Books, Monographs & Collaborative Studies

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French Policy Toward NATO: Enhanced Selectivity, Vice Rapprochement

William T. Johnsen Dr. and Thomas-Durell Young Dr.

The authors of this report explain how French policy toward NATO has changed since 1992. Importantly, they discuss how these changes have been effected. However, certain key elements of French external policy have not changed. In effect, therefore, the authors argue that while France may wish to cooperate with NATO, this does not imply that there will be a more cooperative French attitude toward the Alliance.
Russian Policy and the Korean Crisis

Stephen J. Blank Dr.

North Korea's nuclear program is the greatest current threat to U.S. and Northeast Asian security. The outcome of negotiations over this program will have a tremendous impact on the future of the Korean peninsula and on the vital interests of the United States and neighboring states to North and South Korea: China, Japan, and Russia. Bearing this in mind, the Center for Strategic and International Studies convened a conference on June 28-29, 1994, to consider the crisis surrounding North Korea's nuclear program in its international context. Experts spoke about the program and its impact on the two Koreas and on the neighboring states. Professor Stephen Blank presented this paper on Russian policy with regard to Korea. Dr. Blank relates Moscow's position on the issues of North Korean nuclearization to the broader domestic debate in Russia over security policy, in general, and Asian policy, in particular. He contends that Russia's policy is a function of that broader debate and must be understood in that context.
Partnership for Peace: Discerning Fact from Fiction

William T. Johnsen Dr. and Thomas-Durell Young Dr.

The authors analyze and assess Partnership for Peace (PfP) from the perspective of the political realities which govern NATO. They counter the critics of PfP with an analysis of its exact provisions. Moreover, by drawing on the Alliance's historical record regarding expansion, they argue that PfP is the best and most realistic means available to resolve the prickly issue of NATO enlargement. The authors do not ignore existing and potential shortcomings in PfP and specify where conceptual, as well as practical, problems will require the Alliance's immediate action.
U.S. Africa Policy: Some Possible Course Adjustment

Daniel H. Simpson Ambassador

Ambassador Daniel H. Simpson addresses the question of U.S. interests in Africa and past, present, and future U.S. policy toward that continent of more than 50 countries and 800 million people on an analytic basis, followed by clear recommendations. His presentation of U.S. strategic interests in Africa permits clear analysis of the present and logical planning of future policy and actions. His message, in addition to being an introspective examination of U.S. policy, is forward-looking. He seeks to lay the basis for a long-term, sustainable U.S. policy toward Africa based on both solid economic and commercial concerns--Africa as a supplier and a market--and on the real cultural ties that link what is core to America and the people of the African continent.
Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs

Jeffrey R. Cooper Mr.

In April 1994, the Army War College and the Strategic Studies Institute hosted the Fifth Annual Strategy Conference. The theme of this year's conference was "The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA): Defining an Army for the 21st Century."

Jeffrey R. Cooper presented the following paper as part of an opening panel which sought to define the RMA. He urges defense planners to determine what strategic--as opposed to operational-- benefits might be derived from the RMA. He contends that making the internal reforms that will be required will be as challenging as coming to terms with the operational and strategic implications of the new technologies. The first requirement is to understand the parameters and dynamics of this particular revolution in military affairs. Mr. Cooper puts the RMA in historical perspective by discussing the relationships among technology, socioeconomic, and political change, and their implications for warfare during the Napoleonic era, the mid-19th century, and World Wars I and II. He argues that, in the past, dramatic technological change affected warfare in different ways. Mr. Cooper warns that by using the RMA to define a "technical legacy" we make three errors. First, such an approach could lead to a fruitless search for a "silver bullet" technology on which to build the RMA. Second, the focus on technology could shift attention away from the critical issues of purpose, strategy, doctrine, operational innovation, and organizational adaptation. Finally, committing the first two errors will compound the problem by wasting very scarce defense resources on new programs and projects which may have little or nothing to do with the strategic situation. Military professionals and defense planners alike need to remind themselves that while technology can provide new capabilities, the strategic equation is not necessarily driven by technological innovation.
Does Russian Democracy Have a Future?

Stephen J. Blank Dr. and Earl H. Tilford Dr.

In 1854, on the eve of the Crimea campaign, Antoine Henri Jomini wrote, "The Russian Army is a wall which, however far it may retreat, you will always find in front of you." The political unrest and economic disarray that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Communist Empire have altered, but not crippled, the formidable strength of the Russian military. While the forces of democracy and reform survived the elections of December 1993, the very strong support generated by ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky reminds us that the future of Russia is far from determined. In late January 1994, the Strategic Studies Institute, with the cooperation of the U.S. Army Center of Military History, hosted a Washington roundtable which addressed the impact of the December 1993 elections. Scholars from the Army, academia, and the strategic community met for a day of frank and sometimes spirited discussion. Each scholar was asked to provide a formal paper presenting his or her perspective on this subject. These proceedings are offered because the Strategic Studies Institute believes that Jomini's observations are as valid today as they were 160 years ago.
Proliferation and Nonproliferation in Ukraine: Implications for European and U.S. Security

Stephen J. Blank Dr.

Limiting nuclear proliferation is a vital goal of U.S. security policy. With this in mind, the Strategic Studies Institute cosponsored a conference at the University of Pittsburgh on March 16-17, 1994 to deal with the issues involved in achieving this objective. An additional U.S. objective is the stabilization of relationships among the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. These two issues come together in Ukraine which, upon achieving independence, found itself in possession of nuclear missiles that were positioned in the former Soviet Union and on Ukraine's territory. Ukraine was reluctant to relinquish control of them for security reasons. This monograph, presented at the conference, seeks to explain why Ukraine originally sought to retain the weapons and then, in 1994, agreed to dismantle them in return for compensation and the very limited security guarantees that exist under the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. The author also examines the nature of Russia's threat to Ukraine and the implications of the new agreement for U.S. policy vis-à-vis Ukraine and Russia.
Responding to Terrorism across the Technological Spectrum

Bruce Hoffman Dr.

In April 1994, the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute held its annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme was "The Revolution in Military Affairs: Defining an Army for the 21st Century." Dr. Bruce Hoffman presented this paper as part of a panel examining "New Technologies and New Threats." Terrorism, of course, is not new. Hoffman warns, however, of the changing nature of terrorism. In the past, terrorists have been motivated by limited political and ideological objectives. Popular images fostered by terrorist events like the bombing of PAN AM Flight 103 and the attack on the Marine Barracks in Beirut notwithstanding, in the past the preponderance of terrorist attacks targeted specific individuals or small groups. The weapons of choice were the pistol, knife, and, on occasion, dynamite. Often the terrorist was a highly-trained individual, a "professional" in pursuit of specific political or ideological objectives. Hoffman warns that, by comparison, the terrorists of today and tomorrow are amateurs. Furthermore, they are likely to act from religious and racial convictions rather than radical political or ideological motivations. Their objective may be to kill large numbers of people. Indeed, they may want to annihilate an entire race or religious group. Not only are these amateurs less predictable and, therefore, more difficult to apprehend before the incident occurs, they have at their disposal lethal devices that range from the relatively simple fertilizer bomb to biologically-altered viruses. Military professionals and civilian planners must contend with warfare at every level. The threat posed by the changing nature of terrorism falls very much within their purview.
Russia's New Doctrine: Two Views

James F. Holcomb Colonel and Michael M. Boll Dr.

The future direction of Russian security and defense policies is a fundamental issue in contemporary world politics. Future Russian policies will have a major impact on all nuclear issues; on bilateral relations with the United States; and on European, Middle Eastern, Central Asian, and Far Eastern security. One primary indicator of the direction of Russian policies is the new Defense Doctrine published in November 1993. This document has aroused much controversy and diverging assessments as to its significance. However, since it encompasses all the major issues in Russia's security and defense agenda, it is a major statement that is crucial to any understanding of Russian trends and policies. Because of the controversy over Russian doctrine, the Strategic Studies Institute, as part of its ongoing coverage of Russian defense and security policies, presents here two very different assessments of that doctrine to contribute to the debate over its meaning. The Institute is not offering an official interpretation of the new doctrine. While both authors work for the Defense Department, they differ in their assessments and are expressing only their personal opinions, not those of any government agency.
The New Russia in the New Asia

Stephen J. Blank Dr.

This monograph offers an account of the current struggle inside Russia over Asian policy and of the direction of that struggle. The author describes the dominant Russian viewpoints on policy in Asia. Current proponents of an Asian policy based primarily upon military considerations seem to hold sway. Advocates of this approach downplay economic integration with Asia, view other states mainly in terms of threat, favor an alliance with China rather than merely friendly relations, openly take a hard line with Japan, and minimize the threat of North Korean nuclear proliferation. Should this view prevail, Russian cooperation with Washington will be difficult, tensions with Japan will remain (if not grow), and Russia's efforts to become a democratic and economically competitive player will be impeded. Since Asia is the most dynamic sector of the global economy, Russian developments, insofar as they affect this region, have a deep significance for the future of Russia and Asian international affairs and security.
The Revolution in Military Affairs and Conflict Short of War

James Kievit LTC and Steven Metz Dr.

The authors concede that the revolution in military affairs holds great promise for conventional, combined-arms warfare, but conclude that its potential value in conflict short of war, whether terrorism, insurgency, or violence associated with narcotrafficking, is not so clear-cut. Given this, national leaders and strategists should proceed cautiously and only after a full exploration of the ethical, political, and social implications of their decisions. To illustrate this, the authors develop a hypothetical future scenario--a "history" of U.S. efforts in conflict short of war during the first decade of the 21st century. It is too early to offer concrete policy prescriptions for adapting many aspects of the revolution in military affairs to conflict short of war, but the authors do suggest an array of questions that should be debated. In order to decide whether to apply new technology and emerging concepts or how to employ them, the United States must first reach consensus on ultimate objectives and acceptable costs.
Two Historians in Technology and War

John F. Guilmartin Dr. and Michael Howard Sir

In April 1994, the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute held its annual Strategy Conference. The theme for this year's conference was "The Revolution in Military Affairs: Defining an Army for the 21st Century." Sir Michael and Professor Guilmartin are historians who have experienced warfare; indeed, have distinguished themselves in combat. Sir Michael Howard served in the Coldstream Guards in Italy in the Second World War. Dr. Guilmartin served two tours as a U.S. Air Force rescue helicopter pilot in Vietnam. Their personal experience with warfare is expressed eloquently in the following pages as they make the point that war is, as Carl von Clausewitz defined it nearly 200 years ago, a distinctly human endeavor. Because the Revolution in Military Affairs makes warfare all the more complex and changeable, one would be well advised to heed another of Clausewitz's admonitions, "The use of force is in no way incompatible with the simultaneous use of the intellect."
Nuclear Threats from Small States

Jerome H. Kahan Mr.

That are the policy implications regarding proliferation and counterproliferation of nuclear weapons among Third World states? How does deterrence operate outside the parameters of superpower confrontation as defined by the cold war's elaborate system of constraints enforced by concepts like mutual assured destruction, and counter-value and counter-force targeting? How can U.S. policymakers devise contingencies for dealing with nuclear threats posed by countries like North Korea, Libya, Iraq, Iran, and Syria? These are some of the unsettling but nevertheless important questions addressed by the author. Mr. Jerome Kahan examines the likelihood that one or more of these countries will use nuclear weapons before the year 2000. He also offers a framework that policymakers and planners might use in assessing U.S. interests in preempting the use of nuclear weapons or in retaliating for their use. Ironically, with the end of the cold war, it is imperative that defense strategists, policymakers, and military professionals think about the "unthinkable."
The Revolution in Military Affairs: A Framework for Defense Planning

Michael J. Mazarr Dr.

In April 1994, the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute held its annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme was "The Revolution in Military Affairs: Defining an Army for the 21st Century." Dr. Michael J. Mazarr argues that the current revolution in military affairs is part of a larger sociopolitical transformation. The new technologies both propelling and resulting from this transformation are having a profound impact on warfare. Dr. Mazarr urges military and civilian strategists, planners, and decisionmakers to think about armed conflict in ways so novel that those used to dealing with "the unchanging truths about war" may feel threatened. To help deal with the ambiguities and complexities presented by the RMA, Dr. Mazarr offers a framework of four principles for defense planning.
Trends in German Defense Policy: The Defense Policy Guidelines and the Centralization of Operational Control

Thomas-Durell Young Dr.

Like most of its NATO allies, the Federal Republic of Germany has undertaken a massive restructuring of its armed forces. The end of the Cold War, the need for unified Germany to assume responsibility for its security, and the current economic recession have made German defense planning extremely difficult. Bonn is also under pressure to reorient the Bundeswehr (Federal Armed Forces) from a defense force organized to deter war in the Central Region to one with deployment capabilities similar to those of other comparable powers. However, countervailing domestic and external political pressures have impeded this reorganizing effort. Internally, even a clear political consensus regarding the use of the Bundeswehr has yet to emerge in Bonn. German participation in peace operations and international humanitarian missions has yet to gain wide political support, let alone participating in military campaigns in support of national interests outside of the immediate defense of German territory. Notwithstanding defense planning efforts undertaken to date by the current Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union/Free Democratic Party coalition government, the resolution of this debate is essential before definitive planning can be undertaken. In the sagacious words of Clay Clemens, "The major consistency in German political life for at least three decades has been the tendency of all the mainstream parties to shape policy together in an incremental, consensus-building process. Thus, until the time when an all party accord is reached in Bonn, Germany's defense structure will remain provisional." Externally, the rest of Europe continues to cast a wary eye over this new iteration of "ein Deutschland." As the largest member of the European Union and possessing an enormous economic potential, the Federal Republic may increasingly come to dominate European affairs. Moreover, if Bonn were to maintain the Bundeswehr at a peacetime ceiling of 370,000, as referred to in A
War in the Information Age

James M. Dubik Colonel and Gordon R. Sullivan General

We are beginning to realize the emergence of a new age--the information age. On the one hand, the full dimensions of this new age, if indeed it is such, are unknown. On the other hand, the authors argue that enough is known to conclude that the conduct of war in the future will be profoundly different. Paradoxically, however, they claim that the nature of war will remain basically the same. In this monograph, General Sullivan and Colonel Dubik examine that paradox and draw some inferences from it. This monograph explains the governing concepts of the industrial age and how they affected the concept of war. Then it describes the concepts emerging to govern the information age and suggests ways in which these concepts may affect the conduct of war. Finally, the monograph discusses those steps that the Army is taking to position itself to exploit what are becoming the dominant military requirements of the information age: speed and precision. Specifically, the authors discuss the ways in which the Army has changed its strategic systems over the past several years so that the Army operational and tactical forces will be able to "see" a situation, decide, adapt, and act faster and more precisely than their opponent. These changes will give strategic planners, and operational and tactical commanders, a new set of information age tools to use in theater and on the battlefield. The net result: more flexibility, more versatility, faster decision making, and broader scope of weapons systems at their immediate disposal.
Whither the RMA: Two Perspectives on Tomorrow's Army

Raoul Henri Alcala COL and Paul Bracken Dr.

In April 1994, the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute hosted its Fifth Annual Strategy Conference. The theme was "The Revolution in Military Affairs: Defining an Army for the 21st Century." After fourteen of the nation's leading defense scholars presented papers on the role of technology in warfare, Dr. Paul Bracken and Colonel Raoul Alcala concluded the conference by offering their views of the Army's future. Professor Bracken contends that the Army of the 21st century will be shaped by domestic concerns as much as by external threats to American security. While economic power has increased in importance in international relations, military power as traditionally conceived remains a dominant factor in determining the status of nations. Colonel Alcala holds that there is a connection between ideas and principles. He argues that doctrines will provide the basis for force structure, training, and weapons acquisition. Colonel Alcala maintains that the Army's ability to stay intellectually ahead of the technology will be, perhaps, its greatest challenge in the next century.
America in the Third World: Strategic Alternatives and Military Implications

Steven Metz Dr.

The author examines the problems of the Third World and the debates that exist regarding the most effective U.S. response to these problems. He has concluded that the Third World is undergoing such significant change that most of the basic assumptions undergirding past and current U.S. policy are no longer viable. He urges a fundamental and radical revision of our national strategy toward the Third World, and recommends a future strategy that would see far more selective and discrete involvement in these staggering problems. If our national leaders accept his theories concerning failed states, they will be less inclined to attempt active intervention on a scale that approximates the current level of U.S. involvement. The United States will, in effect, disengage from large segments of the Third World, with only carefully selected humanitarian or ecological relief operations being executed. Such a strategy would, of course, have profound implications for the U.S. military and would require adjustments in force structure and operational directives concerning the application of military power in pursuit of national interests. During times of strategic transition, "muddling through" is not enough: basic concepts must be rigorously examined and debated. The Strategic Studies Institute sees this study as a means of supporting the process of developing a coherent post-cold war strategy for dealing with the Third World as it will be, not as it was.
Japan's Self-Defense Forces: What Dangers to Northeast Asia?

Thomas L. Wilborn Dr.

Dr. Thomas Wilborn examines Japan's defense policy and the capabilities of its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to determine if the fears of a remilitarized Japan have any basis in fact. He concludes that Japanese defense policy places rigid restraints on the SDF, and that currently there is no support for anything but a thoroughly defensive military posture. Moreover, the SDF lack the force projection ability to attack any of Japan's neighbors, and could not develop the ability in less than a decade--even if there were a political decision to do so. Finally, the preponderance of evidence suggests that future generations of leaders are no more likely to pursue a military role in the region than the generation which has governed since the end of American occupation, in 1952.
National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy

Michael G. Roskin Dr.

Because the national interest is the foundation for both the National Security Strategy and its supporting National Military Strategy, it is essential that military leaders understand the political context from which the details of the national interest emerge. The guiding concept of national interest is more often assumed than analyzed in the dynamic context of domestic and international politics. For these reasons, Dr. Michael Roskin, Visiting Professor of Foreign Policy, was asked to synthesize the academic literature, focusing on those works that had greatest value and relevance to members of the national security community who must apply as well as serve the national interest.
The Owl of Minerva Flies at Twilight: Doctrinal Change and Continuity and the Revolution in Military Affairs

David Jablonsky Dr.

Revolutions in military affairs have never been strictly military phenomena. Social and political transformations in the past have also been major and often catalytic ingredients of such revolutions. The current revolution is no exception, whether it involves the relationship of communication-information breakthroughs to the interaction of the elements of Clausewitz's remarkable trinity, or the civil- military aspects concerning the use of military force in the post-cold war era. In all this, the United States military, and particularly the United States Army, is doctrinally ready to move into the revolution underway in military affairs. On the one hand, there is the emphasis on versatility in terms of dealing with the changes that accompany any such revolution. On the other, there is the continuity of the doctrinal framework, itself a product of an earlier RMA, which will serve, this study convincingly concludes, to ease many of the sociopolitical problems that may emerge as the revolution in military affairs continues.
Environmental Security: A DoD Partnership for Peace

Kent Hughes Butts Dr.

International environmental issues can lead to instability and conflict that threaten U.S. security interests and may result in the commitment of U.S. forces. Chronic, unresolved environmental issues threaten stability in such critical regions as the former Soviet Union, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. Recognizing this, the Department of Defense (DOD) has committed itself to using DOD assets to mitigate environmental issues that could lead to instability. However, a strategy to implement this proactive policy has not been developed. As part of the effort to create this strategy, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Environment, Safety and Occupation Health), Mr. Lewis D. Walker, convened a panel on Environmental Security as part of the Fifth Senior Environmental Leadership Conference. The panel was sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute and the Army Environmental Policy Institute. Its members were environmental security experts from within and outside DOD and represented Major Commands and the Joint Community. This report was drafted by members of the panel and edited by the panel chairman. While recognizing that their report was a contribution to the ongoing effort to define DOD's environmental security role and not a comprehensive study, the panel reached consensus, and made recommendations on key policy
Shari'a Law, Cult Violence and System Change in Egypt: The Dilemma Facing President Mubarak

Stephen C. Pelletiere Dr.

Egypt is one of the more economically deprived countries in the world. Societal stress is a major challenge. Few believe that Egypt will escape the poverty that has for so long oppressed it. For all its challenges, Egypt is of strategic importance to the United States, because of its leadership position in the Arab world. It would be extremely difficult for Washington to safeguard its interests in the Middle East without support from Cairo. Recently, Egypt has been hit with an outbreak of religious strife that poses a threat to the rule of President Husni Mubarak. This study looks at the unrest, identifies the forces behind it, and prescribes steps that can be taken to alleviate the situation.
World View: The 1994 Strategic Assessment from the Strategic Studies Institute

Steven Metz Dr. and Earl H. Tilford Dr.

Every year the analysts at the Strategic Studies Institute prepare current strategic assessments for their particular areas of interest. These assessments are the bedrock of the annual SSI Study Program. This year's assessments seem especially crucial as the strategic situation throughout the world is far more complex and fraught with danger than many may realize. The dramatically altered world of the post-cold war period is not the peaceful and tranquil scene many had longed for and thought had, indeed, arrived. From the Danube eastward along the southern boundaries of what used to be the Soviet Union, ethnic conflict is rampant. Russia remains very much an enigma wrapped in a riddle, but, as always, Russian national interests are paramount in Kremlin thinking. While there are those in the Middle East who earnestly seek peace, there are others who are determined to support old hatreds and the policies that issued from them. In the Far East, North Korea has resisted U.N. demands to inspect its nuclear production facilities, China is modernizing its military forces, and Japan continues to seek new markets. In this dynamic international setting, a technological revolution is propelling many nations, the United States being foremost among them, from the industrial age into the information age. The implications for military force structures and strategies are as enormous as they are uncertain.
Ethnic Conflict: Implications for the Army of the Future

William A. Stofft Major General and Gary L. Guertner Dr.

Ethnic conflict is an ascendant phenomenon replacing ideology as a social force most likely to promote violence and regional instability. The ferocity of ethnic violence and its potential for escalation increase the political pressures for U.S. leadership and collective engagement. The U.S. Army has a direct interest in ethnic-based conflicts because land power is the dominant means for intervention through coalition peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. For these reasons, the Army War College was tasked to identify potential Army requirements for responding to ethnic-based, regional conflicts. This study pinpoints specific patterns of ethnic conflict, and cautions that each may confront military planners with unique circumstances and requirements. Political and military strategies must be tailored to fit a broad spectrum of ethnic conflict. Specific Army requirements are discussed, the most important being a thorough understanding of the complex political environments of ethnic conflict before committing our forces.