Books, Monographs & Collaborative Studies

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  An Army Transformed: The U.S. Army's Post-Vietnam Recovery and the Dynamics of Change in Military Organizations

  Suzanne C. Nielsen Lieutenant Colonel

  During the 2 decades preceding the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the U.S. Army went through tremendous reform and rejuvenation. In explaining this important case of military change, this paper makes four central arguments. First, leaders within military organizations are essential; external developments most often have an indeterminate impact on military change. Second, military reform is about more than changing doctrine. To implement its doctrine, an organization must have appropriate training practices, personnel policies, organizations, equipment, and leader development programs. Third, the implementation of comprehensive change requires an organizational entity with broad authority able to craft, evaluate, and execute an integrated program of reforms. In the case of the U.S. Army in the 1970s and 1980s, this organization was the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). To an unprecedented degree, TRADOC was able to ensure that changes in personnel policies, organizations, doctrine, training practices, and equipment were integrated and mutually reinforcing. Fourth and finally, the process of developing, implementing, and institutionalizing complementary reforms can take several decades. While today’s demands differ from those of the past, this report suggests questions that may be useful in thinking about change today. Knowing the answers to these questions would enable informed judgment about the prospects for the successful implementation of a program of reforms. The consequences, for good or for ill, could be quite significant in terms of resources, lives, and the national interest.

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  Is the Organizational Culture of the U.S. Army Congruent with the Professional Development of Its Senior Level Officer Corps?

  James G. Pierce Dr.

  In the present study, Dr. Pierce postulates that the ability of a professional organization to develop future leaders in a manner that perpetuates readiness to cope with future environmental and internal uncertainty depends on organizational culture. Specifically, the purpose of his study is to explore the relationship between the Army’s organizational culture and professional development. He examines the degree of congruence between the Army’s organizational culture and the leadership and managerial skills of its officer corps senior leaders. He uses data from a representative sample of such leaders while they were students at the Army War College, Classes of 2003 and 2004. At the macro level, the results of his research strongly suggest a significant lack of congruence between the U.S. Army’s organizational culture and the results of its professional development programs for its future strategic leaders. He bases his conclusion on empirical data that indicate that the future strategic leaders of the Army believe that they operate on a day-to-day basis in an organization whose culture is characterized by: • an overarching desire for stability and control, • formal rules and policies, • coordination and efficiency, • goal and results oriented, and • hard-driving competitiveness. Dr. Pierce recommends that the leaders of the Army profession initiate an organizational culture change effort. Specifically, he recommends changes to the more informal aspects of the professional development program, such as the less than lifelong commitment to the Army profession, the “up or out” personnel policy, and the officer evaluation system which may be creating an underlying assumption that failure will not be tolerated regardless of the circumstances. Those conditions all are representative of “theories-in-use” that are incongruent with the concept of professionalism. As a result of the current culture, senior leaders may be exercising an excessive degree of structured supervision which reinforces the culture of stability and control despite, the formal education system which attempts to teach the opposite. Therefore, it is not surprising that junior professionals learn to distrust their senior leaders and to then subsequently perpetuate the cycle of over-control, or depart the profession altogether.

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  Preparing for One War and Getting Another?

  Antulio J. Echevarria II

  This monograph examines the fundamental argument that America's adversaries are shifting more toward irregular methods due to the demonstrated prowess of the U.S. military at conventional warfare. This argument is based on what one might call a paradoxical logic, not unlike that described by Edward Luttwak in his classic work, Strategy. Among other things, the monograph concludes that few genuine paradoxes exist in war; most principles that appear paradoxical are completely linear. Moreover, those adversarial states and nonstate actors employing irregular methods today were doing so long before the U.S. military demonstrated its superiority at conventional warfare, and will likely continue to do so.

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  Somalia: Line in the Sand--Identification of MYM Vulnerabilities

  Eloy E. Cuevas LTC and Madeleine Wells Ms.

  The al-Shabaab Organization, also known as the Mujahidin Youth Movement (MYM), and its allies have been active opponents in undermining the United Nations (UN)-supported African Union (AU) peacekeeping forces, the fledging Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and all the UN efforts to support the Somali people. Al-Shabaab’s use of the internet and its control of the local news media has resulted in its increased ability to disseminate its story to the Somali public, to sympathizers throughout the world, and to the greater Islamic community. It is able to accomplish its strategic communication campaign through the use of organic websites, publication of online magazines and newsletters, and through international press conferences and interviews. The authors of this monograph identify al-Shabaab’s strategic, operational, and tactical vulnerabilities organized according to four sources of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME). After exploring the group’s inherent and apparent weaknesses, the authors then provide some suggestions on what efforts or capabilities may be leveraged in defeating and deterring the group. Such instruments do not have to be kinetic or military in nature, but can be diplomatic, economic, or persuasive. The authors concentrate on diplomatic and informational options and do not address the military or economic implications at this time.

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  Chinese Energy Security: The Myth of the PLAN's Frontline Status

  Ryan Clarke Dr.

  This monograph examines the dynamics of China’s energy security dilemma and the role of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Following this, PLAN development is discussed and its future role in regional security is hypothesized. This report argues that it is domestic market inefficiencies and poor management practices that pose the greatest threat to China’s energy security. Further, less and less of Chinese energy imports are making their way to the country by sea, and as such, the PLAN actually has a minimal role to play. Given these realities, Chinese fears of a naval blockade that deprives it of energy supplies, and American confidence that this is a realistic strategic option in the event of hostilities are implausible. In addition, Beijing’s desire to develop aircraft carriers and other high-tech naval capabilities, combined with its contribution to the anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden, have led many analysts to erroneously conclude that China seeks to engage in global power projection like the United States. However, the focus of the PLAN will remain regional and on asymmetric capabilities, namely the effective use of submarines and other undersea “unknowns” that ultimately seek to deter American and possible Japanese involvement in a conflict over Taiwan and/or maritime features in the South China Sea, such as the Spratly Islands, which China views as inalienable parts of its territory. Although China’s interests are expanding and becoming more international in nature, recovering from the Century of Humiliation and ensuring domestic legitimacy remain the top priorities of China’s leadership.

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  Defense Energy Resilience: Lessons from Ecology

  Scott Thomas Dr. and David Kerner Mr.

  Energy security is a fundamental requirement for national security, and global energy competition threatens to make Department of Defense (DoD) missions increasingly vulnerable to the whims of energy suppliers. DoD’s approach to energy security must accommodate a highly uncertain outlook for energy resource availability. Although U.S. energy security needs are currently met, the shrinking gap between global supply and demand draws the world closer to a point at which competition disrupts social and geopolitical normalizing forces, and conflict becomes likely. While DoD expresses concern over trends that are threatening energy security, Defense planners still operate as if adequate energy supplies will continue to be available without interruption into the extended future. What limited energy-related planning that is currently done addresses only the symptoms of a systemic over-reliance on very few energy resources. This analysis offers key insights into what a shifting energy security environment is, and the paper provides a novel theoretical framework for how the United States can best respond to this ever changing energy security environment.

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  Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy

  Hal Brands Dr.

  This monograph analyzes Brazilian grand strategy under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. During Lula’s nearly 8 years in office, he has pursued a multi-tiered grand strategy aimed at hastening the transition from unipolarity to a multipolar order in which international rules, norms, and institutions are more favorable to Brazilian interests. Lula has done so by emphasizing three diplomatic strategies: soft-balancing, coalition-building, and seeking to position Brazil as the leader of a more united South America. This strategy has successfully raised Brazil’s profile and increased its diplomatic flexibility, but it has also exposed the country to four potent strategic dilemmas that could complicate or undermine its ascent. These dilemmas touch on issues ranging from anemic macroeconomic performance to rising tensions in Brazil’s relationship with the United States. In the future, the efficacy of Brazilian grand strategy—and its implications for U.S. interests and the global system—will be contingent on how Lula’s successors address these dilemmas.

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  Organizing to Compete in the Political Terrain

  Nadia Schadlow Dr.

  In this analysis, the author identifies some of the contining obstacles to achieving civil-military integration in war. She argues that there are continuing disagreements about who should lead the shaping of the political landscape in war, and that while doctrine has advanced in this area, good doctrine does not guarantee the effective execution of governance-related tasks. Sound operational approaches are required as well.

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  Got Vision? Unity of Vision in Policy and Strategy: What It Is and Why We Need It

  Anna Simons Dr.

  Moving beyond “unity of effort” and “unity of command,” this monograph identifies an overarching need for “unity of vision.” Without someone at the helm who has a certain kind--not turn, not frame, but kind--of mind, asymmetric confrontations will be hard (if not impossible) to win. If visionary generals can be said to possess “coup d’oeil,” then unity of vision is cross-cultural coup d’oeil. As with strategic insight, either individuals have the ability to take what they know of another society and turn this to strategic--and war-winning--effect, or they do not. While having prior knowledge of the enemy is essential, strategy will also only succeed if it fits “them” and fits “us.” This means that to convey unity of vision a leader must also have an intuitive feel for “us.”

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  Endgame for the West in Afghanistan? Explaining the Decline in Support for the War in Afghanistan in the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, France and Germany

  Charles A. Miller Mr.

  Domestic public opinion is frequently and correctly described as a crucial battlefront in the war in Afghanistan. Commentary by media and political figures currently notes not only the falling support for the war in the United States but also in many of its key allies in Europe and elsewhere, making it all the more difficult for the Obama administration to secure the help it believes it needs to bring the war to a successful conclusion. This study is an extensive examination of the determinants of domestic support for and opposition to the war in Afghanistan in the United States and in five of its key allies--the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada, and Australia. Tracing the trajectory of public opinion on the war from the original invasion in 2001 to the fall of 2009, this paper concludes that the combination of mounting casualties with a declining belief that the war could be won by the Coalition is the key factor driving the drop in support. Other factors, such as the deployment of numerous and shifting rationales by the political leadership in various countries, and the breakdown of elite consensus have played important but secondary roles in this process.

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  Decisionmaking In Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: The Strategic Shift of 2007

  Steven Metz Dr.

  In this second volume of the series, Dr. Metz looks carefully at the 2007 decision to surge forces into Iraq, a choice which is generally considered to have been effective in turning the tide of the war from potential disaster to possible—perhaps probable—strategic success. Although numerous strategic decisions remain to be made as the U.S. military executes its “responsible withdrawal” from Iraq, Dr. Metz has encapsulated much of the entire war in these two monographs, describing both the start and what may eventually be seen as the beginning of the end of the war. In this volume, he provides readers with an explanation of how a decision process that was fundamentally unchanged—with essentially the same people shaping and making the decision—could produce such a different result in 2007. As the current administration tries to replicate the surge in Afghanistan, this monograph is especially timely and shows the perils of attempting to achieve success in one strategic situation by copying actions successfully taken in another, but where different conditions applied.

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  Implications of a Changing NATO

  Phillip R. Cuccia, COL (Ret) Dr

  NATO officials plan to unveil the new NATO Strategic Concept during the Alliance’s summit in Portugal at the end of this year. This monograph focuses on the impact of what the Strategic Concept will have on the Alliance. This analysis describes recent trends within NATO and their implications. The monograph provides senior military and political leaders with a discussion of the changing composition of the NATO nations and the impact of these changes on the nature of the Alliance. This monograph describes four possible scenarios of what NATO could look like in the future in order to give senior leaders thoughts to consider while instituting NATO policy. The NATO Alliance has now reached its 60th birthday and is currently in the middle of updating and rewriting the new Strategic Concept. The Alliance, which has grown to 28 countries, is facing problems with changing demographics, an awkward relationship with Russia, a war in Afghanistan and threats of global jihad. Muslim immigration into Europe and population aging will have a great impact on European views of the Alliance. NATO must decide how closely it wants to work and coordinate with Russia in future endeavors. The most important issue at hand is how NATO is going to fare coming out of the war in Afghanistan. The desired NATO outcome needs to be defined clearly. It is imperative that the New Strategic Concept address NATO goals in Afghanistan and the ways and means of accomplishing those goals. Defined goals will give member nations objectives while formulating national defense plans. Getting the Strategic Concept right is the first step in maintain the health of the Alliance.

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  Sufism in Northern Nigeria: A Force for Counter-Radicalization?

  Jonathan N. C. Hill Dr.

  In light of the ongoing threats issued by al-Qaeda (AQ) against the United States and its allies, the need to prevent the radicalization of young Muslim men and women remains as pressing as ever, and perhaps nowhere is this task more urgent than in the countries of West Africa. The global expanse of the ongoing war on terror places these territories in the frontline. With large Muslim populations that have hitherto remained mostly impervious to the advances of Islamism, the challenge now confronting the Nigerian government and the international community is ensuring that this remains the case. But in recent months, Islamist groups have been highly active in the region. The aim of this monograph is to assess the potential of Nigeria’s Sufi Brotherhoods to act, both individually and collectively, as a force for counter-radicalization, to prevent young people from joining Islamist groups.

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  Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success: Employing Talent

  Casey Wardynski Colonel, Michael J. Colarusso Dr., and David S. Lyle Colonel

  Efficient talent employment is at the core of the Army Officer Human Capital Model. However, the Army’s current employment paradigm is unequal to the needs of a professional, volunteer Army facing the twin challenges of a competitive labor market and an increasingly complex global operating environment. It unduly prioritizes "fairness" when making assignments, has a narrowly defined pathway to senior leadership ranks, cannot see the talent it possesses, and suffers from severe principal-agent problems. Optimal employment theories, information age tools, and well-regulated market mechanisms can help the Army match individual officer talents against specific work requirements, reducing risk and achieving the depth and breadth of talent it needs, both now and in the future.

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  Crime, Violence, and the Crisis in Guatemala: A Case Study in the Erosion of the State

  Hal Brands Dr.

  Guatemala is currently experiencing a full-blown crisis of the democratic state. An unholy trinity of criminal elements—international drug traffickers, domestically based organized crime syndicates, and youth gangs—is effectively waging a form of irregular warfare against government institutions, with devastating consequences. The police, the judiciary, and entire local and departmental governments are rife with criminal infiltrators; murder statistics have surpassed civil-war levels in recent years; criminal operatives brazenly assassinate government officials and troublesome members of the political class; and broad swaths of territory are now effectively under the control of criminal groups. Guatemala’s weak institutions have been unable to contain this violence, leading to growing civic disillusion and causing a marked erosion in the authority and legitimacy of the government.

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  Shades of CORDS in the Kush: The False Hope of "Unity of Effort" in American Counterinsurgency

  Henry Nuzum Mr.

  Counterinsurgency (COIN) requires an integrated military, political, and economic program best developed by teams that field both civilians and soldiers. These units should operate with some independence but under a coherent command. In Vietnam, after several false starts, the United States developed an effective unified organization, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), to guide the counterinsurgency. CORDS had three components absent from our efforts in Afghanistan today: sufficient personnel (particularly civilian), numerous teams, and a single chain of command that united the separate COIN programs of the disparate American departments at the district, provincial, regional, and national levels. This Paper focuses on the third issue and describes the benefits that unity of command at every level would bring to the American war in Afghanistan. The work begins with a brief introduction to counterinsurgency theory, using a population-centric model, and examines how this warfare challenges the United States. It traces the evolution of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the country team, describing problems at both levels. Similar efforts in Vietnam are compared, where persistent executive attention finally integrated the government’s counterinsurgency campaign under the unified command of the CORDS program. The next section attributes the American tendency towards a segregated response to cultural differences between the primary departments, executive neglect, and societal concepts of war. The Paper argues that, in its approach to COIN, the United States has forsaken the military concept of unity of command in favor of “unity of effort” expressed in multiagency literature. The final sections describe how unified authority would improve our efforts in Afghanistan and propose a model for the future.

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  The Construction of Liberal Democracy: The Role of Civil-Military Institutions in State and Nation-Building in West Germany and South Africa

  Jack J. Porter Dr.

  Recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan remind U.S. policymakers of the tremendous obstacles and challenges that confront states as they attempt to install liberal, democratic political institutions. The multifaceted transition process involves a host of overlapping and interrelated political, economic, and social innovations that often must be tailored to the specific historical, demographic, and regional needs of each community. While it would be presumptuous to suggest any rigid schedule or set of priorities, most scholars and policymakers agree that restructuring the security and civil-military institutions is vital to the transition. The primary focus of this analysis is a detailed examination of two earlier and successful efforts at democratization—the Federal Republic of Germany and South Africa—paying particular attention to the role of civil-military institutions. The West German and South African examples illustrate the intricate complexities and numerous considerations that factor into this process and provide some important lessons for the future. This monograph analyzes the decisionmaking process behind the construction of the German and South African armed forces in their transition to democracy, and it concludes with a brief list of policy recommendations for future efforts geared toward democratizing formerly authoritarian armed forces.

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  Thinking about Nuclear Power in Post-Saddam Iraq

  Norman Cigar Dr.

  Iraqis are debating the desirability of atomic power for their country. One can expect increasing Iraqi calls for a revival of the country’s nuclear capability, at least in the civilian sector, which reflects a general consensus within key sectors of Iraqi public opinion as well as a growing regional trend. The Iraqi government will continue to reestablish its legitimacy by its support of a nuclear program as a litmus test for modernity and success, and has asked France to rebuild its former reactor, although significant practical obstacles will hamper rapid development in the nuclear field. Despite a continuing widespread perception of the utility of nuclear weapons, at least in some sectors of Iraqi opinion, a near-term resumption of a military nuclear program is not likely, although volatile conditions in the region and within Iraq itself could change that option at some time in the future. U.S. and international policymakers will have to consider Iraqi views as they shape policy to manage the process of an orderly, safe, and peaceful nuclear reintegration of Iraq in the civilian sector while guaranteeing safeguards against both accidents and any future diversion of a nuclear program for military purposes or terrorist exploitation.

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  Criminal Sovereignty: Understanding North Korea's Illicit International Activities

  Paul Rexton Kan Dr., Bruce E. Bechtol Dr., and Robert M. Collins Mr.

  This monograph examines Office Number 39’s origins, organizational structure, and activities in order to develop a more calibrated strategy and policy to meet the North Korean challenge. This monograph focuses on Office Number 39's key illicit activities— to include manufacture and distribution of illegal drugs, the counterfeiting of U.S. currency, and the manufacture and distribution of counterfeit cigarettes. Finally, as Kim Jong-Il grows frailer, assessing how his successor may continue or alter Office Number 39’s activities is also examined.

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  Lashkar-I-Taiba: The Fallacy of Subservient Proxies and the Future of Islamist Terrorism in India

  Ryan Clarke Dr.

  A discussion of the foundation of Lashkar-i-Taiba (LeT), the development of its modus operandi, and engages in an investigation of LeT’s activities in India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir region are discussed. Further, LeT’s fundraising methods are touched upon, and LeT’s relationships with regional state and nonstate actors such as Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Dawood Ibrahim’s D-Company are analyzed. Also, the impact that these developments have on domestic Islamist terrorism in India are addressed. The author argues that although LeT has been a vital component of Islamabad’s regional strategy in the past, the organization has grown beyond the control of its former patron, is largely self-sufficient and operates independently of the political process, and has expanded its agenda well beyond Kashmir. These developments challenge the long-held notion that irregulars can be sustainably used to achieve limited objectives in an asymmetric conflict and should serve as a clear warning to other state sponsors of terrorism. However, contrary to many analyses, LeT is not likely to sacrifice its independence and come under Al-Qaeda’s umbrella. Rather, LeT will continue to evolve into a distinctive, South Asia-centric terrorist actor in its own right while still receiving aid from fringe elements in Pakistan’s security and intelligence apparatus and elsewhere. This will not only allow LeT to continue to plan future Mumbai-style terrorist attacks in India from safe havens in Pakistan, but will also allow LeT to guide and assist the predominantly indigenous Indian Mujahideen (IM).

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  Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success: Developing Talent

  Casey Wardynski Colonel, David S. Lyle Colonel, and Michael J. Colarusso Dr.

  Developing leaders through experience, formal training, and education is a long-standing hallmark of the U.S. Army. Maintaining its excellence as a developmental organization requires vigilance, however. Authorized strength and inventory mismatches, an inverse relationship between responsibility and formal developmental time, and sparse nonoperational development opportunities are serious challenges the Army must address. Doing so requires a talent development strategy firmly rooted in human capital theory. Such a strategy will recognize the value of continuing higher education, genuinely useful evaluations, and the signals associated with professional credentials.

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  Transnational Insurgencies and the Escalation of Regional Conflict: Lessons for Iraq and Afghanistan

  Idean Salehyan Dr

  Many insurgents groups benefit from sanctuaries in neighboring countries where they are relatively safe from state security forces. These transnational insurgencies complicate traditional counterinsurgency operations in significant ways. Most importantly, transnational insurgencies have the potential to spark conflicts between neighboring countries. This monograph examines several transnational insurgencies that have been active since the end of the Cold War. While many neighboring countries have experienced the escalation of conflict between them as the result of cross-border violence, other states have successfully cooperated in providing border security. In depth case studies of relations between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo as well as India and its eastern neighbors are explored. The lessons learned from this research are applied to contemporary issues facing Iraq and Afghanistan.

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  Accessing Talent: The Foundation of a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy

  Casey Wardynski Colonel, David S. Lyle Colonel, and Michael J. Colarusso Dr.

  Accessing Talent: The Foundation of a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy, is the fourth of six monographs focused upon officer talent management in the U.S. Army. In it, the authors continue their examination of how the U.S. Army accesses, develops, retains, and employs officer talent. In particular, they focus upon the ways in which dynamic labor market conditions and generational preferences have shaped service propensity among potential officer prospects.

  As in the previous volumes of this series, the authors first articulate a theoretical framework for improvement and then demonstrate how the application of those theories can yield desired results. In sum, they explain why a proper talent accessions strategy can create a “positive sum game” for the Army as perhaps nothing else can. Since the officer accessions process presents the Army with a dramatic opportunity to leverage talent investments made by others, the theories and programs discussed in this monograph merit thoughtful consideration.

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  Decisionmaking in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Removing Saddam Hussein by Force

  Steven Metz Dr. and John R. Martin Professor

  In 1946, General Walter Bedell Smith wrote a series of articles describing six great decisions made in World War II by General Dwight David Eisenhower Writing so soon after the war, General Smith could not hope to produce a definitive history, but felt that writing then would document an important viewpoint of one of the major participants in Eisenhower’s many significant decisions. With this initial volume of their Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Key Decisions Monograph Series, the Strategic Studies Institute also attempts to write about key decisions while they are still fresh in the memories of the participants. This series will not produce a definitive history, however, it will make a major contribution to understanding decisions made by senior military and civilian leaders during the several years thus far of the war in Iraq. Looking more at the how and why of certain decisions than at the results of those same decisions, this series will be particularly useful to senior leaders--both uniformed and civilian--as they reflect on how decisions were made in Iraq and how better decisions might be made in future conflicts. As General James Mattis at Joint Forces Command recently said, the challenges of operating in a counterinsurgency can be greater than in large-scale conventional combat, “since the adversary has more flexibility to determine how, when, where, and whether to fight.” This, plus the fact that irregular combat is the more likely challenge of the future operating environment, makes it even more important to examine the key decisions of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM as soon as possible. One of the greatest strengths of our Army over the centuries has been its ability to look critically at itself and to devise ways to improve its ability to prosecute the Nation’s wars.

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  Do Oil Exports Fuel Defense Spending?

  Clayton K. S. Chun Dr.

  This monograph explores the impact that oil revenue had on the national defense spending of five oil-exporting countries. Despite periods of falling oil revenues, these countries typically did not lower defense spending. In some cases, defense spending increased sharply, or the rate of decrease was much lower than the drop in oil revenues. This condition creates challenges for national security professionals. If nations face falling oil revenues and still have the will and ability to expand their military or security capabilities, then they might do so through the sacrifice of domestic spending or regional stability. Economic sanctions, worldwide recession, or falling oil demand may not stop these oil-exporting nations from purchasing weapons and creating large security forces. Policies that attempt to limit oil revenues of potential enemies alone may not be sufficient to inhibit them from creating regional instability through expansion of their defense capabilities. Hopes for reduced defense expenditures, by countries like Iran, as a result of a drop in energy demand seem to be diminished by these findings. A more complex picture emerges that forces analysts and policymakers to search more broadly for options to stem potential arms races that may be fueled by the riches of oil-exporting countries.