Stephen C. Pelletiere Dr.
As a result of a conference on the peace process in the Middle East, co-hosted by the Strategic Studies Institute and North Georgia College in March 1996, the authors discussed the developing crisis in that area. They have analyzed three crucial areas of relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors--Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. In these three essays, the authors analyze several key aspects of what can be considered the first phase of the Mideast Peace Process (the time from the 1991 Madrid Conference to the 1996 Israeli election). They remind us that despite recent renewed progress on the Israeli-Palestinian agenda, the peace process has a long and difficult road ahead.
Earl H. Tilford Dr.
In December of each year the analysts at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) look to the year ahead to assess the strategic equation for their particular areas of interest. This is part of an effort to focus our priorities both corporately as well as individually. As they address those issues and factors that will affect U.S. national security strategy over the next 12-18 months, our analysts are also forced to think about the next decade. The strategic context in 1997 will be quite similar to that of 1996 in that it remains complex and uncertain. This year, however, the way we assess the world of the 21st century is even more important because the Army, along with the other services, is engaged in the congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Beyond the QDR, our conceptions of the future have implications not only for Force XXI and Army XXI, but also for the kind of Army that will serve the nation when Army XXI systems near obsolescence in 15-20 years. Getting the strategic context about right is important because the Army After Next, although highly capable, will also be small by comparison to those forces of only a few years past. Furthermore, decisions made in 1997 as to weapons development and force structure will emerge in the Army of 2010-2015.
Dianne L. Smith LTC, Abraham Kim Mr., Marc Jason Gilbert Prof., and Perry L. Wood Mr.
In January 1996, the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) hosted a conference on "Asian Security to the Year 2000." No region of the world has greater potential for expanded influence on American interests. This compendium of papers from the conference examines the security policies being pursued by many of the key Asian actors--China, the Koreas, Pakistan, and the nations of Southeast Asia, particularly those in ASEAN. The contributors to this volume paint the picture of a dynamic and diverse Asia on the verge of the new century. Each author identifies the critical issues which frame both challenges and opportunities for U.S. foreign, economic, and security policies.
Thomas-Durell Young Dr.
One can make two general observations concerning Bonn's ongoing attempt to adapt institutions and practices. First, confusion in German policy making is clearly a manifestation of officials largely navigating in a little-known policy milieu. Realpolitik, let alone Machtpolitik (either as mere terms, let alone as concepts) are neither freely used in "polite" political discord in Germany, nor widely contemplated. As a result of a wide-spread political culture governed by self-restraint, confronting difficult issues in their proper context has made decision making frequently complicated and confusing to outside observers. What we are presently witnessing is a learning period in German external policy making, with all of its attendant errors. It is an open question how long this educational process will last or if the German body politic is prepared for such straight forward discussion.
Second, perturbations in policy formation are partly a result of Bonn's approach to foreign and security policies which remains exclusively defined and expressed by the German government in the context of the North Atlantic Alliance and the emerging European Security and Defense Identity. Indeed, there is no sizeable political bloc in the Federal Republic that argues otherwise. In consequence, there is no evidence that Bonn is prepared to consider adopting a national approach to national security.
In sum, German statecraft has the unenviable task of legitimizing its new national status, not only before its allies and neighbors, but also before a skeptical German public. Given the history of statecraft in a unified Germany, this will surely be a difficult and potentially time- consuming process. To the Federal Republic's credit, one must recall that, unlike previous historical experiences, contemporary German democratic traditions and institutions are universally accepted in Germany, and they have been tested.
Larry M. Wortzel Dr.
U.S. Asian policy today is a curious blend of seemingly firm bilateral commitments and occasionally startling ambiguities. The latter, while preserving American flexibility, run the risk of signaling weakness when friends and potential adversaries probe for clarity of purpose. This American "inscrutability" in Asia is all the more troubling in a region lacking a strong web of multilateral institutions, as exists across the North Atlantic. Indeed, if the United States is to maintain regional stability in Asia, Colonel Larry Wortzel, the U.S. Army attaché in Beijing, argues, it must make multilateral dialogues like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum a major tenet of its Asian policy. The problems that need to be addressed by the United States in conjunction with its Asian friends, allies and potential foes—proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ethnic conflict, territorial issues, trade relations, and the future of democracy throughout the region—are every bit as important to U.S. security in the Asian context as they are in Europe, where they receive intensive, continuous, multilateral scrutiny. Colonel Wortzel calls our attention to the nascent ASEAN Regional Forum and causes us to consider its potential to enable a highly diverse group of nations to enhance their mutual understanding, stability, and security as they enter the 21st century.
Stephen C. Pelletiere Dr.
For 5 years U.S. policy has managed to steer a coalition of states which share broad interests in regional stability and free trade. Yet below these common interests, the United States has walked a tightrope stretched between competing objectives vis-à-vis Iraq, e.g., undermining Saddam while preserving Iraq as a counterweight to Iran; protecting the Kurds while not promoting their independence. Time, however, has a habit of eroding international coalitions and exposing seams in the details of policy. Iraq's September 1996 actions in the Kurdish north found such a seam in coalition objectives, or, to return to the original metaphor, shook one anchor of the U.S. policy tightrope. Dr. Stephen Pelletiere examines how the Kurdish crisis developed, why--most disturbingly--the key coalition members divided in response to U.S. actions, and what factors might guide future U.S. policy. He concludes that U.S. policy needs reanchoring if we are to achieve our paramount interests in this vital region.
Vincent Davis Dr.
Three papers presented at the Patterson School-Strategic Studies Institute Symposium focused on civil-military relations at various levels. West Point professor Don M. Snider maintains that continued pressures on the armed forces—especially the Army—to put aside war-fighting missions in favor of other missions will further strain civil-military relations. In the second essay, retired Admiral Stanley R. Arthur examines the broader aspects of civil-military relations where he sees a growing estrangement between all levels of the armed forces on the one hand, and the larger civilian society on the other. Finally, George Washington University professor Deborah D. Avant argues that the post-Vietnam war reluctance of senior military officers to take their forces into low-level threat interventions does not constitute defiance of established civilian political authority. In fact, she holds that this is precisely the way the American system of constitutionally-divided government is supposed to work, and that the real problem is the inability of top civilian politicians to form and achieve a consensus in their vision. Together these papers address a spectrum of issues attendant to the current debate over civil-military relations
Maria Alongi Ms.
On October 23-25, 1995, coinciding with the Bosnia peace talks being held in Dayton, Ohio, Women in International Security (WIIS), an international, nonpartisan educational program; The Friedrich-Eberet Foundation; the U.S. Institute of Peace; and the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute sponsored a conference, "Ethnic Conflict and European Security: Lessons from the Past and Implications for the Future." Among the participants and attendees were scholars and policymakers from the United States and Europe concerned with the crisis in the Balkans and the larger ramifications of ethnic conflict for European security.
This rapporteur's summary compiled by Ms. Maria Alongi captures the primary themes of the conference to include linkages between ethnicity and instability in Europe, the role European and transatlantic security institutions can play in mitigating those tensions, and the various positive roles Russia and the United States can play in resolving or lessening the impact of ethnic conflict. Ms. Alongi concludes that the nature of the threat posed by ethnic conflict to European security is bound inexorably to a political manipulation; an ethnicization of politics. And while the Balkan crisis held the potential for catapulting Europe back to July 1914, the way the international community reacted to head off a further deterioration in the situation provides some basis for optimism.
Steven Metz Dr. and James Kievit LTC
Every day of the "Information Age" makes more material available via the Internet. Yet simply "surfing the 'Net'," while perhaps enjoyable as recreation, is ill-suited for rapidly locating valid, salient information. This is particularly true for analysts or military professionals seeking to develop strategy, to research national security issues, or to provide policy advice. With the original edition of this essay in February 1996, James Kievit and Steven Metz began an effort to construct guideposts for strategic thinkers and practitioners to follow when travelling the "information superhighway." That such a "travel guide" is valuable is amply demonstrated by the rapidity with which SSI's stock of the original The Strategist and the Web has been exhausted. Accordingly, the authors have "revisited" the Web and updated this guide for planners and researchers interested in the practice, problems, and policies of contemporary national security and military strategy. As with the first version of this essay, the authors conclude that the Internet still is not "a solution to the analyst's need for relevant, timely information," but they remain convinced that individuals and organizations must prepare themselves for the day when "an analyst's collection of Internet 'bookmarks' will be nearly as valuable as a rolodex of personal contacts is now."
Stephen J. Blank Dr.
In 1995 Finland joined the European Union (EU). This action culminated several years of a fundamental reorientation of Finnish security policy as Finland moved from the neutrality imposed on it by the Soviet Union to a policy with a priority on European integration through the European Union. Finland, in joining the EU, has retained its independent defense and security posture, even as it seeks to strengthen its standing abroad and gain added leverage, through the EU, for dealing with Russia. Finland's odyssey indicates much about two fundamental issues in European security: coping with Russia's crises, and the interrelationship between the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as providers of security for small states in Europe. Furthermore, Finland's proximity to Russia and the difficult history of Fenno-Russian relations have imposed on Finnish policymakers the need for penetrating and sober analysis of Finland's and Europe's security situation. Therefore, Finland's evolution from an imposed neutrality to overt participation in European integration merits our careful scrutiny and attention.
Robert S. Ross Prof.
In April 1996, the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute held its Seventh Annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme was, "China into the 21st Century: Strategic Partner and…or Peer Competitor." The author of the following monograph, Dr. Robert S. Ross, of Harvard University's Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, argues that Japan's relationship with China is a key element in the evolving East Asian security structure. From Beijing's perspective, China's Japan policy rivals its relationship with the United States in relative strategic importance. Japan's economic strength and its potential military power make it a major factor in Chinese security calculations. Many of the same factors that affect Sino-American relations and Sino-Russian relations are integral to the relationship between Beijing and Tokyo. Among these are Chinese treatment of dissidents, the Taiwan issue, economic investment, and Japanese military policy and strategy. Today Japanese and Chinese interests compete in many areas, requiring tolerance, patience and diplomatic sophistication to keep competition from evolving into conflict. In the future, these challenges are likely to grow in complexity.
Jer Donald Get Colonel
In May 1995, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry asked the Army to examine various ways to re-establish the army-to-army ties which existed between the U.S. Army and Beijing's People's Liberation Army (PLA) prior to the 1980s. U.S. President George Bush ordered a curb in military-to-military ties following the Tiananmen incident in 1989, and, since then, efforts at rapprochement between the two armies have been faltering and uneven. There are some who question the value of renewing military ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC) based on the limited gains accrued to the U.S. Army from the earlier relationship. In this essay, U.S. Army Colonel Jer Donald Get argues that this is a short-sighted attitude. The reasons for renewing army-to-army ties are substantial given that China's relevance as a power will grow. The United States needs to marshal all the resources at its disposal to influence China positively. One of those resources, Colonel Get argues, is America's Army. The ideas expressed in this monograph constitute a host of positive recommendations which could influence the course of trans-Pacific relations over the next decade. Our Army and the PLA must take a measured approach, setting pragmatic objectives and extending the reciprocity that characterizes relations between great powers. For both armies, and both nations, the stakes are high—to engage as strategic partners rather than clash again in conflict.
Unification of the United States Armed Forces: Implementing the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act
Douglas C. Lovelace Professor
The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act was the most significant legislation for the U.S. Armed Forces since the National Security Act of 1947. The increased unification the Goldwater-Nichols Act was intended to bring to the Department of Defense was considered too extreme by some, but insufficient by others. Professor Douglas Lovelace assesses many of the act's major provisions. He describes the congressional motivation for passing the act, assesses the extent to which the act has been implemented, discusses its impact on the Department of Defense, and offers recommendations for furthering the purposes underlying the act. The author's critical analysis leads him to conclude that the Department of Defense and the nation have benefited from the substantial implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. As we approach its 10-year anniversary, however, Professor Lovelace finds significant room both for the Department of Defense to complete implementation and for the Congress to enact modifications to more coherently focus the act on its central purposes. His thought-provoking analyses, conclusions, and recommendations should fuel discussions of the extent to which the act has, or can, achieve its intended results.
Samuel S. Kim Dr.
In April 1996, the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute held its Seventh Annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme was, "China Into the 21st Century: Strategic Partner and . . . or Peer Competitor."
Dr. Samuel S. Kim of Columbia University argues that, while post-Tiananmen China is a growing regional military power, it is, almost paradoxically, a weak state both pretending and trying to be a strong one. By flexing its muscles with its weaker neighbors, China, is largely compensating for self-doubts about its national image and strength. What the world sees in China, a modernizing, economically robust, and assertive regional hegemon and world power "want-to-be," is, Dr. Kim asserts, at least in part a facade. Although China has made remarkable economic progress in the past few years, those who trumpet its rise do not consider its massive internal contradictions involving social, political, demographic, and environmental problems. Dr. Kim makes the point that weaknesses in those areas cannot be overcome by purchasing modern weapons, even those high-tech weapons that bolster a nation's claim to being a major military power. The United States is, and in all likelihood will remain, a Pacific power. China, despite the limitations Dr. Kim examines herein, will be an immense factor in the strategic balance of power in the Pacific region.
David Shambaugh Dr. and Wang Zhongchun Senior Colonel
This past April the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute held its Seventh Annual Strategy Conference. The theme, "China Into the 21st Century: Strategic Partner and . . . or Peer Competitor," was especially timely.
Dr. David Shambaugh and Senior Colonel Wang Zhongchun look at China from two very different perspectives. Professor Shambaugh contends that those who succeed Deng Xiaoping, fearful of any further erosion of Communist Party hegemony and determined to return China to a purer form of neo-Maoist Marxism, will become even more conservative as China's economic and social problems intensify. Despite considerable political and economic challenges, his best estimate is that China will, from inherent inertia, "muddle through" well into the 21st century. Indeed, it is in the interests of the United States for China to hold together as a territorial nation-state and political unit because disintegration would foster socio-economic dislocations that could destabilize Asia. At the same time, U.S. policy must maintain pressure on China to improve human and civil rights performance.
Senior Colonel Wang Zhongchun provides a tour d'horizon of nearly a half-century of Chinese defense policy, from a distinctly PRC perspective. He then argues that China has attained a position of security and, even though the world presents many uncertainties, Beijing is committed to playing a positive role for peace and stability in Asia. The central principle in today's security analysis is that defense policy must support economic development so that China can grow into an economically progressive, democratic, and modern socialist country. Colonel Wang portrays China's military posture as one that seeks, above all, to protect China's territorial sovereignty, while focusing in this relatively peaceful era on modernizing in step with national economic development.
Raju G. C. Thomas Dr.
In January 1996, the U.S. War College's Strategic Studies Institute and the Center for Strategic and International Studies hosted a conference on "Asian Security to the Year 2000." In his presentation to the conference, Dr. Raju Thomas examined India's defense perspectives and prospects. From the standpoint of national security, India's post-independence history divides neatly into a turbulent first half, which included conflicts with China and Pakistan, and a relatively more stable period since 1971. That stability has been rattled by significant challenges (Kashmir, Sri Lanka, etc.), as Dr. Thomas points out. Five years ago, the collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to presage a more troubled era. Certainly, it caused as broad a reassessment of strategic policy in South Asia as elsewhere in the world. Dr. Thomas analyzes India's security environment and the three levels of challenges that India confronts in this post-Cold War period--internal, conventional military, and nuclear. While the challenges in each arena are profound and interrelated, he finds considerable room for optimism that the early years of the next century will see continued stability in South Asia.
Dianne L. Smith LTC
In January 1996, the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) hosted a conference on "Asian Security to the Year 2000." One focus of the conferees was the growing relevance of events in Central Asia. Perhaps nowhere on the continent was the Cold War transformation in the security environment more dramatic than in Central Asia. There the sudden retraction of Soviet power and decline in superpower competition was rapidly followed by the creation of new states, whose prospects for legitimacy, development, and independent survival were, at best, uncertain. The half-decade that has followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union has not been sufficient time for any of the vast challenges facing Central Asia to have been addressed definitively. Nor can we be confident that a stable regional "system" has coalesced. Yet, the past 5 years have produced an emerging pattern of relations amenable to tentative analysis.
Lieutenant Colonel Dianne Smith of SSI details the complex problems facing the region and then turns her attention to Central Asia's evolving security structure. By involving the "Great Game" analogy, she takes the perspective that, for this part of the continent, it is the nations surrounding the region that will play the primary role in shaping its future (although the new Central Asian nations are participants, not pawns, in this struggle for influence). Colonel Smith's analysis focuses on the interests and actions of five of those surrounding nations: Iran, Pakistan, India, Russia, and China. Each has significant interests in Central Asia, and each, thus far, has tempered, to some degree, its actions to advance those interests in recognition of the competing objectives of the others. For the United States, a power vacuum in Central Asia seems a remote concern at first blush.
Steven Metz Dr.
U.S. foreign policy in Sub-Saharan Africa seeks stability, democracy, and economic development. Despite recent positive trends, it is clear that not all African countries will move in this direction; some will sink into greater violence and misery. In the central part of the continent, Zaire is the linchpin. Because of its great size and natural wealth, Zaire has the ability to serve as either the locomotive of development or an agent of destabilization. If Zaire collapses, the U.S. Army may become involved in a major humanitarian relief operation. On the other hand, if Zaire succeeds at political reform and democratization, the Army may be tasked to reinvigorate military-to-military contacts. This study is designed to offer Army planners and leaders an understanding of the current crisis in Zaire and provide recommendations on future U.S. policy and Army activities.
William T. Johnsen Dr.
The U.S. decision to join the Implementation Force (IFOR) for the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Hercegovina (familiarly known as the Dayton Accords) marked a crucial milestone toward achieving the U.S. national objective of a lasting political settlement to the conflict in Bosnia. Equally critical will be determining whether the United States will continue participating in IFOR beyond the currently established 12-month deadline. Decisions of great import rarely entail simple cause and effect judgments. Thinking through the likely second and third order consequences of contemplated actions often defines success or failure as much as dealing with the issue of the moment. Such is the case for U.S. policy in Bosnia. In examining what form U.S. involvement in IFOR beyond the current deadline will take, we should recall that, while events inside Bosnia influenced the introduction of U.S. ground troops, wider U.S. interests in the Balkans, in Europe, and throughout the world proved more pivotal in the decision-making calculus. Likewise, a decision on whether to withdraw from or to extend IFOR also must encompass a similarly broad geo-strategic context. To that end, Dr. William Johnsen examines in this monograph the potential for creating suitable conditions for a lasting political settlement in Bosnia by December 1996, identifies possible outcomes of a U.S. withdrawal from IFOR, and assesses potential consequences for U.S. national objectives and interests within the Balkans, and beyond. Dr. Johnsen's conclusions will not sit well with most in the United States and abroad who are weary of the Bosnian "problem" and would like to see it "wrapped up" by December. That it appears intractable on the civil side despite IFOR's quieting of the guns heightens the frustration.
Bates Gill Dr. and Lonnie Henley LTC
In April 1996, the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute held its Seventh Annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme was, "China Into the 21st Century: Strategic Partner and…or Peer Competitor."
Dr. Bates Gill of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), on a panel entitled, "Seizing the RMA: China's Prospects," argued that there is more to participating in the RMA than securing or producing high-tech weaponry. A revolution is an all-encompassing phenomenon with socio-cultural as well as purely technological aspects. China's prospects for seizing the RMA lie not so much in the development of technology as in the restructuring of concepts and organizations. History, culture, and philosophical values will make it difficult for China to participate in the RMA. On the other hand, Dr. Gill believes that China may be able to develop an "RMA with Chinese characteristics" much as it took Marxism-Leninism, a Germanic-Russian innovation devised for proletarian revolution, and modified its tenets to be relevant within a peasant revolutionary context. Through sheer determination and by optimizing technology and expertise available from outside sources, China might approximate a less sophisticated RMA entirely suited to its own needs.
Army Lieutenant Colonel Lonnie Henley argues that, over the next 20 years, China will deploy a dozen or so divisions possessing relatively advanced systems, but that overall, the PLA will remain about a generation behind the U.S. Army in terms of its ability to participate in a fully-developed RMA. Furthermore, capabilities within the air and sea forces of the PLA will be even more limited with relatively small infusions of advanced aircraft like the SU-27 and naval vessels such as the KILO class submarines. These modern weapons will make up only a fraction of what will be otherwise dated forces. According to Colonel Henley, by 2010 the PLA may be able to achieve the kind of capabilities demonstrated by U.S. forces in the Gulf War.
Anatoly Bolyatko Major General (Retired), Peggy Falkenheim Meyer Prof., and Stephen J. Blank Dr.
In May 1995, the British Ministry of Defence, the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, the RAND Corporation, the Institute for National Security Studies of the U.S. Air Force Academy, and King's College, London, hosted a conference at King's College on "Russian Defense and Security Policy." The participants at the conference discussed a wide range of Russian defense and security policies from civil-military relations to defense economics, and regional policies: Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, and the Asia-Pacific Region. The two papers offered here, written by Dr. Peggy Falkenheim Meyer and Major General (Retired) Anatoly Bolyatko, reflect Western and Russian views on Russian policy in East Asia and its challenges. In this form, as throughout the conference, the intent was to juxtapose Western and Russian views on topical issues.
The Invitation to Struggle: Executive and Legislative Competition over the U.S. Military Presence on the Korean Peninsula
William E. Berry Dr.
This monograph was presented originally at the International Workshop on the U.S.-ROK Alliance held in Seoul, Korea, in October 1995. The Strategic Studies Institute co-hosted this workshop in collaboration with the Institute for Far Eastern Studies of Kyungnam University and in partnership with The Korea Society and the Defense Nuclear Agency. Dr. William E. Berry examines the history and the ongoing debate between the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. Government regarding policy in Korea. The issue of troop presence has taken a back seat to concerns over the North Korean nuclear threat. Most of the current congressional criticism is focused on the effectiveness of the administration's counterproliferation policy with respect to North Korea. Dr. Berry concludes that, until the nuclear issue is resolved, U.S. forces will likely remain in South Korea because vital national security interests are involved.
Pascale Combelles-Siegel Dr.
Ms. Pascale Combelles-Siegel examines the difficult road traveled by the press and the military since Operation URGENT FURY in 1983. She focuses on the development of the 1992 Joint Doctrine for Public Affairs as a practical tool for reducing tension and providing press access to the battlefield. Her analysis reflects the duality of the relationship and the efforts of both communities to find a modus vivendi.
Stephen C. Pelletiere Dr.
Yemen is one of the oldest societies in the Middle East. It sits athwart one of the world's most strategic waterways, and hence, throughout the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union contended for influence over it. With the end of the Cold War, Yemen's fortunes sank. Soviet support vanished, and the United States saw little need to cultivate Sana'a, particularly in light of Yemen's actions preceding the Gulf War. This study argues that Yemen should not be abandoned. It is part of the vital Persian Gulf system, which the United States has pledged to uphold. That whole system could be destabilized by conflicts that currently simmer on Yemen's borders. The study suggests ways in which Yemen could be assisted economically, and also how tensions between it and its most important neighbor, Saudi Arabia, could be attenuated. The study focuses attention on a problem of growing importance for U.S. policymakers—that of the so-called failed state. It rarely happens, the author declares, that states can be allowed to fail without undermining regional stability. And sometimes—as looms in the case with Yemen—the damage could be considerable.
June Teufel-Dreyer Dr.
In April 1996, the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute held its Seventh Annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme was, "China Into the 21st Century: Strategic Partner and…or Peer Competitor." Dr. June Tuefel Dreyer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, on a panel examining "China's Strategic View," argued that the armed forces of China, although large, simply are not capable today of militarily endorsing the kind of truculent actions recently undertaken in the Taiwan Straits. The qualitative advantage possessed by the sum total of Asian nations with interests at stake, not to mention those of the United States, exceeds that of the People's Liberation Army. Professor Dreyer provides a good overview of the current and projected strengths of the PLA's land, sea and air forces. Pressure is growing throughout the Pacific and around the world for China to attenuate hard line positions of the past. Dr. Dreyer argues that the PRC's actions may be eliciting equal and opposite reactions from states that feel their interests are being threatened. On the other hand, domestic pressures may make it difficult for the Chinese leadership to back away from some of the positions they have taken. The course China pursues into the 21st century will directly bear on the strategic interests of the United States in a significant way--and vice-versa.
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