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Schools for Strategy: Teaching Strategy for 21st Century Conflict
Colin S. Gray Dr.
All would-be strategists would benefit by some formal education. However, for education in strategy to be well-directed, it needs to rest upon sound assumptions concerning the eternal nature yet ever shifting character, meaning, and function of strategy, as well as the range of behaviors required for effective strategic performance. The author emphasizes the necessity for strategic education to help develop the strategic approach, the way of thinking that can solve or illuminate strategic problems. He advises that such education should not strive for a spurious relevance by presenting a military variant of current affairs. The author believes that the strategist will perform better in today's world if he has mastered and can employ strategy’s general theory.
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Talent: Implications for a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy
Casey Wardynski Colonel, David S. Lyle Colonel, and Michael J. Colarusso Dr.
In our proposed Army Officer Corps Strategy, we established the interdependency of accessing, developing, retaining and employing talented leaders. Before exploring each of those functions in greater detail, however, we must first define “talent.” In our view, talent is something possessed by everyone. In fact, each individual has a unique distribution of talent across three dimensions—skills, knowledge, and behaviors. Effective organizations understand this. They successfully access and retain a depth and breadth of talent that can be developed and employed against current and future requirements.
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YouTube War: Fighting in a World of Cameras in Every Cell Phone and Photoshop on Every Computer
Cori E. Dauber Dr.
Terrorist attacks today are often media events in a second sense: information and communication technologies have developed to such a point that these groups can film, edit, and upload their own attacks within minutes of staging them, whether the Western media are present or not. In this radically new information environment, the enemy no longer depends on traditional media. This is the “YouTube War.” This monograph methodically lays out the nature of this new environment in terms of its implications for a war against media-savvy insurgents, and then considers possible courses of action for the Army and the U.S. military as they seek to respond to an enemy that has proven enormously adaptive to this new environment and the new type of warfare it enables.
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Guide to Rebuilding Public Sector Services in Stability Operations: A Role for the Military
Derick W. Brinkerhoff Mr., Richard Hill Mr., Ronald W. Johnson Mr., and Susan Merrill Professor
The guide is designed to provide peacekeepers with a thorough and nuanced understanding on the policy, planning, cultural and ethnic implications, tradeoffs, and options for public services reconstruction. It takes the position ultimately that the host government is responsible for public goods. Stability actors and host country governments can cooperate on policy, resource allocation, and service planning, even when the majority of services may initially be provided by nonstate or external actors, but the host country is in the lead. Issues addressed include control of corruption, administration of public services, policy, resource allocation and joint budgeting for restoration, reconstruction, and maintenance. Immediately after a conflict, the flight of skilled professionals may have left little capacity for public services restoration, making it a critical priority to rebuild capacity in engineering, planning, budgeting, and maintenance as well as to reestablish the revenue generation to sustain these services. The role for stability actors is broad and critical in this effort, as they seek to restore the ability of a government to meet the expectations of its citizens and restore legitimacy and stability to a nation.
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The Army's Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent Conflict
Paul Oh Major, Don M. Snider Dr., and Kevin Toner Major
As the character of conflict in the 21st century evolves, the Army’s strength will continue to rest on our values, our ethos, and our people. Our Soldiers and leaders must remain true to these values as they operate in increasingly complex environments where moral-ethical failures can have strategic implications. Most of our Soldiers do the right thing--and do it well--time and again under intense pressure. But we must stay ever vigilant in upholding our high professional standards, mindful of the strains that accompany repeated combat deployments in the longest war our country has fought with an all-volunteer force. We must think critically about our Professional Military Ethic and promote dialogue at all levels as we deepen our understanding of what this time-honored source of strength means to the profession today.
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A Comprehensive Approach to Improving U.S. Security Force Assistance Efforts
Theresa Baginski Lieutenant Colonel, Francis Donovan Lieutenant Colonel, Richard A. Lacquement Colonel, and Simon Don Roach Brigadier
Security Force Assistance is analyzed, and some specific recommendations designed to improve U.S. performance are provided. While SFA may be a new term, the activities themselves are familiar ones related to how the Department of Defense works to train, advise, and assist foreign partners' security establishments to accomplish common objectives. The United States has demonstrated serious SFA deficiencies in recent years. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has noted, the United States is likely to remain actively and broadly engaged in SFA for many years to come. The need for comprehensive improvement encompasses DoD military and civilian efforts and requires thoughtful integration with broader whole of government approaches.
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Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy
Justin Kelly Brigadier and Michael James Brennan Dr.
The publication of the 1982 version of Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, introduced to the English-speaking world the idea of an operational level of war encompassing the planning and conduct of campaigns and major operations. It was followed 3 years later by the introduction of the term “operational art” which was, in practice, the skillful management of the operational level of war. This conception of an identifiably separate level of war that defined the jurisdiction of the profession of arms was, for a number of historical and cultural reasons, attractive to U.S. practitioners and plausible to its English-speaking allies. As a result, it and its associated doctrine spread rapidly around the world. The authors argue that as warfare continues to diffuse across definitional and conceptual boundaries and as the close orchestration of all of the instruments of national power becomes even more important, the current conception of campaigns and operations becomes crippling. To cope with these demands by formulating and prosecuting “national campaigns,” the authors propose that the responsibility for campaign design should “actually” return to the political-strategic leadership of nations supported by the entirety of the state bureaucracy. This would mark the return of the campaign to its historical sources. If the United States and its allies fail to make this change, they risk continuing to have a “way of battle” rather than a “way of war.”
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A "New" Dynamic in the Western Hemisphere Security Environment: The Mexican Zetas and Other Private Armies
Max G. Manwaring Dr.
This monograph is intended to help political, military, policy, opinion, and academic leaders think strategically about explanations, consequences, and responses that might apply to the volatile and dangerous new dynamic that has inserted itself into the already crowded Mexican and hemispheric security arena, that is, the privatized Zeta military organization. In Mexico, this new dynamic involves the migration of traditional hard-power national security and sovereignty threats from traditional state and nonstate adversaries to hard and soft power threats from professional private nonstate military organizations. This dynamic also involves a more powerful and ambiguous mix of terrorism, crime, and conventional war tactics, operations, and strategies than experienced in the past. Moreover, this violence and its perpetrators tend to create and consolidate semi-autonomous enclaves (criminal free-states) that develop in to quasi-states—and what the Mexican government calls “Zones of Impunity.” All together, these dynamics not only challenge Mexican security, stability, and sovereignty, but, if left improperly understood and improperly countered, also challenge the security and stability of the United States and Mexico’s other neighbors.
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Dealing with Political Ferment in Latin America: The Populist Revival, the Emergence of the Center, and Implications for U.S. Policy
Hal Brands Dr.
The current political dynamics in Latin America is analyzed, and their meaning for the United States is evaluated. The author argues that references to a uniform “left turn” in the region are misleading, and that Latin America is actually witnessing a dynamic competition between two very different forms of governance. Represented by leaders like Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales, and others, radical populism emphasizes the politics of grievance and a penchant for extreme solutions. Moderate, centrist governance can be found in countries like Chile, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and Uruguay. It stresses diplomatic pragmatism, the protection of democratic practices, and the need to blend macroeconomic responsibility with a social conscience. To the extent that the United States can strengthen the centrists while limiting the damage caused by radical populism, the author argues it can promote integral growth, democratic stability, and effective security cooperation in Latin America. A clear understanding of the trends discussed is essential to devising appropriate U.S. policies toward that region.
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Escalation and Intrawar Deterrence During Limited Wars in the Middle East
W. Andrew Terrill Dr.
A central purpose of this monograph is to reexamine two earlier conflicts for insights that may be relevant for ongoing dangers during limited wars involving nations possessing chemical or biological weapons or emerging nuclear arsenals. These conflicts are the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the 1991 Gulf War. Both of these wars were fought at the conventional level, although the prospect of Israel using nuclear weapons (1973), Egypt using biological weapons (1973), or Iraq using chemical and biological weapons (1991) were of serious concern at various points during the fighting. This monograph will consider why efforts at escalation control and intrawar deterrence were successful in the two case studies and assess the points at which these efforts were under the most intensive stress that might have caused them to fail.
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Iraq: Strategic Reconciliation, Targeting, and Key Leader Engagement
Jeanne F. Hull Captain
Discussion of Key Leader Engagements (KLE) as a nonlethal option for countering insurgent organizations. Outreach to insurgent organizations through KLE can be both an economy of force measure and, in some circumstances, could be more effective than engaging insurgent organizations with lethal force. The challenge with insurgent outreach to KLE, though, is that it must be tied to a legitimate host-nation government effort towards reconciliation or, at a minimum, accommodation with the insurgent organizations in question. Through the lens of the Multi-National Forces-Iraq Force Strategic Engagement Cell (FSEC), the author illustrates how KLEs can be incorporated as targets in the U.S. military’s targeting process. FSEC’s mission to reach out to Iraq-based insurgent organizations who sought reconciliation with the Iraqi government was entirely based in KLE-related targeting. FSECs activities, therefore, present a suitable case to study how including KLE as “targets” within the targeting process can maximize the utility of the relationships commanders and diplomats alike establish during counterinsurgency and nation-building operations. The operations of this strategic engagement cell also demonstrate the employment of KLE as a part of Information Operations, and the challenges associated with developing and refining intelligence to support KLE targeting. The other challenges FSEC personnel dealt with highlight some additional difficulties commanders and diplomats face with respect to KLE operations with emphasis on managing expectations, continuity, capability, and synchronization of effort. Finally, FSEC’s endeavors in Iraq underscore the utility of outreach to both local leaders and insurgent populations in counterinsurgency operations.
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Mind-Sets and Missiles: a First Hand Account of the Cuban Missile Crisis
Kenneth Michael Absher Mr.
This chronology provides details and analysis of the intelligence failures and successes of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and suggests the applicability of lessons learned to the collection, analysis, and use of intelligence in strategic decisionmaking. The author describes how the crisis unfolded using the author’s personal recollection, declassified documents, and many memoirs written by senior CIA officers and others who were participants. Lessons learned include the need to avoid having our political, analytical and intelligence collection mind-sets prevent us from acquiring and accurately analyzing intelligence about our adversaries true plans and intentions. When our national security is at stake, we should not hesitate to undertake risky intelligence collection operations including espionage, to penetrate our adversary’s deceptions. We must also understand that our adversaries may not believe the gravity of our policy warnings or allow their own agendas to be influenced by diplomatic pressure.
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Russian Elite Image of Iran: From the Late Soviet Era to the Present
Dmitry Shlapentokh Dr.
Since the late Soviet era, the presence of Iran has loomed large in the minds of the Russian elite. Soon after the end of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)—and even before—increasing numbers of Russian intellectuals became disenchanted with the West, especially the United States, and looked for alternative geopolitical alliances. The Muslim world became one of the possible alternatives. Iran became especially important in the geopolitical construction of Eurasianists or neo-Eurasianists who believed that Russia’s alliance with Iran is essential for Russia’s rise to power. Yet, by the middle of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s tenure, increasing tension with the Muslim community and the rise of Russian nationalism had led to more complicated views of the Russian elite on Iran. At present, the Russian elite does not mind using Iran as a bargaining chip in its dealings with the West, especially the United States, and as a market for Russian weapons and other goods and services. However, the dream of a Russian-Iran axis is apparently abandoned for good.
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Criminals, Militias, and Insurgents: Organized Crime in Iraq
Phil Williams Dr.
Dr. Williams looks in detail at major criminal activities, including the theft, diversion, and smuggling of oil, the kidnapping of both Iraqis and foreigners, extortion, car theft, and the theft and smuggling of antiquities. He also considers the critical role played by corruption in facilitating and strengthening organized crime and shows how al-Qaeda in Iraq, Jaish-al-Mahdi, and the Sunni tribes used criminal activities to fund their campaigns of political violence. Dr. Williams identifies the roots of organized crime in post-Ba’athist Iraq in an authoritarian and corrupt state dominated by Saddam Hussein and subject to international sanctions. He also explains the rise of organized crime after the U.S. invasion in terms of two distinct waves: the first wave followed the collapse of the state and was accompanied by the breakdown of social control mechanisms and the development of anomie; the second wave was driven by anarchy, insecurity, political ambition, and the imperatives of resource generation for militias, insurgents, and other groups. He also identifies necessary responses to organized crime and corruption in Iraq, including efforts to reduce criminal opportunities, change incentive structures, and more directly target criminal organizations and activities. His analysis also emphasizes the vulnerability of conflict and post-conflict situations to organized crime and the requirement for a holistic or comprehensive strategy in which security, development, and the rule of law complement one another.
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Challenges and Opportunities for the Obama Administration in Central Asia
Stephen J. Blank Dr.
President Obama has outlined a comprehensive strategy for the war in Afghanistan which is now the central front of our campaign against Islamic terrorism. The strategy strongly connects our prosecution of that war to our policy in Pakistan and internal developments there as a necessary condition of victory. But the strategy has also provided for a new logistics road through Central Asia. The author argues that a winning strategy in Afghanistan depends as well upon the systematic leveraging of the opportunity provided by that road and a new coordinated nonmilitary approach to Central Asia. That approach would rely heavily on improved coordination at home and the more effective leveraging of our superior economic power in Central Asia to help stabilize the region so that it provides a secure rear to Afghanistan. In this fashion we would help Central Asia meet the challenges of extremism, of economic decline due to the global economic crisis, and thus help provide political stability in states that are likely to be challenged by the confluence of those trends.
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New Partnerships for a New Era: Enhancing the South African Army's Stabilization Role in Africa
Deane-Peter Baker Professor
Since emerging from the mire of its apartheid past, South Africa has become a key player in Sub-Saharan Africa. The challenge of creating a truly national military, during a period in which South Africa has also wrestled with tough internal socio-economic problems, has left the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in a weakened state. Despite this, they have in recent years made a considerable contribution to efforts to bring peace and stability to the African continent. A critical step in building a capable and confident future South African Army has been the commencement of the SA Army’s Vision 2020 forward planning process. Recent political changes in both the United States and South Africa have opened up a new window of opportunity for developing a productive partnership between the two nations. This monograph outlines ways in which the United States can contribute to the SA Army’s Vision 2020 program to help optimize South Africa’s potential contribution to the emergence of a peaceful and stable Africa.
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Cultural Dimensions of Strategy and Policy
Jiyul Kim Colonel
There has been a growing recognition in the post-Cold War era that culture has increasingly become a factor in determining the course of today’s complex and interconnected world. The U.S. experience in Afghanistan and Iraq extended this trend to national security and military operations. There is also a growing recognition by the national security community that culture is an important factor at the policy and strategy levels. Cultural proficiency at the policy and strategic levels means the ability to consider history, values, ideology, politics, religion, and other cultural dimensions and assess their potential effect on policy and strategy. The Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and Policy (ACFSP) is one systematic and analytical approach to the vital task of viewing the world through many lenses. The ACFSP identifies basic cultural dimensions that seem to be of fundamental importance in determining such behavior and thus are of importance in policy and strategy formulation and outcomes. These dimensions are (1) Identity, or the basis for defining identity and its linkage to interests; (2) Political Culture, or the structure of power and decisionmaking; and (3) Resilience, or the capacity or ability to resist, adapt or succumb to external forces. Identity is the most important, because it ultimately determines purpose, values and interests that form the foundation for policy and strategy to attain or preserve those interests.
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Mexico's Narco-Insurgency and U.S. Counterdrug Policy
Hal Brands Dr.
In late 2007, the U.S. and Mexican governments unveiled the Merida Initiative. A 3-year, $1.4 billion counternarcotics assistance program, the Merida Initiative is designed to combat the drug-fueled violence that has ravaged Mexico of late. The initiative aims to strengthen the Mexican police and military, permitting them to take the offensive in the fight against Mexico’s powerful cartels. As currently designed, however, the Merida Initiative is unlikely to have a meaningful, long-term impact in restraining the drug trade and drug-related violence. Focussing largely on security, enforcement, and interdiction issues, it pays comparatively little attention to the deeper structural problems that fuel these destructive phenomena. These problems, ranging from official corruption to U.S. domestic drug consumption, have so far frustrated Mexican attempts to rein in the cartels, and will likely hinder the effectiveness of the Merida Initiative as well. To make U.S. counternarcotics policy fully effective, it will be imperative to forge a more holistic, better-integrated approach to the “war on drugs.”
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State and Nonstate Associated Gangs: Credible "Midwives of New Social Orders"
Max G. Manwaring Dr.
The monograph examines contemporary populism and neopopulism, 21st century socialism, and a nonstate actor (al-Qaeda) seeking regional and global hegemony. They are: first, paramilitary gang permutations in Colombia that are contributing significantly to the erosion of the Colombian state and its democratic institutions, and implementing the anti-system objectives of their elite neo-populist sponsors; second, Hugo Chavez’s use of the New Socialism and popular militias to facilitate his populist Bolivarian dream of creating a mega-state in Latin America; and, third, al-Qaeda’s strategic and hegemonic use of political-criminal gangs to coerce substantive change in Spanish and other Western European foreign and defense policy and governance. Lessons derived from these cases demonstrate how gangs might fit into a holistic effort to force radical political-social-economic change, and illustrate how traditional political-military objectives may be achieved indirectly, rather than directly.
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New NATO Members: Security Consumers or Producers?
Joel R. Hillison Dr.
This monograph examines the burden-sharing of new members in NATO. Qualitative and quantitative methods are used to test the hypothesis that new NATO members are burden-sharing at a greater rate than older NATO members. An analysis of the burden-sharing behavior of NATO’s 1999 wave of new members reveals that new NATO members have demonstrated the willingness to contribute to NATO missions, but are often constrained by their limited capabilities. However, new member contributions to NATO have improved and, in comparison to older NATO members, the new members are doing quite well. The United States should focus on improving the capabilities of the new members while encouraging its older allies to increase their own contributions to the alliance where feasible.
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Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success: A Proposed Human Capital Model Focused upon Talent
Casey Wardynski Colonel, David S. Lyle Colonel, and Michael J. Colarusso Dr.
Creating and maintaining a highly competent U.S. Army Officer Corps has always been the cornerstone of the nation's defense. The authors consider America’s continuing commitment to an all-volunteer military, its global engagement in an era of persistent conflict, and evolving changes in its domestic labor market. They argue that the intersection of these factors demands a comprehensive Officer Corps strategy recognizing the interdependency of accessing, developing, retaining and employing talent. They believe that building a talent-focused strategy around this four-activity human capital model will best posture the Army to match individual officer competencies to specific competency requirements. Such a strategy will enable the thoughtful and deliberate integration of resources, policies, and organizations to employ “the right talent in the right job at the right time.” The authors conclude that without such a talent-focused strategy, the Army and its Officer Corps confront the increasing likelihood that they will be unequal to future American national security demands.
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Provincial Reconstruction Teams: How Do We Know They Work?
Carter Malkasian Dr. and Gerald Meyerle Dr.
Over the past 6 years, provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) have played a growing role in the U.S. counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan. PRTs are one of several organizations working on reconstruction there, along with civilian development agencies, including the U.S. Agency for International Development, numerous nongovernmental organizations, and the Afghan government’s National Solidarity Program. Perhaps unsurprisingly, something of a debate has emerged over whether PRTs are needed. The authors argue that civilian reconstruction agencies cannot do the same job as the PRTs. While these agencies remain essential for long-term economic and political development, the PRTs conduct reconstruction in ways that help create stability in the short term. Absent the PRTs, the “build” in clear-hold-build efforts deemed essential to effective counterinsurgency would fall flat. Based on over 2 months of field research in 2007 and 2 months in 2008 by a CNA team with 4 different PRTs—Khost, Kunar, Ghazni, and Nuristan—plus interviews with the leadership of 10 others, the authors recommend that the United States give the PRTs the lead role in reconstruction activities that accompany any surge of military forces into Afghanistan.
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Russia and Arms Control: Are There Opportunities for the Obama Administration?
Stephen J. Blank Dr.
Russo-American relations are generally acknowledged to be at an impasse. Arms control issues feature prominently in that conflicted agenda. Indeed, as of September 2008, the Bush administration was contemplating not just a break in arms talks but actual sanctions, and allowed the bilateral civil nuclear treaty with Russia to die in the Senate rather than go forward for confirmation. Russian spokesmen make clear their belief that American concessions on key elements of arms control issues like missile defenses in Europe are a touchstone for the relationship and a condition of any further progress towards genuine dialogue. This impasse poses several risks beyond the obvious one of a breakdown in U.S.-Russian relations and the easily foreseeable bilateral consequences. Since the outbreak of the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008, both sides have further hardened positions and raised tensions apart from the war itself and Russia’s quite evident refusal to abide by its own cease-fire terms. Nevertheless, for better or worse, arms control and its agenda will remain at the heart of the bilateral Russo-American relationship for a long time. For these reasons, neither the political nor the military aspect can be divorced from the other. And for these same reasons, we cannot refuse to participate in the bilateral effort to resolve those issues.
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Kazakhstan's Defense Policy: An Assessment of the Trends
Roger N. McDermott Mr.
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, since its independence, has successfully avoided favoring any one country based on what Astana styles as a “multi-vectored” approach to foreign policy. Yet, in terms of its conduct of defense and security policies, this paradigm simply does not fit with how the regime makes policy in its most sensitive areas of security cooperation. Indeed, its closest defense ties are still with Russia, which have deepened and intensified at a bilateral level, as well as through multilateral initiatives in the context of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Washington’s military assistance programs have therefore often run into geopolitical issues, such as the limiting effect on its objectives emanating from Kazakhstan’s political and defense relationship with Russia, or sensitivities to its close proximity to China, as well as internal issues surrounding Astana’s military reform agenda. Defense spending in Kazakhstan will also be subject in the short to medium term depending on how the government handles its unfolding financial crisis and continued exposure to the global financial crisis, coupled with the sliding price of oil on the world markets. These issues, sharply refocused by the Russian military exposure of weaknesses within Georgia’s armed forces despite several years of time-phased U.S. training and equipment programs, serve to question the aims, scope, and utility of American defense assistance programs calibrated to enhance Kazakhstan’s military capabilities. While Astana grapples with these internal issues and remains politically sensitive to the anxieties of Moscow as it perceives U.S. training and aid to the Kazakhstani armed forces, success will be modest. New, deeper and more closely monitored programs are needed and, combined with multilateral cooperative initiatives, should be a matter of urgent priority, otherwise, such programs will underperform and languish in the repetition of the misjudgements of the past.
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Building Partner Capacity/Security Force Assistance: A New Structural Paradigm
Scott G. Wuestner Colonel
The Civil Response Corps (CRC) would function much like our military reserve. It would ease the burden on the Armed Forces by allowing the hiring of civilians with critical skills to serve on missions abroad when America needs them. The CRC is a product of the efforts of State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The core mission of S/CRS is to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, good governance, and a market economy. As the General Purpose Force looks forward to expanding roles in Irregular Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, Security Assistance and Stability Operations, does the U.S. Army or the Department of Defense have the proper force structure and minimal capability to fight and win through all phases of conflict? This paper analyzes this construct and provides a framework for identifying proponency, institutionalizing lessons learned, and providing a military, police, and governance structure as a tool for global engagement. This new structural paradigm complements S/CRS's efforts to provide the United States with the ability to access, influence, and build capacity throughout this new world order.
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