers and their advisors close the report. While this report focuses on Europe, it bears noting that many of the insights and recommendations apply to ethnic conflict in other regions of the world.

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  The Awakening: The Zapatista Revolt and Its Implications for Civil-Military Relations and the Future of Mexico

  Stephen J. Wager LTC and Donald E. Schulz Dr.

  Drs. Stephen Wager and Donald Schulz examine the causes, nature and implications of the Zapatista uprising, emphasizing in particular its impact on Mexican civil-military relations. They argue that, together with the onset of democratization, the Chiapas rebellion has strained these relations and led to a certain mutual distancing between the Mexican army and government. Interestingly enough, however, they argue that this may actually be a good thing since it means that the military is becoming a more politically neutral institution and will likely be more open to the idea of an opposition electoral victory than in the past. Of more immediate importance, Wager and Schulz note that there has been little progress toward resolving the rebellion, and that as long as this is so fighting could very well break out anew, with disastrous results. They therefore urge the incoming Zedillo administration to move quickly to "bring the Zapatistas in from the cold" by co-opting them and their supporters both economically and politically. This means fulfilling not only the socioeconomic promises that have been made by the government, but reforming state and local political power structures to assure the rule of law and the access of those who have been shut out of the system. They further argue that the process of national political reform should be broadened and deepened, since without democratization on the national level any other gains that might be made would probably be ephemeral.

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  Total Force: Federal Reserves and State National Guards

  Charles E. Heller COL

  Never before in peacetime has the United States placed so much emphasis and reliance on the Armed Forces' Reserve Components. Since the Total Force Policy was introduced by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird in 1970, this dependency has grown even more. The 1990 mobilization for OPERATION DESERT SHIELD and the follow-on offensive OPERATION DESERT STORM in 1991 validated the use of the Reserve Components for contingency operations and guaranteed the policy's extension for the foreseeable future. Yet, even with the renewed emphasis on the Reserve Components' roles, their legal basis, mission, mobilization, training, force structure, and relationship to their respective Active Component remain relatively little understood. There are relatively few, if any, single source references pertaining to these Reserve Component areas. This report responds to the growing strategic importance of the Armed Forces Reserve Components. Declining defense budgets leading to small Active Component forces, coupled with inherent dangers facing the world community in a multipolar world, makes the use of Reserve forces on a recurring basis a necessity. This is especially true for Reserve Combat Support and Combat Service Support Forces not readily available in the Active Components. In essence, because of the relatively short time in which contingency operations unfold, the Reserve Components have become the Nation's strategic reserve insurance policy.

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  Hamas and Hizbollah: The Radical Challenge to Israel in the Occupied Territories

  Stephen C. Pelletiere Dr.

  This study argues that Hamas and Hizbollah, the two main religious groups fighting Israel, probably are more threatening to U.S. interests than is generally believed. It discusses the various openings that the groups were able to exploit to advance themselves, and particularly how they profited from errors on the Israelis' part. At the same time, the study contends, there has been a corresponding rise of religious radicalism in Israel. This means that on both sides of the struggle--Jewish as well as Arab-- extremism is gaining strength. It is going to be difficult, the study concludes, to avoid a decisive confrontation between the two forces.

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  Security Cooperation with China: Analysis and a Proposal

  Thomas L. Wilborn Dr.

  Dr. Wilborn examines U.S.-China security cooperation before Tiananmen, the strategic context in which it took place, and the strategic environment of U.S.-China relations at the present time. He then concludes that the reasons which justified the program of security cooperation with China during the cold war are irrelevant today. Security cooperation and military-to-military relations with China are highly desirable in the strategic environment of the 1990s. China is a major regional power which inevitably will affect U.S. security interests, and the PLA is an extremely important institution within that nation. Additionally, as a member of the U.N. Security Council and one of the five acknowledged nuclear powers, China's actions can influence a wide range of U.S. global interests. In the future, China is likely to be even more powerful and its actions more significant for the United States. Structurally, renewed U.S.-China security cooperation can be modeled on the program of the 1980s. However, the purpose of the high level visits, functional exchanges, and technological cooperation will no longer be to strengthen a strategic alliance against a common enemy, as it was before, but to contribute to stability in an important region of the world and to achieve U.S. global objectives.