Follow

• 

  Yemen and Stability in the Persian Gulf: Confronting the Threat from Within

  Stephen C. Pelletiere Dr.

  Yemen is one of the oldest societies in the Middle East. It sits athwart one of the world's most strategic waterways, and hence, throughout the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union contended for influence over it. With the end of the Cold War, Yemen's fortunes sank. Soviet support vanished, and the United States saw little need to cultivate Sana'a, particularly in light of Yemen's actions preceding the Gulf War. This study argues that Yemen should not be abandoned. It is part of the vital Persian Gulf system, which the United States has pledged to uphold. That whole system could be destabilized by conflicts that currently simmer on Yemen's borders. The study suggests ways in which Yemen could be assisted economically, and also how tensions between it and its most important neighbor, Saudi Arabia, could be attenuated. The study focuses attention on a problem of growing importance for U.S. policymakers—that of the so-called failed state. It rarely happens, the author declares, that states can be allowed to fail without undermining regional stability. And sometimes—as looms in the case with Yemen—the damage could be considerable.

• 

  China's Strategic View: The Role of the People's Liberation Army

  June Teufel-Dreyer Dr.

  In April 1996, the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute held its Seventh Annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme was, "China Into the 21st Century: Strategic Partner and…or Peer Competitor." Dr. June Tuefel Dreyer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, on a panel examining "China's Strategic View," argued that the armed forces of China, although large, simply are not capable today of militarily endorsing the kind of truculent actions recently undertaken in the Taiwan Straits. The qualitative advantage possessed by the sum total of Asian nations with interests at stake, not to mention those of the United States, exceeds that of the People's Liberation Army. Professor Dreyer provides a good overview of the current and projected strengths of the PLA's land, sea and air forces. Pressure is growing throughout the Pacific and around the world for China to attenuate hard line positions of the past. Dr. Dreyer argues that the PRC's actions may be eliciting equal and opposite reactions from states that feel their interests are being threatened. On the other hand, domestic pressures may make it difficult for the Chinese leadership to back away from some of the positions they have taken. The course China pursues into the 21st century will directly bear on the strategic interests of the United States in a significant way--and vice-versa.

• 

  Prague, NATO, and European Security

  Stephen J. Blank Dr.

  One of the most likely candidates for future membership in NATO is the Czech Republic. Inasmuch as the debate over this issue is engaging chancelleries all over the United States and Europe, it is necessary to understand how the prospective members view European security issues, what they hope to gain from membership, and how their interests and security relationships mesh with NATO's. Dr. Stephen Blank examines Czech policy. His purpose is not to determine whether the United States or any other members should support or oppose NATO enlargement. Instead, he seeks to analyze Czech views and inform our audience as to their meaning and importance for both the Czech Republic and the other NATO members.

• 

  Shaping China's Future in World Affairs: The U.S. Role

  Robert G. Sutter

  In April 1996, the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute held its Seventh Annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme was, "China Into the 21st Century: Strategic Partner and…or Peer Competitor." Robert G. Sutter, a Senior Specialist in International Policy with the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, sets the scene for his discussion of the U.S. role in China's future by providing a comprehensive analysis of the key factors that shape China's domestic and international policies. He outlines a mixed picture—a regime today that is pragmatic in its international political and economic relations but highly protective on territorial and sovereignty issues. He also notes that it is a regime in transition and articulates the various interpretations of where that transition might be headed. But if understanding China is vital to effective U.S. policy, so too are achieving consensus on U.S. objectives and framing coherent courses of action. On this count, Dr. Sutter finds several competing outlooks at work, both within and outside the U.S. Government. His review of these suggests that Chinese leaders will have as much difficulty predicting the future course of American policy as the other way around. Dr. Sutter concludes his paper with several useful guidelines for those charged with formulating instrumental policy with respect to China. These insights complete a thorough survey of the major issues, interactions, and choices which will shape the U.S.-China strategic relationship.

• 

  Whither Haiti?

  Donald E. Schulz Dr.

  Dr. Donald E. Schulz looks at the prospects for political stability, democratization, and socioeconomic development. His conclusions are sobering. While by no means dismissing the possibility that Haiti can "make it," he presents a portrait of the imposing obstacles that must still be overcome and a detailed discussion of the things that could go wrong. In a nutshell, he argues that without a much greater willingness on the part of the United States and the international community to "stay the course" in terms of providing long-term security and socioeconomic aid, Haiti is unlikely to make a successful transition to a stable, democratic, economically modernizing nation. (Even with continuing assistance, the outlook will be problematic.) He argues that unless the United States and other foreign donors recognize this and do what is necessary to give the Haitian experiment a better chance to succeed, the "tactical success" that has been enjoyed so far will sooner or later be transformed into a "strategic failure." His policy recommendations, in particular, deserve close scrutiny.

• 

  International Politics in Northeast Asia: The China-Japan-United States Strategic Triangle

  Thomas L. Wilborn Dr.

  The United States has vital security and economic interests in Northeast Asia, one of the most dynamic regions of the world. This monograph focuses on the three bilateral relationships, those connecting China, Japan, and the United States to each other, which will dominate the future of the region. Dr. Thomas Wilborn analyzes these relations, taking into account key issues involving Taiwan and North Korea, and offers insights regarding their future course. He also reviews U.S. engagement policy and assesses the value of U.S. military presence for regional stability. Dr. Wilborn suggests that in the short range, Washington should avoid significant changes of policy. However, in the long range, the United States will have to establish machinery which provides ways for the major states, especially China and Japan, to assert greater initiative commensurate with their economic power, yet within a stable political context. Multilateral operational structures to supplement existing bilateral relations in Northeast Asia may provide a means for the United States to influence long-range trends and protect U.S. interests.

• 

  The Future of American Landpower: Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century Army

  William T. Johnsen Dr., Douglas V. Johnson Dr., Douglas C. Lovelace Professor, and Steven Metz Dr.

  Armies historically have been criticized for preparing for the last war. Since the early 1980s, however, the U.S. Army has broken this pattern and created a force capable of winning the next war. But, in an era characterized by a volatile international security environment, accelerating technological advances (particularly in acquiring, processing, and disseminating information), the emergence of what some are calling a "revolution in military affairs," and forecasts of increasingly constrained fiscal resources, it seems ill-advised to plan only for the "next Army." The purpose of this monograph, therefore, is to begin the debate on the "Army After Next." Initiating such a discussion requires positing the outlines of future security conditions and the Army's role in that environment. This also means challenging convictions that provide much of the basis for the "current Army," as well as some of the assumptions that undergird planning for the "next Army." The authors recognize that not all will agree with their assumptions, analysis, or conclusions. Their efforts, however, are not intended to antagonize. Rather, they seek to explore the premises which will shape thinking about the "Army After Next." The ensuing exchange of ideas, they hope, will help create a force that can continue to be called upon to serve the interests of the Nation in an as yet uncertain future.

• 

  Federal Budget Policy and Defense Strategy

  Dennis S. Ippolito Dr.

  Defense economist Dennis S. Ippolito dissects Federal budget practices over the past several decades, with a particular focus on sources and trends in our national deficit spending syndrome. Underlying his message is an unsettling truth, that no matter how the current debate over balancing the budget turns out, future cases for the Army Budget are going to have to be made in an even more challenging spending environment as discretionary spending margins shrink. Army professionals, now more than ever, need to be articulate advocates of landpower for the 21st century. But before articulate and reasoned arguments can be made for the kind of force that will ensure that the nation does, indeed, build and maintain the world's best Army (or Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps), one must take into account the realities of the Federal budget.

• 

  The Strategist and the Web: Guide to Internet Resources

  James Kievit LTC and Steven Metz Dr.

  Lieutenant Colonel James Kievit and Dr. Steven Metz begin the effort to construct guideposts for strategists to follow. They provide basic information explaining the most important features of the Internet, and a critical review of more than a hundred of the electronic sites most likely to be of interest to research analysts or military planners. While the authors conclude that the Internet today "is not a solution to the analyst's need for relevant, timely information," they argue that individuals and organizations must prepare themselves now for the day in the not-so-distant future when "an analyst's collection of Internet 'bookmarks' will be nearly as valuable as a rolodex of personal contacts is now."

• 

  World View: The 1996 Strategic Assessment from the Strategic Studies Institute

  Earl H. Tilford Dr.

  The analysts at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) annually assess the strategic equation for their particular area of interest. This year they were asked to consider not only the next 12-18 months, but also to look 10 years ahead and to think about the future as it might affect both the nation and the Army. From the strategic context that they envision, SSI is producing its 1996 Study Program. This process provides the transition from the general strategic context to individual studies. These 1996 strategic assessments are crucial for two reasons. First, the post-Cold War world remains complex. These complexities present the nation and the Army with diverse and potentially perilous challenges. To remain the world's best Army in the 21st century, we must define clearly today the strategic challenges we may face tomorrow. Second, the Army is addressing this strategic context at a crucial juncture when it has nearly completed its planned downsizing and has begun to transform its vision of the future into modernization requirements through the Force XXI process. That transformation is threatened by continued pressures to reduce Army spending.

• 

  Armies and Democracy in the New Africa: Lessons from Nigeria and South Africa

  Steven Metz Dr. and Kent Hughes Butts Dr.

  In October 1994, the Strategic Studies Institute sponsored a roundtable on democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa. Particular attention was paid to the role the U.S. military and Department of Defense played in democracy support. This study developed from a paper presented at the roundtable. Dr. Butts and Dr. Metz reject the notion that the political culture of African states allows or even encourages military intervention in politics. Drawing on case studies from Nigeria and South Africa, they contend that if the fragile democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa are to be sustained, African militaries must be extricated from politics and take decisive steps toward the type of military professionalism seen in stable democracies around the world. U.S. national interests in Sub-Saharan Africa are so limited that the region will receive only a very small proportion of the human, political, military, and economic resources devoted to American national security strategy. This makes efficiency imperative. Dr. Butts and Dr. Metz argue that if U.S. strategic resources are used wisely in Africa, they can have the desired effect. In particular, the U.S. military can play an important part in helping African militaries professionalize. They close with concrete proposals through which the U.S. Department of Defense and the Army could more effectively support African democratization.

• 

  Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy

  William T. Johnsen Dr.

  After having been fueled by the events of the distant and recent past, the current wars in the former Yugoslavia finally may be grinding to a halt. An understanding of that past, and of how history and myth combine to influence the present and help to define the future in the Balkans, is no less relevant today than it was two years ago when the original version of this monograph was published. Events of the intervening years have largely validated the insights and conclusions offered in the initial report. That said, strategic conditions have evolved, and two years of additional study and analysis provide a greater understanding of the long-term roots of conflict in the Balkans, as well as a firmer grasp of the proximate historical factors that contributed to the outbreak of violence.
  
  In this revised monograph, the first four chapters that provide the historical examination of the Balkan enigma remain substantially unchanged. Details have been added, and interpretations modified attenuated or accentuated as the author's understanding of events has matured. The last chapter of the original version has been expanded into three chapters. Chapter 5 first offers insights that are drawn from the first portion of the report. Because the passage of time has foreclosed some alternatives, and the changed strategic conditions have created the possibility for new options to be examined, the policy assessments that are now Chapter 6 have been substantially rewritten. Similarly, a new Chapter 7, "Conclusions", contains revised reflections on the preceding analysis. Despite the revisions, the focus of the monograph remains on the tangled history of the region, and how policy options fit into the larger historical context that has influenced, and will continue to affect, the course of events in the Balkans.

• 

  Strategic Implications for the United states and Latin America of the 1995 Ecuador-Peru War

  Gabriel Marcella Dr.

  One of the more serious dangers to peace and security in Latin America is the territorial dispute between Ecuador and Peru, which broke out into warfare in February-March 1995. In this monograph, Dr. Gabriel Marcella explores the critical historical and strategic dimensions of the conflict. He argues that unless this age-old dispute is settled amicably and soon, it could very well generate a more disastrous war in the future. Dr. Marcella proposes a basis for settlement and provides specific policy recommendations for the United States and the inter-American community.

• 

  Strategic Art: The New Discipline for 21st Century Leaders

  Richard A. Chilcoat Lieutenant General (USA, Ret)

  This essay develops a simple, yet comprehensive definition of strategic art. Strategic art entails the orchestration of all the instruments of national power to yield specific, well-defined end states. Desired end states and strategic outcomes derive from the national interests and are variously defined in terms of physical security, economic well-being, and the promotion of values. Strategic art, broadly defined, is therefore: The skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends (objectives), ways (courses of action), and means (supporting resources) to promote and defend the national interests.

• 

  Strategic Plans, Joint Doctrine and Antipodean Insights

  Douglas C. Lovelace Professor and Thomas-Durell Young Dr.

  This is the second in an analytical series on joint issues. It follows the authors' U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus, in which they articulated the need for more formal joint strategic plans. This essay examines the effect such plans would have on joint doctrine development and illustrates the potential benefits evident in Australian defense planning. Doctrine and planning share an iterative development process. The common view is that doctrine persists over a broader time frame than planning and that the latter draws on the former for context, syntax, even format. In truth the very process of planning shapes new ways of military action. As the environment for that action changes, planners address new challenges, and create the demand for better methods of organizing, employing and supporting forces. Evolutionary, occasionally revolutionary, doctrinal changes result. The authors explore the relationship between strategic planning and doctrine at the joint level. They enter the current debate over the scope and authority of joint doctrine from a joint strategic planning perspective. In their view, joint doctrine must have roots, and those roots have to be planted firmly in the strategic concepts and plans developed to carry out the National Military Strategy. Without the fertile groundwork of strategic plans, the body of joint doctrine will struggle for viability.

• 

  Yugoslavia's Wars: The Problem from Hell

  Stephen J. Blank Dr.

  The continuing warfare in the former Yugoslavia looms as one of the most intractable problems in contemporary world politics. For four years the international community has struggled merely to contain this fire and prevent it from inflaming a general European crisis. Only now does there seem a real chance of extinguishing it. By late 1994, it was apparent that the danger of continued fighting could fracture the NATO Alliance and lead to the spread of the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Bearing this possibility in mind, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), U.S. Army War College, convened its second annual roundtable on the subject on January 30, 1995. SSI asked the specialists published in this volume to assess how we have gotten to the present situation, to define its parameters, and, finally, to suggest where we should and might be going in the future. Because of the continuing urgency and intensity of the crisis these wars have caused, SSI offers the analysis and information herein to specialists, policymakers, and laymen alike with a goal of helping to clarify the issues at stake in former Yugoslavia.

• 

  A Theory of Fundamentalism: An Inquiry into the Origin and Development of the Movement

  Stephen C. Pelletiere Dr.

  Islamic fundamentalism is growing at such a rapid rate that many believe it threatens to take over the Middle East. To prevent this, enormous resources have been summoned, not only from within the region, but in the West as well. Yet, for all the efforts to contain, if not turn back the fundamentalists, the movement appears likely to pose a security challenge well into the next century. Dr. Stephen Pelletiere points out that containment of fundamentalism depends first and foremost on accurate information about the nature of the movement. He examines the origins of the various fundamentalist groups that are challenging the area's governments, and explains why they were able to grow in the face of official repression by some of the most sophisticated and well-equipped security services in the world. The author concludes by building a theory about fundamentalism, which implies a need to redirect policy for coping with it. Dr. Pelletiere maintains that the solution is not to try to crush the movement—that has been attempted numerous times and consistently has failed. Rather, the way to proceed is to locate and act on the basic split within the movement between its socially constructive and other more violent elements.

• 

  Mexico and the Future

  Donald E. Schulz Dr.

  The recent traumatic developments in Mexico caught both the Mexican and U.S. governments, as well as most academic observers, by surprise. Until the Zapatista National Liberation Army burst onto the scene in January 1994, Mexico s future seemed assured. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) had just been ratified by the U.S. Congress, and there was a widespread expectation that Mexico would take off economically and would, within the reasonably near future, join the ranks of the developed countries. And while the outlook for democracy seemed more problematic, few questioned the essential stability of the political system. Since then, much has changed. What happened and why are explored by Donald Schulz in an earlier SSI study, Mexico in Crisis. Dr. Schulz goes beyond that preliminary assessment to look at the prospects for democratization, socioeconomic development, political stability, U.S.-Mexican relations, and the national security implications for both countries. His findings are unsettling, and so are some of his policy recommendations, for they cut at the heart of many of the assumptions U.S. and Mexican leaders have made about the effects of current policies and where Mexico and the U.S.-Mexican relationship are headed.

• 

  U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus

  Douglas C. Lovelace Professor and Thomas-Durell Young Dr.

  The authors define a formal strategic plan: one that contains specific strategic objectives, offers a clear and executable strategy for achieving objectives, illuminates force capability requirements, and is harmonized with the Future Years Defense Program. They discuss the reasons why a strategic plan is needed and the value it would have in coherently connecting the guidance provided by the National Command Authorities to the integrated activities of the unified commands, the Services, and other components of DoD. They conclude by examining three alternatives to improve the strategic planning processes and to facilitate efficient development of strategic plans. They settle on a set of recommendations that they believe would comprehensively link the major elements of current strategic planning, albeit modified in some cases, and establish a clearer military foundation for DoD resource decisions.

• 

  Russian Defense Legislation and Russian Democracy

  Stephen J. Blank Dr.

  As recent events demonstrate, Russia's political system has yet to stabilize. This is particularly the case with civil-military relations for, as the course of the Chechnya invasion reveals, control by the government over the military is erratic and the military is all too often politicized. In this vein, legislation on civilian control of the military and on peacemaking operations in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a particularly important barometer of the course of Russia's democratization and stabilization. Dr. Stephen Blank dissects that legislation and finds that it reflects and contributes to the drift away from democratic rule towards a form of presidential power that is unaccountable to either legal or parliamentary institutions. Furthermore, these laws will also politicize the military still further and promote the use of Russian armed forces in so-called peacemaking operations that actually contribute to Moscow's openly proclaimed program to reintegrate the CIS around it. Therefore, these draft laws should arouse considerable concern among those charged with, or interested in, monitoring Russia's troubled evolution to democracy.

• 

  The Principles of War in the 21st Century: Strategic Considerations

  Steven Metz Dr., Douglas C. Lovelace Professor, Douglas V. Johnson Dr., and William T. Johnsen Dr.

  For nearly two centuries, the principles of war have guided practitioners of the military art. During the last 55 years the principles of war have been a key element of U.S. Army doctrine, and recently they have been incorporated into other Service and Joint doctrines. The turn of the 21st century and the dawn of what some herald as the "Information Age," however, may call into question whether principles originally derived in the 19th century and based on the experience of "Industrial Age" armed forces still hold. Moreover, despite their long existence, the applicability of the principles of war at the strategic level of warfare has not been the subject of detailed analysis or assessment. The purpose of this study is to stimulate a debate on the importance of the principles of war at the strategic level of warfare and on their continued relevancy in the Information Age. To this end, the study proposes a revised set of the nine principles of war that may be applied at the strategic level of warfare and are believed to conform to the conditions and demands of the 21st century.

• 

  U.S. Policy in the Balkans: A Hobson's Choice

  Stephen J. Blank Dr., William T. Johnsen Dr., and Earl H. Tilford Dr.

  At this writing, the strategic balance may have shifted in the ongoing war in the former Yugoslavia, and the region could be on the verge of a settlement. But, the "window of opportunity" may be fleeting, and the failures and frustrations of the past four years temper any optimism that conflict in the former Yugoslavia will end quickly or completely. If this opening passes without an end to the fighting, the United States may have to reassess its fundamental policy objectives and the ways and means to achieve them if peace is to be effected in the Balkans. The intent of this report, therefore, is to analyze and assess existing policies, to identify any conflicts or contradictions that may stymie U.S. efforts to bring about a peaceful resolution of the crisis, and to offer potential solutions. The report does not offer an ambitious criticism of policy or an "expert's" solution to an intractable problem. Its more modest goal is to examine current policy within a context that fits Bosnia into the larger pattern of U.S. interests and policy. In this manner, the report offers a broader framework for the strategic decisions that may face the United States in the not so distant future.

• 

  Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs: From Theory to Policy

  James Kievit LTC and Steven Metz Dr.

  A small band of "RMA" analysts has emerged in the military and Department of Defense, in the academic strategic studies community, and in defense-related think-tanks and consulting firms. To these analysts, the Gulf War provided a vision of a potential revolution in military affairs (RMA) in which Information Age technology would be combined with appropriate doctrine and training to allow a small but very advanced U.S. military to protect national interests with unprecedented efficiency. The authors examine the open-source literature on the RMA that has resulted. They find that much of it has concentrated on defining and describing military revolutions and that, despite the efforts of some of the finest minds in the defense analytical community, it has not offered either comprehensive basic theories or broad policy choices and implications. The authors believe that in order to master a RMA rather than be dragged along by it, Americans must debate its theoretical underpinnings, strategic implications, core assumptions, and normative choices. As a step in that direction they provide a set of hypotheses regarding the configuration and process of revolutions in military affairs, and examine some of their potential policy implications.

• 

  The Fog of Peace: The Military Dimensions of the Concert of Europe

  Daniel Moran Dr.

  Last April the Army War College held its Sixth Annual Strategy Conference. The theme of this year's Conference, "Strategy During the Lean Years: Learning From the Past and the Present," brought together scholars, serving and retired officers, and civilian defense officials from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom to discuss strategy formulation in times of penury from Tacitus to Force XXI.
  
  Professor Daniel Moran of the Naval Postgraduate School is well known for his scholarship on Carl von Clausewitz. In his discussion of the 19th century, Professor Moran made the point that while it was a time of small wars and big riots, Europeans enjoyed the benefits of economic growth, increasingly integrated markets, and cultural interaction due to higher literacy rates and more convenient and affordable means of travel. Additionally, a large and healthy bourgeoisie and working class gradually assumed power from aristocratic elites. The Concert of Europe, established in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, was the entity which fostered this century of relative peace and progress. Its goals were twofold: to suppress violent political revolution and to avoid general war. To a great extent, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 notwithstanding, it succeeded until 1914 when war burst forth to engulf Europe and bring down the very order the Concert was established to preserve. Professor Moran asserts that, in the final analysis, the dominant strategic challenge is not simply how much military strength a nation can muster from available resources, rather the more pressing challenge is to maintain military and political control over existing strength. Prior to 1914, conventional wisdom among military strategists was that the integration of technologically advanced weaponry into their armies and navies would make the next war bloody but short. They were tragically wrong.

• 

  The Revolution in Military Affairs: Prospects and Cautions

  Earl H. Tilford Dr.

  The current Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is taking place against the background of a larger historical watershed involving the end of the Cold War and the advent of what Alvin and Heidi Toffler have termed "the Information Age." In this essay, Dr. Earl Tilford argues that RMAs are driven by more than breakthrough technologies, and that while the technological component is important, a true revolution in the way military institutions organize, equip and train for war, and in the way war is itself conducted, depends on the confluence of political, social, and technological factors. After an overview of the dynamics of the RMA, Dr. Tilford makes the case that interservice rivalry and a reintroduction of the managerial ethos, this time under the guise of total quality management (TQM), may be the consequences of this revolution. In the final analysis, warfare is quintessentially a human endeavor. Technology and technologically sophisticated weapons are only means to an end. The U.S. Army, along with the other services, is embracing the RMA as it downsizes and restructures itself into Force XXI. Warfare, even on the digitized battlefield, is likely to remain unpredictable, bloody, and horrific. Military professionals cannot afford to be anything other than well-prepared for whatever challenges lie ahead, be it war with an Information Age peer competitor, a force of guerrillas out of the Agrarian Age, or a band of terrorists using the latest in high-tech weaponry. While Dr. Tilford is optimistic about the prospects for Force XXI, what follows is not an unqualified endorsement of the RMA or of the Army's transition to an Information Age force. By examining issues and problems that were attendant to previous RMAs, Dr. Tilford raises questions that ought to be asked by the Army as it moves toward Force XXI.