Samuel S. Kim Dr.
In April 1996, the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute held its Seventh Annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme was, "China Into the 21st Century: Strategic Partner and . . . or Peer Competitor."
Dr. Samuel S. Kim of Columbia University argues that, while post-Tiananmen China is a growing regional military power, it is, almost paradoxically, a weak state both pretending and trying to be a strong one. By flexing its muscles with its weaker neighbors, China, is largely compensating for self-doubts about its national image and strength. What the world sees in China, a modernizing, economically robust, and assertive regional hegemon and world power "want-to-be," is, Dr. Kim asserts, at least in part a facade. Although China has made remarkable economic progress in the past few years, those who trumpet its rise do not consider its massive internal contradictions involving social, political, demographic, and environmental problems. Dr. Kim makes the point that weaknesses in those areas cannot be overcome by purchasing modern weapons, even those high-tech weapons that bolster a nation's claim to being a major military power. The United States is, and in all likelihood will remain, a Pacific power. China, despite the limitations Dr. Kim examines herein, will be an immense factor in the strategic balance of power in the Pacific region.
David Shambaugh Dr. and Wang Zhongchun Senior Colonel
This past April the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute held its Seventh Annual Strategy Conference. The theme, "China Into the 21st Century: Strategic Partner and . . . or Peer Competitor," was especially timely.
Dr. David Shambaugh and Senior Colonel Wang Zhongchun look at China from two very different perspectives. Professor Shambaugh contends that those who succeed Deng Xiaoping, fearful of any further erosion of Communist Party hegemony and determined to return China to a purer form of neo-Maoist Marxism, will become even more conservative as China's economic and social problems intensify. Despite considerable political and economic challenges, his best estimate is that China will, from inherent inertia, "muddle through" well into the 21st century. Indeed, it is in the interests of the United States for China to hold together as a territorial nation-state and political unit because disintegration would foster socio-economic dislocations that could destabilize Asia. At the same time, U.S. policy must maintain pressure on China to improve human and civil rights performance.
Senior Colonel Wang Zhongchun provides a tour d'horizon of nearly a half-century of Chinese defense policy, from a distinctly PRC perspective. He then argues that China has attained a position of security and, even though the world presents many uncertainties, Beijing is committed to playing a positive role for peace and stability in Asia. The central principle in today's security analysis is that defense policy must support economic development so that China can grow into an economically progressive, democratic, and modern socialist country. Colonel Wang portrays China's military posture as one that seeks, above all, to protect China's territorial sovereignty, while focusing in this relatively peaceful era on modernizing in step with national economic development.
Raju G. C. Thomas Dr.
In January 1996, the U.S. War College's Strategic Studies Institute and the Center for Strategic and International Studies hosted a conference on "Asian Security to the Year 2000." In his presentation to the conference, Dr. Raju Thomas examined India's defense perspectives and prospects. From the standpoint of national security, India's post-independence history divides neatly into a turbulent first half, which included conflicts with China and Pakistan, and a relatively more stable period since 1971. That stability has been rattled by significant challenges (Kashmir, Sri Lanka, etc.), as Dr. Thomas points out. Five years ago, the collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to presage a more troubled era. Certainly, it caused as broad a reassessment of strategic policy in South Asia as elsewhere in the world. Dr. Thomas analyzes India's security environment and the three levels of challenges that India confronts in this post-Cold War period--internal, conventional military, and nuclear. While the challenges in each arena are profound and interrelated, he finds considerable room for optimism that the early years of the next century will see continued stability in South Asia.
Dianne L. Smith LTC
In January 1996, the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) hosted a conference on "Asian Security to the Year 2000." One focus of the conferees was the growing relevance of events in Central Asia. Perhaps nowhere on the continent was the Cold War transformation in the security environment more dramatic than in Central Asia. There the sudden retraction of Soviet power and decline in superpower competition was rapidly followed by the creation of new states, whose prospects for legitimacy, development, and independent survival were, at best, uncertain. The half-decade that has followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union has not been sufficient time for any of the vast challenges facing Central Asia to have been addressed definitively. Nor can we be confident that a stable regional "system" has coalesced. Yet, the past 5 years have produced an emerging pattern of relations amenable to tentative analysis.
Lieutenant Colonel Dianne Smith of SSI details the complex problems facing the region and then turns her attention to Central Asia's evolving security structure. By involving the "Great Game" analogy, she takes the perspective that, for this part of the continent, it is the nations surrounding the region that will play the primary role in shaping its future (although the new Central Asian nations are participants, not pawns, in this struggle for influence). Colonel Smith's analysis focuses on the interests and actions of five of those surrounding nations: Iran, Pakistan, India, Russia, and China. Each has significant interests in Central Asia, and each, thus far, has tempered, to some degree, its actions to advance those interests in recognition of the competing objectives of the others. For the United States, a power vacuum in Central Asia seems a remote concern at first blush.
Steven Metz Dr.
U.S. foreign policy in Sub-Saharan Africa seeks stability, democracy, and economic development. Despite recent positive trends, it is clear that not all African countries will move in this direction; some will sink into greater violence and misery. In the central part of the continent, Zaire is the linchpin. Because of its great size and natural wealth, Zaire has the ability to serve as either the locomotive of development or an agent of destabilization. If Zaire collapses, the U.S. Army may become involved in a major humanitarian relief operation. On the other hand, if Zaire succeeds at political reform and democratization, the Army may be tasked to reinvigorate military-to-military contacts. This study is designed to offer Army planners and leaders an understanding of the current crisis in Zaire and provide recommendations on future U.S. policy and Army activities.
William T. Johnsen Dr.
The U.S. decision to join the Implementation Force (IFOR) for the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Hercegovina (familiarly known as the Dayton Accords) marked a crucial milestone toward achieving the U.S. national objective of a lasting political settlement to the conflict in Bosnia. Equally critical will be determining whether the United States will continue participating in IFOR beyond the currently established 12-month deadline. Decisions of great import rarely entail simple cause and effect judgments. Thinking through the likely second and third order consequences of contemplated actions often defines success or failure as much as dealing with the issue of the moment. Such is the case for U.S. policy in Bosnia. In examining what form U.S. involvement in IFOR beyond the current deadline will take, we should recall that, while events inside Bosnia influenced the introduction of U.S. ground troops, wider U.S. interests in the Balkans, in Europe, and throughout the world proved more pivotal in the decision-making calculus. Likewise, a decision on whether to withdraw from or to extend IFOR also must encompass a similarly broad geo-strategic context. To that end, Dr. William Johnsen examines in this monograph the potential for creating suitable conditions for a lasting political settlement in Bosnia by December 1996, identifies possible outcomes of a U.S. withdrawal from IFOR, and assesses potential consequences for U.S. national objectives and interests within the Balkans, and beyond. Dr. Johnsen's conclusions will not sit well with most in the United States and abroad who are weary of the Bosnian "problem" and would like to see it "wrapped up" by December. That it appears intractable on the civil side despite IFOR's quieting of the guns heightens the frustration.
Bates Gill Dr. and Lonnie Henley LTC
In April 1996, the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute held its Seventh Annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme was, "China Into the 21st Century: Strategic Partner and…or Peer Competitor."
Dr. Bates Gill of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), on a panel entitled, "Seizing the RMA: China's Prospects," argued that there is more to participating in the RMA than securing or producing high-tech weaponry. A revolution is an all-encompassing phenomenon with socio-cultural as well as purely technological aspects. China's prospects for seizing the RMA lie not so much in the development of technology as in the restructuring of concepts and organizations. History, culture, and philosophical values will make it difficult for China to participate in the RMA. On the other hand, Dr. Gill believes that China may be able to develop an "RMA with Chinese characteristics" much as it took Marxism-Leninism, a Germanic-Russian innovation devised for proletarian revolution, and modified its tenets to be relevant within a peasant revolutionary context. Through sheer determination and by optimizing technology and expertise available from outside sources, China might approximate a less sophisticated RMA entirely suited to its own needs.
Army Lieutenant Colonel Lonnie Henley argues that, over the next 20 years, China will deploy a dozen or so divisions possessing relatively advanced systems, but that overall, the PLA will remain about a generation behind the U.S. Army in terms of its ability to participate in a fully-developed RMA. Furthermore, capabilities within the air and sea forces of the PLA will be even more limited with relatively small infusions of advanced aircraft like the SU-27 and naval vessels such as the KILO class submarines. These modern weapons will make up only a fraction of what will be otherwise dated forces. According to Colonel Henley, by 2010 the PLA may be able to achieve the kind of capabilities demonstrated by U.S. forces in the Gulf War.
Anatoly Bolyatko Major General (Retired), Peggy Falkenheim Meyer Prof., and Stephen J. Blank Dr.
In May 1995, the British Ministry of Defence, the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, the RAND Corporation, the Institute for National Security Studies of the U.S. Air Force Academy, and King's College, London, hosted a conference at King's College on "Russian Defense and Security Policy." The participants at the conference discussed a wide range of Russian defense and security policies from civil-military relations to defense economics, and regional policies: Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, and the Asia-Pacific Region. The two papers offered here, written by Dr. Peggy Falkenheim Meyer and Major General (Retired) Anatoly Bolyatko, reflect Western and Russian views on Russian policy in East Asia and its challenges. In this form, as throughout the conference, the intent was to juxtapose Western and Russian views on topical issues.
The Invitation to Struggle: Executive and Legislative Competition over the U.S. Military Presence on the Korean Peninsula
William E. Berry Dr.
This monograph was presented originally at the International Workshop on the U.S.-ROK Alliance held in Seoul, Korea, in October 1995. The Strategic Studies Institute co-hosted this workshop in collaboration with the Institute for Far Eastern Studies of Kyungnam University and in partnership with The Korea Society and the Defense Nuclear Agency. Dr. William E. Berry examines the history and the ongoing debate between the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. Government regarding policy in Korea. The issue of troop presence has taken a back seat to concerns over the North Korean nuclear threat. Most of the current congressional criticism is focused on the effectiveness of the administration's counterproliferation policy with respect to North Korea. Dr. Berry concludes that, until the nuclear issue is resolved, U.S. forces will likely remain in South Korea because vital national security interests are involved.
Pascale Combelles-Siegel Dr.
Ms. Pascale Combelles-Siegel examines the difficult road traveled by the press and the military since Operation URGENT FURY in 1983. She focuses on the development of the 1992 Joint Doctrine for Public Affairs as a practical tool for reducing tension and providing press access to the battlefield. Her analysis reflects the duality of the relationship and the efforts of both communities to find a modus vivendi.
Stephen C. Pelletiere Dr.
Yemen is one of the oldest societies in the Middle East. It sits athwart one of the world's most strategic waterways, and hence, throughout the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union contended for influence over it. With the end of the Cold War, Yemen's fortunes sank. Soviet support vanished, and the United States saw little need to cultivate Sana'a, particularly in light of Yemen's actions preceding the Gulf War. This study argues that Yemen should not be abandoned. It is part of the vital Persian Gulf system, which the United States has pledged to uphold. That whole system could be destabilized by conflicts that currently simmer on Yemen's borders. The study suggests ways in which Yemen could be assisted economically, and also how tensions between it and its most important neighbor, Saudi Arabia, could be attenuated. The study focuses attention on a problem of growing importance for U.S. policymakers—that of the so-called failed state. It rarely happens, the author declares, that states can be allowed to fail without undermining regional stability. And sometimes—as looms in the case with Yemen—the damage could be considerable.
June Teufel-Dreyer Dr.
In April 1996, the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute held its Seventh Annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme was, "China Into the 21st Century: Strategic Partner and…or Peer Competitor." Dr. June Tuefel Dreyer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, on a panel examining "China's Strategic View," argued that the armed forces of China, although large, simply are not capable today of militarily endorsing the kind of truculent actions recently undertaken in the Taiwan Straits. The qualitative advantage possessed by the sum total of Asian nations with interests at stake, not to mention those of the United States, exceeds that of the People's Liberation Army. Professor Dreyer provides a good overview of the current and projected strengths of the PLA's land, sea and air forces. Pressure is growing throughout the Pacific and around the world for China to attenuate hard line positions of the past. Dr. Dreyer argues that the PRC's actions may be eliciting equal and opposite reactions from states that feel their interests are being threatened. On the other hand, domestic pressures may make it difficult for the Chinese leadership to back away from some of the positions they have taken. The course China pursues into the 21st century will directly bear on the strategic interests of the United States in a significant way--and vice-versa.
Stephen J. Blank Dr.
One of the most likely candidates for future membership in NATO is the Czech Republic. Inasmuch as the debate over this issue is engaging chancelleries all over the United States and Europe, it is necessary to understand how the prospective members view European security issues, what they hope to gain from membership, and how their interests and security relationships mesh with NATO's. Dr. Stephen Blank examines Czech policy. His purpose is not to determine whether the United States or any other members should support or oppose NATO enlargement. Instead, he seeks to analyze Czech views and inform our audience as to their meaning and importance for both the Czech Republic and the other NATO members.
Robert G. Sutter
In April 1996, the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute held its Seventh Annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme was, "China Into the 21st Century: Strategic Partner and…or Peer Competitor." Robert G. Sutter, a Senior Specialist in International Policy with the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, sets the scene for his discussion of the U.S. role in China's future by providing a comprehensive analysis of the key factors that shape China's domestic and international policies. He outlines a mixed picture—a regime today that is pragmatic in its international political and economic relations but highly protective on territorial and sovereignty issues. He also notes that it is a regime in transition and articulates the various interpretations of where that transition might be headed. But if understanding China is vital to effective U.S. policy, so too are achieving consensus on U.S. objectives and framing coherent courses of action. On this count, Dr. Sutter finds several competing outlooks at work, both within and outside the U.S. Government. His review of these suggests that Chinese leaders will have as much difficulty predicting the future course of American policy as the other way around. Dr. Sutter concludes his paper with several useful guidelines for those charged with formulating instrumental policy with respect to China. These insights complete a thorough survey of the major issues, interactions, and choices which will shape the U.S.-China strategic relationship.
Donald E. Schulz Dr.
Dr. Donald E. Schulz looks at the prospects for political stability, democratization, and socioeconomic development. His conclusions are sobering. While by no means dismissing the possibility that Haiti can "make it," he presents a portrait of the imposing obstacles that must still be overcome and a detailed discussion of the things that could go wrong. In a nutshell, he argues that without a much greater willingness on the part of the United States and the international community to "stay the course" in terms of providing long-term security and socioeconomic aid, Haiti is unlikely to make a successful transition to a stable, democratic, economically modernizing nation. (Even with continuing assistance, the outlook will be problematic.) He argues that unless the United States and other foreign donors recognize this and do what is necessary to give the Haitian experiment a better chance to succeed, the "tactical success" that has been enjoyed so far will sooner or later be transformed into a "strategic failure." His policy recommendations, in particular, deserve close scrutiny.
Thomas L. Wilborn Dr.
The United States has vital security and economic interests in Northeast Asia, one of the most dynamic regions of the world. This monograph focuses on the three bilateral relationships, those connecting China, Japan, and the United States to each other, which will dominate the future of the region. Dr. Thomas Wilborn analyzes these relations, taking into account key issues involving Taiwan and North Korea, and offers insights regarding their future course. He also reviews U.S. engagement policy and assesses the value of U.S. military presence for regional stability. Dr. Wilborn suggests that in the short range, Washington should avoid significant changes of policy. However, in the long range, the United States will have to establish machinery which provides ways for the major states, especially China and Japan, to assert greater initiative commensurate with their economic power, yet within a stable political context. Multilateral operational structures to supplement existing bilateral relations in Northeast Asia may provide a means for the United States to influence long-range trends and protect U.S. interests.
William T. Johnsen Dr., Douglas V. Johnson Dr., Douglas C. Lovelace Professor, and Steven Metz Dr.
Armies historically have been criticized for preparing for the last war. Since the early 1980s, however, the U.S. Army has broken this pattern and created a force capable of winning the next war. But, in an era characterized by a volatile international security environment, accelerating technological advances (particularly in acquiring, processing, and disseminating information), the emergence of what some are calling a "revolution in military affairs," and forecasts of increasingly constrained fiscal resources, it seems ill-advised to plan only for the "next Army." The purpose of this monograph, therefore, is to begin the debate on the "Army After Next." Initiating such a discussion requires positing the outlines of future security conditions and the Army's role in that environment. This also means challenging convictions that provide much of the basis for the "current Army," as well as some of the assumptions that undergird planning for the "next Army." The authors recognize that not all will agree with their assumptions, analysis, or conclusions. Their efforts, however, are not intended to antagonize. Rather, they seek to explore the premises which will shape thinking about the "Army After Next." The ensuing exchange of ideas, they hope, will help create a force that can continue to be called upon to serve the interests of the Nation in an as yet uncertain future.
Dennis S. Ippolito Dr.
Defense economist Dennis S. Ippolito dissects Federal budget practices over the past several decades, with a particular focus on sources and trends in our national deficit spending syndrome. Underlying his message is an unsettling truth, that no matter how the current debate over balancing the budget turns out, future cases for the Army Budget are going to have to be made in an even more challenging spending environment as discretionary spending margins shrink. Army professionals, now more than ever, need to be articulate advocates of landpower for the 21st century. But before articulate and reasoned arguments can be made for the kind of force that will ensure that the nation does, indeed, build and maintain the world's best Army (or Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps), one must take into account the realities of the Federal budget.
James Kievit LTC and Steven Metz Dr.
Lieutenant Colonel James Kievit and Dr. Steven Metz begin the effort to construct guideposts for strategists to follow. They provide basic information explaining the most important features of the Internet, and a critical review of more than a hundred of the electronic sites most likely to be of interest to research analysts or military planners. While the authors conclude that the Internet today "is not a solution to the analyst's need for relevant, timely information," they argue that individuals and organizations must prepare themselves now for the day in the not-so-distant future when "an analyst's collection of Internet 'bookmarks' will be nearly as valuable as a rolodex of personal contacts is now."
Earl H. Tilford Dr.
The analysts at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) annually assess the strategic equation for their particular area of interest. This year they were asked to consider not only the next 12-18 months, but also to look 10 years ahead and to think about the future as it might affect both the nation and the Army. From the strategic context that they envision, SSI is producing its 1996 Study Program. This process provides the transition from the general strategic context to individual studies. These 1996 strategic assessments are crucial for two reasons. First, the post-Cold War world remains complex. These complexities present the nation and the Army with diverse and potentially perilous challenges. To remain the world's best Army in the 21st century, we must define clearly today the strategic challenges we may face tomorrow. Second, the Army is addressing this strategic context at a crucial juncture when it has nearly completed its planned downsizing and has begun to transform its vision of the future into modernization requirements through the Force XXI process. That transformation is threatened by continued pressures to reduce Army spending.
Steven Metz Dr. and Kent Hughes Butts Dr.
In October 1994, the Strategic Studies Institute sponsored a roundtable on democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa. Particular attention was paid to the role the U.S. military and Department of Defense played in democracy support. This study developed from a paper presented at the roundtable. Dr. Butts and Dr. Metz reject the notion that the political culture of African states allows or even encourages military intervention in politics. Drawing on case studies from Nigeria and South Africa, they contend that if the fragile democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa are to be sustained, African militaries must be extricated from politics and take decisive steps toward the type of military professionalism seen in stable democracies around the world. U.S. national interests in Sub-Saharan Africa are so limited that the region will receive only a very small proportion of the human, political, military, and economic resources devoted to American national security strategy. This makes efficiency imperative. Dr. Butts and Dr. Metz argue that if U.S. strategic resources are used wisely in Africa, they can have the desired effect. In particular, the U.S. military can play an important part in helping African militaries professionalize. They close with concrete proposals through which the U.S. Department of Defense and the Army could more effectively support African democratization.
William T. Johnsen Dr.
After having been fueled by the events of the distant and recent past, the current wars in the former Yugoslavia finally may be grinding to a halt. An understanding of that past, and of how history and myth combine to influence the present and help to define the future in the Balkans, is no less relevant today than it was two years ago when the original version of this monograph was published. Events of the intervening years have largely validated the insights and conclusions offered in the initial report. That said, strategic conditions have evolved, and two years of additional study and analysis provide a greater understanding of the long-term roots of conflict in the Balkans, as well as a firmer grasp of the proximate historical factors that contributed to the outbreak of violence.
In this revised monograph, the first four chapters that provide the historical examination of the Balkan enigma remain substantially unchanged. Details have been added, and interpretations modified attenuated or accentuated as the author's understanding of events has matured. The last chapter of the original version has been expanded into three chapters. Chapter 5 first offers insights that are drawn from the first portion of the report. Because the passage of time has foreclosed some alternatives, and the changed strategic conditions have created the possibility for new options to be examined, the policy assessments that are now Chapter 6 have been substantially rewritten. Similarly, a new Chapter 7, "Conclusions", contains revised reflections on the preceding analysis. Despite the revisions, the focus of the monograph remains on the tangled history of the region, and how policy options fit into the larger historical context that has influenced, and will continue to affect, the course of events in the Balkans.
Gabriel Marcella Dr.
One of the more serious dangers to peace and security in Latin America is the territorial dispute between Ecuador and Peru, which broke out into warfare in February-March 1995. In this monograph, Dr. Gabriel Marcella explores the critical historical and strategic dimensions of the conflict. He argues that unless this age-old dispute is settled amicably and soon, it could very well generate a more disastrous war in the future. Dr. Marcella proposes a basis for settlement and provides specific policy recommendations for the United States and the inter-American community.
Richard A. Chilcoat Lieutenant General (USA, Ret)
This essay develops a simple, yet comprehensive definition of strategic art. Strategic art entails the orchestration of all the instruments of national power to yield specific, well-defined end states. Desired end states and strategic outcomes derive from the national interests and are variously defined in terms of physical security, economic well-being, and the promotion of values. Strategic art, broadly defined, is therefore: The skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends (objectives), ways (courses of action), and means (supporting resources) to promote and defend the national interests.
Douglas C. Lovelace Professor and Thomas-Durell Young Dr.
This is the second in an analytical series on joint issues. It follows the authors' U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus, in which they articulated the need for more formal joint strategic plans. This essay examines the effect such plans would have on joint doctrine development and illustrates the potential benefits evident in Australian defense planning. Doctrine and planning share an iterative development process. The common view is that doctrine persists over a broader time frame than planning and that the latter draws on the former for context, syntax, even format. In truth the very process of planning shapes new ways of military action. As the environment for that action changes, planners address new challenges, and create the demand for better methods of organizing, employing and supporting forces. Evolutionary, occasionally revolutionary, doctrinal changes result. The authors explore the relationship between strategic planning and doctrine at the joint level. They enter the current debate over the scope and authority of joint doctrine from a joint strategic planning perspective. In their view, joint doctrine must have roots, and those roots have to be planted firmly in the strategic concepts and plans developed to carry out the National Military Strategy. Without the fertile groundwork of strategic plans, the body of joint doctrine will struggle for viability.
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