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  Germany, France and NATO

  Maria Alongi Ms. and Peter Schmidt Dr.

  U.S. national strategy and U.S. Army doctrine explicitly establish the overwhelming need for, and value of, coalitions and alliances in the post-cold war era. Two generations of U.S. civil officials and military officers have been inculcated with the precept of NATO's importance to security and stability in Europe. Free of the confines of the cold war, competing national interests and different national perceptions have transformed the Alliance. While NATO retains its value to U.S. national interests in Europe, the lack of a common threat now is producing a different Alliance. Clearly, if the Alliance is to survive and remain meaningful, an understanding of NATO and its political subtleties will be essential. To provide a wider understanding of the changed nature of the Alliance, Dr. Peter Schmidt of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Ebenhausen, Germany, examines the current policies of France and Germany, the two largest continental NATO powers, toward NATO. Dr. Schmidt presented this paper in June 1994 to a roundtable sponsored by the American Institute for Contemporary Germany Studies and the Chief of Staff of the Army's Strategic Outreach Program. Approximately two dozen European experts participated in this roundtable ably recorded by Ms Maria Alongi.

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  Haiti Strategy: Control, Legitimacy, Sovereignty, Rule of Law, Handoffs, and Exit

  Gabriel Marcella Dr.

  Now that the armed forces of the United States have entered Haiti, what is the exit strategy? As the United States, the government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and the United Nations coalition establish order, it is best to be mindful of the tasks ahead: building a new authority system based on the rule of law, instilling respect for human rights, and developing those values common to democratic communities around the world. The two keys to the success of this strategy will be how Haiti handles the amnesty question and what kind of judicial and police system is developed. The United States should not allow its exit strategy to be determined by the success or failure of the above. In this paper, Professor Gabriel Marcella of the U.S. Army War College proposes an interlocking strategy that emphasizes the achievement of limited objectives by the United States. He contends that our strategy should emphasize the humanitarian dimensions of our assistance rather than pursue the open-ended goal of the restoration of democracy. Such an approach provides the United States greater hope for success and the probability of a dignified exit.

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  The Impact of the Media on National Security Policy Decision Making

  Douglas V. Johnson Dr.

  What is the impact of the media upon national security policy decision making? Do network news personalities exert genuine power over the national command authority? Does the photograph of a mob dragging the body of a dead American soldier through the streets drive policy decisions? If the answers to these questions are "Yes," then the claim made by William Randolph Hearst is correct, and national policy is at the mercy of the media. In asking whether, or to what extent, these questions might be answered in the affirmative, the author of this study has raised as many additional questions. The impact of the Information Age is being felt right now, but what the long-term impact may be requires considerable further study. The mere fact that personal computers are proliferating and with them FAX and E-mail capability does not necessarily mean that we are moving into an age of increased public involvement in government nor that the groups actively interested in foreign affairs will change dramatically. But it might.

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  Disaster and Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa: Learning from Rwanda

  Steven Metz Dr.

  Rwanda's horrific civil war suggests that human disasters requiring outside intervention will remain common in Sub-Saharan Africa. The American people want a prompt and effective response to human disasters when the United States becomes involved. The Army is taking steps to enhance its demonstrated effectiveness at such operations. Steven Metz examines the policy and strategy implications of violence-induced human disasters in Sub-Saharan Africa with special emphasis on Rwanda. The author argues that our senior military leaders, policymakers and strategists must better understand the African security environment. He also warns that to avoid overtaxing the military, U.S. objectives in African disaster relief must be limited. This combination of limited policy goals and operational efficiency will allow the U.S. military to serve public demands at a minimal cost to its other efforts.

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  Energy and Security in Transcaucasia

  Stephen J. Blank Dr.

  One of the world's enduring regional conflicts is in Nagorno-Karabakh. This war pits local Armenians and their cousins from Armenia against Azerbaidzhan and has enmeshed Russia, Turkey and the Western allies (France, Great Britain, and the United States) in a complex series of regional relationships. The international stakes of this war involve the control over exploration for natural gas and oil and the transhipment of these commodities from Azerbaidzhan to the West. Energy resources represent Azerbaidzhan's primary means of economic modernization and are therefore vital to its economic and political freedom. For Russia and Turkey the question is one of access to enormous amounts of desperately needed hard currency and control over a long-standing area of contention between them. More broadly, Russia's tactics in attempting to impose a peace settlement in the war and to establish control of a large share of the local energy economy represent a recrudescence of the imperial tendencies in Russian policy that are incompatible with democratic reform. Accordingly, this war is overlaid with international rivalries of great scope and of more than regional significance. Western policy here is a sign of U.S. and European intentions to preserve the post-Soviet status quo while Russian policy is no less illustrative of the direction of its political evolution. The Strategic Studies Institute hopes that this study will clarify the links between energy and regional security and that it will enable our readers to assess regional trends and their importance for the United States, its allies, and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

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  French Policy Toward NATO: Enhanced Selectivity, Vice Rapprochement

  William T. Johnsen Dr. and Thomas-Durell Young Dr.

  The authors of this report explain how French policy toward NATO has changed since 1992. Importantly, they discuss how these changes have been effected. However, certain key elements of French external policy have not changed. In effect, therefore, the authors argue that while France may wish to cooperate with NATO, this does not imply that there will be a more cooperative French attitude toward the Alliance.

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  Russian Policy and the Korean Crisis

  Stephen J. Blank Dr.

  North Korea's nuclear program is the greatest current threat to U.S. and Northeast Asian security. The outcome of negotiations over this program will have a tremendous impact on the future of the Korean peninsula and on the vital interests of the United States and neighboring states to North and South Korea: China, Japan, and Russia. Bearing this in mind, the Center for Strategic and International Studies convened a conference on June 28-29, 1994, to consider the crisis surrounding North Korea's nuclear program in its international context. Experts spoke about the program and its impact on the two Koreas and on the neighboring states. Professor Stephen Blank presented this paper on Russian policy with regard to Korea. Dr. Blank relates Moscow's position on the issues of North Korean nuclearization to the broader domestic debate in Russia over security policy, in general, and Asian policy, in particular. He contends that Russia's policy is a function of that broader debate and must be understood in that context.

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  Partnership for Peace: Discerning Fact from Fiction

  William T. Johnsen Dr. and Thomas-Durell Young Dr.

  The authors analyze and assess Partnership for Peace (PfP) from the perspective of the political realities which govern NATO. They counter the critics of PfP with an analysis of its exact provisions. Moreover, by drawing on the Alliance's historical record regarding expansion, they argue that PfP is the best and most realistic means available to resolve the prickly issue of NATO enlargement. The authors do not ignore existing and potential shortcomings in PfP and specify where conceptual, as well as practical, problems will require the Alliance's immediate action.

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  U.S. Africa Policy: Some Possible Course Adjustment

  Daniel H. Simpson Ambassador

  Ambassador Daniel H. Simpson addresses the question of U.S. interests in Africa and past, present, and future U.S. policy toward that continent of more than 50 countries and 800 million people on an analytic basis, followed by clear recommendations. His presentation of U.S. strategic interests in Africa permits clear analysis of the present and logical planning of future policy and actions. His message, in addition to being an introspective examination of U.S. policy, is forward-looking. He seeks to lay the basis for a long-term, sustainable U.S. policy toward Africa based on both solid economic and commercial concerns--Africa as a supplier and a market--and on the real cultural ties that link what is core to America and the people of the African continent.

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  Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs

  Jeffrey R. Cooper Mr.

  In April 1994, the Army War College and the Strategic Studies Institute hosted the Fifth Annual Strategy Conference. The theme of this year's conference was "The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA): Defining an Army for the 21st Century."
  
  Jeffrey R. Cooper presented the following paper as part of an opening panel which sought to define the RMA. He urges defense planners to determine what strategic--as opposed to operational-- benefits might be derived from the RMA. He contends that making the internal reforms that will be required will be as challenging as coming to terms with the operational and strategic implications of the new technologies. The first requirement is to understand the parameters and dynamics of this particular revolution in military affairs. Mr. Cooper puts the RMA in historical perspective by discussing the relationships among technology, socioeconomic, and political change, and their implications for warfare during the Napoleonic era, the mid-19th century, and World Wars I and II. He argues that, in the past, dramatic technological change affected warfare in different ways. Mr. Cooper warns that by using the RMA to define a "technical legacy" we make three errors. First, such an approach could lead to a fruitless search for a "silver bullet" technology on which to build the RMA. Second, the focus on technology could shift attention away from the critical issues of purpose, strategy, doctrine, operational innovation, and organizational adaptation. Finally, committing the first two errors will compound the problem by wasting very scarce defense resources on new programs and projects which may have little or nothing to do with the strategic situation. Military professionals and defense planners alike need to remind themselves that while technology can provide new capabilities, the strategic equation is not necessarily driven by technological innovation.

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  Does Russian Democracy Have a Future?

  Stephen J. Blank Dr. and Earl H. Tilford Dr.

  In 1854, on the eve of the Crimea campaign, Antoine Henri Jomini wrote, "The Russian Army is a wall which, however far it may retreat, you will always find in front of you." The political unrest and economic disarray that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Communist Empire have altered, but not crippled, the formidable strength of the Russian military. While the forces of democracy and reform survived the elections of December 1993, the very strong support generated by ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky reminds us that the future of Russia is far from determined. In late January 1994, the Strategic Studies Institute, with the cooperation of the U.S. Army Center of Military History, hosted a Washington roundtable which addressed the impact of the December 1993 elections. Scholars from the Army, academia, and the strategic community met for a day of frank and sometimes spirited discussion. Each scholar was asked to provide a formal paper presenting his or her perspective on this subject. These proceedings are offered because the Strategic Studies Institute believes that Jomini's observations are as valid today as they were 160 years ago.

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  Proliferation and Nonproliferation in Ukraine: Implications for European and U.S. Security

  Stephen J. Blank Dr.

  Limiting nuclear proliferation is a vital goal of U.S. security policy. With this in mind, the Strategic Studies Institute cosponsored a conference at the University of Pittsburgh on March 16-17, 1994 to deal with the issues involved in achieving this objective. An additional U.S. objective is the stabilization of relationships among the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. These two issues come together in Ukraine which, upon achieving independence, found itself in possession of nuclear missiles that were positioned in the former Soviet Union and on Ukraine's territory. Ukraine was reluctant to relinquish control of them for security reasons. This monograph, presented at the conference, seeks to explain why Ukraine originally sought to retain the weapons and then, in 1994, agreed to dismantle them in return for compensation and the very limited security guarantees that exist under the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. The author also examines the nature of Russia's threat to Ukraine and the implications of the new agreement for U.S. policy vis-à-vis Ukraine and Russia.

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  Responding to Terrorism across the Technological Spectrum

  Bruce Hoffman Dr.

  In April 1994, the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute held its annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme was "The Revolution in Military Affairs: Defining an Army for the 21st Century." Dr. Bruce Hoffman presented this paper as part of a panel examining "New Technologies and New Threats." Terrorism, of course, is not new. Hoffman warns, however, of the changing nature of terrorism. In the past, terrorists have been motivated by limited political and ideological objectives. Popular images fostered by terrorist events like the bombing of PAN AM Flight 103 and the attack on the Marine Barracks in Beirut notwithstanding, in the past the preponderance of terrorist attacks targeted specific individuals or small groups. The weapons of choice were the pistol, knife, and, on occasion, dynamite. Often the terrorist was a highly-trained individual, a "professional" in pursuit of specific political or ideological objectives. Hoffman warns that, by comparison, the terrorists of today and tomorrow are amateurs. Furthermore, they are likely to act from religious and racial convictions rather than radical political or ideological motivations. Their objective may be to kill large numbers of people. Indeed, they may want to annihilate an entire race or religious group. Not only are these amateurs less predictable and, therefore, more difficult to apprehend before the incident occurs, they have at their disposal lethal devices that range from the relatively simple fertilizer bomb to biologically-altered viruses. Military professionals and civilian planners must contend with warfare at every level. The threat posed by the changing nature of terrorism falls very much within their purview.

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  Russia's New Doctrine: Two Views

  James F. Holcomb Colonel and Michael M. Boll Dr.

  The future direction of Russian security and defense policies is a fundamental issue in contemporary world politics. Future Russian policies will have a major impact on all nuclear issues; on bilateral relations with the United States; and on European, Middle Eastern, Central Asian, and Far Eastern security. One primary indicator of the direction of Russian policies is the new Defense Doctrine published in November 1993. This document has aroused much controversy and diverging assessments as to its significance. However, since it encompasses all the major issues in Russia's security and defense agenda, it is a major statement that is crucial to any understanding of Russian trends and policies. Because of the controversy over Russian doctrine, the Strategic Studies Institute, as part of its ongoing coverage of Russian defense and security policies, presents here two very different assessments of that doctrine to contribute to the debate over its meaning. The Institute is not offering an official interpretation of the new doctrine. While both authors work for the Defense Department, they differ in their assessments and are expressing only their personal opinions, not those of any government agency.

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  The New Russia in the New Asia

  Stephen J. Blank Dr.

  This monograph offers an account of the current struggle inside Russia over Asian policy and of the direction of that struggle. The author describes the dominant Russian viewpoints on policy in Asia. Current proponents of an Asian policy based primarily upon military considerations seem to hold sway. Advocates of this approach downplay economic integration with Asia, view other states mainly in terms of threat, favor an alliance with China rather than merely friendly relations, openly take a hard line with Japan, and minimize the threat of North Korean nuclear proliferation. Should this view prevail, Russian cooperation with Washington will be difficult, tensions with Japan will remain (if not grow), and Russia's efforts to become a democratic and economically competitive player will be impeded. Since Asia is the most dynamic sector of the global economy, Russian developments, insofar as they affect this region, have a deep significance for the future of Russia and Asian international affairs and security.

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  The Revolution in Military Affairs and Conflict Short of War

  James Kievit LTC and Steven Metz Dr.

  The authors concede that the revolution in military affairs holds great promise for conventional, combined-arms warfare, but conclude that its potential value in conflict short of war, whether terrorism, insurgency, or violence associated with narcotrafficking, is not so clear-cut. Given this, national leaders and strategists should proceed cautiously and only after a full exploration of the ethical, political, and social implications of their decisions. To illustrate this, the authors develop a hypothetical future scenario--a "history" of U.S. efforts in conflict short of war during the first decade of the 21st century. It is too early to offer concrete policy prescriptions for adapting many aspects of the revolution in military affairs to conflict short of war, but the authors do suggest an array of questions that should be debated. In order to decide whether to apply new technology and emerging concepts or how to employ them, the United States must first reach consensus on ultimate objectives and acceptable costs.

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  Two Historians in Technology and War

  John F. Guilmartin Dr. and Michael Howard Sir

  In April 1994, the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute held its annual Strategy Conference. The theme for this year's conference was "The Revolution in Military Affairs: Defining an Army for the 21st Century." Sir Michael and Professor Guilmartin are historians who have experienced warfare; indeed, have distinguished themselves in combat. Sir Michael Howard served in the Coldstream Guards in Italy in the Second World War. Dr. Guilmartin served two tours as a U.S. Air Force rescue helicopter pilot in Vietnam. Their personal experience with warfare is expressed eloquently in the following pages as they make the point that war is, as Carl von Clausewitz defined it nearly 200 years ago, a distinctly human endeavor. Because the Revolution in Military Affairs makes warfare all the more complex and changeable, one would be well advised to heed another of Clausewitz's admonitions, "The use of force is in no way incompatible with the simultaneous use of the intellect."

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  Nuclear Threats from Small States

  Jerome H. Kahan Mr.

  That are the policy implications regarding proliferation and counterproliferation of nuclear weapons among Third World states? How does deterrence operate outside the parameters of superpower confrontation as defined by the cold war's elaborate system of constraints enforced by concepts like mutual assured destruction, and counter-value and counter-force targeting? How can U.S. policymakers devise contingencies for dealing with nuclear threats posed by countries like North Korea, Libya, Iraq, Iran, and Syria? These are some of the unsettling but nevertheless important questions addressed by the author. Mr. Jerome Kahan examines the likelihood that one or more of these countries will use nuclear weapons before the year 2000. He also offers a framework that policymakers and planners might use in assessing U.S. interests in preempting the use of nuclear weapons or in retaliating for their use. Ironically, with the end of the cold war, it is imperative that defense strategists, policymakers, and military professionals think about the "unthinkable."

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  The Revolution in Military Affairs: A Framework for Defense Planning

  Michael J. Mazarr Dr.

  In April 1994, the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute held its annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme was "The Revolution in Military Affairs: Defining an Army for the 21st Century." Dr. Michael J. Mazarr argues that the current revolution in military affairs is part of a larger sociopolitical transformation. The new technologies both propelling and resulting from this transformation are having a profound impact on warfare. Dr. Mazarr urges military and civilian strategists, planners, and decisionmakers to think about armed conflict in ways so novel that those used to dealing with "the unchanging truths about war" may feel threatened. To help deal with the ambiguities and complexities presented by the RMA, Dr. Mazarr offers a framework of four principles for defense planning.

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  Trends in German Defense Policy: The Defense Policy Guidelines and the Centralization of Operational Control

  Thomas-Durell Young Dr.

  Like most of its NATO allies, the Federal Republic of Germany has undertaken a massive restructuring of its armed forces. The end of the Cold War, the need for unified Germany to assume responsibility for its security, and the current economic recession have made German defense planning extremely difficult. Bonn is also under pressure to reorient the Bundeswehr (Federal Armed Forces) from a defense force organized to deter war in the Central Region to one with deployment capabilities similar to those of other comparable powers. However, countervailing domestic and external political pressures have impeded this reorganizing effort. Internally, even a clear political consensus regarding the use of the Bundeswehr has yet to emerge in Bonn. German participation in peace operations and international humanitarian missions has yet to gain wide political support, let alone participating in military campaigns in support of national interests outside of the immediate defense of German territory. Notwithstanding defense planning efforts undertaken to date by the current Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union/Free Democratic Party coalition government, the resolution of this debate is essential before definitive planning can be undertaken. In the sagacious words of Clay Clemens, "The major consistency in German political life for at least three decades has been the tendency of all the mainstream parties to shape policy together in an incremental, consensus-building process. Thus, until the time when an all party accord is reached in Bonn, Germany's defense structure will remain provisional." Externally, the rest of Europe continues to cast a wary eye over this new iteration of "ein Deutschland." As the largest member of the European Union and possessing an enormous economic potential, the Federal Republic may increasingly come to dominate European affairs. Moreover, if Bonn were to maintain the Bundeswehr at a peacetime ceiling of 370,000, as referred to in A

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  War in the Information Age

  James M. Dubik Colonel and Gordon R. Sullivan General

  We are beginning to realize the emergence of a new age--the information age. On the one hand, the full dimensions of this new age, if indeed it is such, are unknown. On the other hand, the authors argue that enough is known to conclude that the conduct of war in the future will be profoundly different. Paradoxically, however, they claim that the nature of war will remain basically the same. In this monograph, General Sullivan and Colonel Dubik examine that paradox and draw some inferences from it. This monograph explains the governing concepts of the industrial age and how they affected the concept of war. Then it describes the concepts emerging to govern the information age and suggests ways in which these concepts may affect the conduct of war. Finally, the monograph discusses those steps that the Army is taking to position itself to exploit what are becoming the dominant military requirements of the information age: speed and precision. Specifically, the authors discuss the ways in which the Army has changed its strategic systems over the past several years so that the Army operational and tactical forces will be able to "see" a situation, decide, adapt, and act faster and more precisely than their opponent. These changes will give strategic planners, and operational and tactical commanders, a new set of information age tools to use in theater and on the battlefield. The net result: more flexibility, more versatility, faster decision making, and broader scope of weapons systems at their immediate disposal.

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  Whither the RMA: Two Perspectives on Tomorrow's Army

  Raoul Henri Alcala COL and Paul Bracken Dr.

  In April 1994, the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute hosted its Fifth Annual Strategy Conference. The theme was "The Revolution in Military Affairs: Defining an Army for the 21st Century." After fourteen of the nation's leading defense scholars presented papers on the role of technology in warfare, Dr. Paul Bracken and Colonel Raoul Alcala concluded the conference by offering their views of the Army's future. Professor Bracken contends that the Army of the 21st century will be shaped by domestic concerns as much as by external threats to American security. While economic power has increased in importance in international relations, military power as traditionally conceived remains a dominant factor in determining the status of nations. Colonel Alcala holds that there is a connection between ideas and principles. He argues that doctrines will provide the basis for force structure, training, and weapons acquisition. Colonel Alcala maintains that the Army's ability to stay intellectually ahead of the technology will be, perhaps, its greatest challenge in the next century.

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  America in the Third World: Strategic Alternatives and Military Implications

  Steven Metz Dr.

  The author examines the problems of the Third World and the debates that exist regarding the most effective U.S. response to these problems. He has concluded that the Third World is undergoing such significant change that most of the basic assumptions undergirding past and current U.S. policy are no longer viable. He urges a fundamental and radical revision of our national strategy toward the Third World, and recommends a future strategy that would see far more selective and discrete involvement in these staggering problems. If our national leaders accept his theories concerning failed states, they will be less inclined to attempt active intervention on a scale that approximates the current level of U.S. involvement. The United States will, in effect, disengage from large segments of the Third World, with only carefully selected humanitarian or ecological relief operations being executed. Such a strategy would, of course, have profound implications for the U.S. military and would require adjustments in force structure and operational directives concerning the application of military power in pursuit of national interests. During times of strategic transition, "muddling through" is not enough: basic concepts must be rigorously examined and debated. The Strategic Studies Institute sees this study as a means of supporting the process of developing a coherent post-cold war strategy for dealing with the Third World as it will be, not as it was.

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  Japan's Self-Defense Forces: What Dangers to Northeast Asia?

  Thomas L. Wilborn Dr.

  Dr. Thomas Wilborn examines Japan's defense policy and the capabilities of its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to determine if the fears of a remilitarized Japan have any basis in fact. He concludes that Japanese defense policy places rigid restraints on the SDF, and that currently there is no support for anything but a thoroughly defensive military posture. Moreover, the SDF lack the force projection ability to attack any of Japan's neighbors, and could not develop the ability in less than a decade--even if there were a political decision to do so. Finally, the preponderance of evidence suggests that future generations of leaders are no more likely to pursue a military role in the region than the generation which has governed since the end of American occupation, in 1952.

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  National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy

  Michael G. Roskin Dr.

  Because the national interest is the foundation for both the National Security Strategy and its supporting National Military Strategy, it is essential that military leaders understand the political context from which the details of the national interest emerge. The guiding concept of national interest is more often assumed than analyzed in the dynamic context of domestic and international politics. For these reasons, Dr. Michael Roskin, Visiting Professor of Foreign Policy, was asked to synthesize the academic literature, focusing on those works that had greatest value and relevance to members of the national security community who must apply as well as serve the national interest.