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Toward a Strategy of Positive Ends
Antulio J. Echevarria Dr. and Huba Wass de Czege Brigadier General (Ret.)
Brigadier General (Retired) Huba Wass de Czege and Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II make a case for a strategy aimed at achieving positive, rather than neutral or negative, ends. They first discuss the dynamic conditions of the new strategic environment, then explore the options the United States has available for dealing with those conditions. The options include (1) preventive defense, (2) neo-isolationism, and (3) a strategy that pursues positive ends. Only the last, the authors argue, deals with the new security environment in a proactive way. It enables the United States to define its vital interests in terms of conditions--such as peace, freedom, rule of law, and economic prosperity--rather than as the containment or defeat of inimical state or nonstate actors. The basic approach of a strategy of positive ends would be to build and enlarge a circle of stakeholders committed to creating conditions for a profitable and enduring peace--thereby reducing the potential for crises--and to preparing response mechanisms for coping successfully when crises do occur.
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Toward a Strategy of Positive Ends
Antulio J. Echevarria II and Huba Wass de Czege Brigadier General (Ret.)
Brigadier General (Retired) Huba Wass de Czege and Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II make a case for a strategy aimed at achieving positive, rather than neutral or negative, ends. They first discuss the dynamic conditions of the new strategic environment, then explore the options the United States has available for dealing with those conditions. The options include (1) preventive defense, (2) neo-isolationism, and (3) a strategy that pursues positive ends. Only the last, the authors argue, deals with the new security environment in a proactive way. It enables the United States to define its vital interests in terms of conditions--such as peace, freedom, rule of law, and economic prosperity--rather than as the containment or defeat of inimical state or nonstate actors. The basic approach of a strategy of positive ends would be to build and enlarge a circle of stakeholders committed to creating conditions for a profitable and enduring peace--thereby reducing the potential for crises--and to preparing response mechanisms for coping successfully when crises do occur.
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Jihadi Groups, Nuclear Pakistan, and the New Great Game
M. Ehsan Ahrari Dr.
For the United States and other nations concerned with security in South and Central Asia, one of the most ominous trends has been the growing influence of Jihadist groups in Pakistan which feel obligated to wage holy war against everything that they perceive as non-Islamic. Their objective would be a Pakistani government similar to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The danger this would pose to regional stability and U.S. interests is clear. The author assesses Jihadi groups from the framework of a new "Great Game" for influence in Central Asia involving an array of states. He argues that, if this competition leads to increased violence, outside states including the United States could be drawn in. On the other hand, if the region stabilizes, it could provide solid economic and political partners for the United States. A well-designed American strategy, Ahrari contends, might help avoid crises or catastrophe.
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The Drug Scourge as a Hemispheric Problem
Barry R. McCaffrey General
Former Drug Czar General Barry McCaffrey, USA (Retired) argues that Colombia s 40 million citizens must not be deserted by their neighbors. Leaving the Colombians to deal in isolation with a pervasive drug problem will deeply affect all 800 million of us in the Western Hemisphere through addiction, violence, and corruption. Moreover, he argues that the United States and the entire international community must support a long-term commitment to Plan Colombia and to building cooperative multinational approaches to the tough drug-associated problems that face us all. This is an undertaking in which we all have an equal stake and an equal responsibility.
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The Drug Scourge as a Hemispheric Problem
Barry R. McCaffrey General
Former Drug Czar General Barry McCaffrey, USA (Retired) argues that Colombia s 40 million citizens must not be deserted by their neighbors. Leaving the Colombians to deal in isolation with a pervasive drug problem will deeply affect all 800 million of us in the Western Hemisphere through addiction, violence, and corruption. Moreover, he argues that the United States and the entire international community must support a long-term commitment to Plan Colombia and to building cooperative multinational approaches to the tough drug-associated problems that face us all. This is an undertaking in which we all have an equal stake and an equal responsibility.
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W(h)ither Corps?
D. Robert Worley Dr.
Army transformation has many dimensions with change in technology, operational methods, and organizations. So far, the focus of organizational transformation has been on the redesign of tactical units such as the interim brigade combat teams. But corps--the Army's operational level organizations--must also be transformed. The author provides a history of the structure and function of Army corps and discusses ways they might be redesigned to play an effective role in the 21st century security environment. He concludes that the different Army corps have such diverse functions that a "one size fits all" approach is inappropriate. After considering a number of options, he provides a blueprint for an array of corps structures that would fulfill missions from peacekeeping to major wars.
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W(h)ither Corps?
D. Robert Worley Dr.
Army transformation has many dimensions with change in technology, operational methods, and organizations. So far, the focus of organizational transformation has been on the redesign of tactical units such as the interim brigade combat teams. But corps--the Army's operational level organizations--must also be transformed. The author provides a history of the structure and function of Army corps and discusses ways they might be redesigned to play an effective role in the 21st century security environment. He concludes that the different Army corps have such diverse functions that a "one size fits all" approach is inappropriate. After considering a number of options, he provides a blueprint for an array of corps structures that would fulfill missions from peacekeeping to major wars.
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Army Transformation: A View from the U.S. Army War College
Williamson Murray Dr.
The U.S. Army is now in the process of transforming itself to meet security interests and the need for land power that span the globe, now and in the future. The following essays are representative of current thinking at the U.S. Army War College by students considering the nature and direction of this transformation. Dr. Williamson Murray s introduction sets the historical context for military transformation, comparing the modern European example with recent U.S. efforts in military innovation. The remaining essays address four themes: the nature of the transformed Army, building irreversible momentum for transformation, improving strategic responsiveness, and how to achieve transformation in key areas.
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Army Transformation: A View from the U.S. Army War College
Williamson Murray Dr.
The U.S. Army is now in the process of transforming itself to meet security interests and the need for land power that span the globe, now and in the future. The following essays are representative of current thinking at the U.S. Army War College by students considering the nature and direction of this transformation. Dr. Williamson Murray s introduction sets the historical context for military transformation, comparing the modern European example with recent U.S. efforts in military innovation. The remaining essays address four themes: the nature of the transformed Army, building irreversible momentum for transformation, improving strategic responsiveness, and how to achieve transformation in key areas.
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Educating International Security Practitioners: Preparing to Face the Demands of the 21st Century International Security Environment
Robert H. Dorff Dr., Daniel J. Kaufman Brigadier General, James M. Smith Dr., and Linda P. Brady Dr.
The authors examine the challenges of the 21st century international security environment to which future strategic leaders and policy practitioners will need to respond. More specifically, they offer the reader insights into security studies and leadership development at their respective levels (military undergraduate, civilian undergraduate, traditional and nontraditional graduate, and senior military officer) and institutions (including research centers and professional outreach programs). The goal is to inform a broader audience about what is currently being done in the way of educating strategic practitioners at these various institutions, and what might need to be done differently or better.
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Future Warfare Anthology, Revised Edition
Robert H. Scales Major General
This Revised Anthology is about the future of military operations in the opening decades of the 21st century. Its purpose is not to predict the future, but to speculate on the conduct of military operations as an instrument of national policy in a world absent massive thermonuclear and conventional superpower confrontation characteristic of the Cold War. Also absent are indirect constraints imposed by that confrontation on virtually all political-military relationships, not solely those between superpower principals. Most of these essays are attempts to define military operational concepts that might be employed to execute such an engagement strategy.
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Future Warfare Anthology, Revised Edition
Robert H. Scales Major General
This Revised Anthology is about the future of military operations in the opening decades of the 21st century. Its purpose is not to predict the future, but to speculate on the conduct of military operations as an instrument of national policy in a world absent massive thermonuclear and conventional superpower confrontation characteristic of the Cold War. Also absent are indirect constraints imposed by that confrontation on virtually all political-military relationships, not solely those between superpower principals. Most of these essays are attempts to define military operational concepts that might be employed to execute such an engagement strategy.
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Plan Colombia: Some Differing Perspectives
Gabriel Marcella Dr., Charles E. Wilhelm GEN (RET), Alvaro Valencia Tovar Colombian General, and Ricardo Arias Calderon Dr.
This monograph, with an introduction by Dr. Gabriel Marcella, includes four short, but interesting and important papers presented at a conference on Plan Colombia, sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and the North-South Center of the University of Miami. General Charles E. Wilhelm, a former Commander-in-Chief of the United States Southern Command; General Alvaro Valencia Tovar, a former commander of the Colombian Army; Dr. Ricardo Arias Calderon, a former Vice President of Panama; and Mr. Chris Marquis, a correspondent for the New York Times, present four distinctly differing views regarding Plan Colombia. Their perspectives reflect the uncertainty and confusion expressed at the conference regarding U.S. policy in Colombia and the implementation of Plan Colombia. In that connection, there appears to be no consensus on what Plan Colombia is and what it is not. This disarray, as well as additional questions generated from it, demonstrates a pressing need to pursue the debate. This is important because, one way or another, Plan Colombia affects us all.
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Plan Colombia: Some Differing Perspectives
Gabriel Marcella Dr., Charles E. Wilhelm GEN (RET), Alvaro Valencia Tovar Colombian General, and Ricardo Arias Calderon Dr.
This monograph, with an introduction by Dr. Gabriel Marcella, includes four short, but interesting and important papers presented at a conference on Plan Colombia, sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and the North-South Center of the University of Miami. General Charles E. Wilhelm, a former Commander-in-Chief of the United States Southern Command; General Alvaro Valencia Tovar, a former commander of the Colombian Army; Dr. Ricardo Arias Calderon, a former Vice President of Panama; and Mr. Chris Marquis, a correspondent for the New York Times, present four distinctly differing views regarding Plan Colombia. Their perspectives reflect the uncertainty and confusion expressed at the conference regarding U.S. policy in Colombia and the implementation of Plan Colombia. In that connection, there appears to be no consensus on what Plan Colombia is and what it is not. This disarray, as well as additional questions generated from it, demonstrates a pressing need to pursue the debate. This is important because, one way or another, Plan Colombia affects us all.
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The Regional Security Crisis in the Andes: Patterns of State Response
Judith A. Gentleman Dr.
The instability, corruption, displacement of people, and violence generated by Colombia's unholy trinity of narcotics traffickers, insurgents, and paramilitaries is spilling over into virtually all of northern South America and Panama. Thus, the stability and political sovereignty of the region are being compromised. And, at the same time, progress toward achieving the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the economic integration of the Western Hemisphere by 2005 is being severely threatened. The author outlines some of the detail and implications of the regional security crisis in the Andes and makes recommendations for U.S. civil-military involvement in the hemispheric security arena. She argues for the United States to lead in the articulation of strategic objectives, while designing a defensible and feasible policy that critical elements in North America, Central and South America, Europe, and Japan can understand and support. She specifically argues for the U.S. military to build stronger and more cooperative security relationships within the circle of affected states around Colombia.
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U.S. Security Policy in the Western Hemisphere: Why Colombia, Why Now, and What Is To Be Done?
Max G. Manwaring Dr.
This is one in the Special Series of monographs stemming from the February 2001 conference on Plan Colombia cosponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center of the University of Miami. In substantive U.S. national security terms, the author addresses the questions, Why Colombia, Why Now, and What Is To Be Done? He explains the importance of that troubled country to the United States. He points out that the fragile democracy of Colombia is at risk, and that the violent spillover effects of three simultaneous wars pose a threat to the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the interdependent global community. Then he makes a case against continued tactical and operational approaches to the Colombian crisis and outlines what must be done. In that connection, he recommends an actionable political-military strategy to attain security, stability, democratic governance, and a sustainable peace. The proposed strategy would not be costly in monetary or military terms. It would, however, require deliberate planning, cooperation, time, and will.
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U.S. Security Policy in the Western Hemisphere: Why Colombia, Why Now, and What Is To Be Done?
Max G. Manwaring Dr.
This is one in the Special Series of monographs stemming from the February 2001 conference on Plan Colombia cosponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center of the University of Miami. In substantive U.S. national security terms, the author addresses the questions, Why Colombia, Why Now, and What Is To Be Done? He explains the importance of that troubled country to the United States. He points out that the fragile democracy of Colombia is at risk, and that the violent spillover effects of three simultaneous wars pose a threat to the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the interdependent global community. Then he makes a case against continued tactical and operational approaches to the Colombian crisis and outlines what must be done. In that connection, he recommends an actionable political-military strategy to attain security, stability, democratic governance, and a sustainable peace. The proposed strategy would not be costly in monetary or military terms. It would, however, require deliberate planning, cooperation, time, and will.
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European Perceptions of Plan Colombia: A Virtual Contribution to a Virtual War and Peace Plan?
Joaquin Roy Dr.
Professor Joaquin Roy, a Spaniard with valuable sources throughout Europe, notes that Europeans apparently do not approve of the seeming U.S. emphasis on providing military equipment and training to Colombia for a counternarcotics effort in what they see as a larger strategic political conflict. At the same time, he reports that Europeans are not only concerned with the counternarcotics violence in Colombia, but also with the economic, security, and political spillover effects for neighboring countries. Finally and logically, the author reflects the European concern that whatever contribution that might be made to Plan Colombia will likely be lost in the violence of a U.S.-led counternarcotics campaign.
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Plan Colombia: The View from the Presidential Palace
Eduardo Pizano Mr.
The author, a former member of the Colombian Senate and now the General Secretary to the President of Colombia, discusses various misconceptions stemming from the uncertainty and confusion that permeated conference discussions involving U.S. policy in Colombia and the implementation of Plan Colombia. He makes several points that are both compelling and instructive. First, Colombia s sovereignty is being impinged by illegal narco-trafficking organizations and insurgent allies that threaten democratic governance from within. Second, of necessity, Plan Colombia must include strong military and counternarcotics components. Third, Colombia has the military forces necessary to deal with the violence in the country, but the armed forces and the police need training, equipment, and mobility assets. Fourth, Plan Colombia also includes a very strong social component as a matter of fact, the vast majority of the $7.5 billion being allocated for the plan is designated for social and economic development purposes. Finally, he argues that there are no cocksure short-term answers to Colombia s problems. What is certain is that these problems are being dealt with aggressively by Colombia and its friends.
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The Search for Accountability and Transparency in PLAN COLOMBIA: Reforming Judicial Institutions--Again
Luz E. Nagle Dr.
The author argues that confidence in an efficient, courageous and transparent judiciary goes to the very heart of the governability of Colombia, and that Plan Colombia does not address the root causes of Colombia's problems. These are weak government, inequality, absence of citizen participation, corruption and an ineffective legal system. Fundamental reforms in Colombia should begin by directly strengthening the moral legitimacy of the government, holistically enhancing socioeconomic development, and meticulously reforming the legal system, thus reestablishing the rule of law. The rule of law, in turn, is critical to the achievement of the ultimate purposes of Plan Colombia--peace, prosperity, and the strengthening of the state. Systemic reform requires well-conceived, long-term, and careful implementation. Unless thinking and actions are reoriented to deal with these realities, the alternative is social calamity, criminal anarchy, and civil war.
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U.S. Support of PLAN COLOMBIA: Rethinking the Ends and Means
Stephen E. Flynn Dr.
The author argues that the U.S. emphasis on drug control in its support of Plan Colombia is misguided and akin to prescribing an antibiotic regime to combat a disease not caused by bacteria or similar micro-organisms. The illegal drug industry in Colombia is not the cause of that country s fragile socio-political system, but a symptom of and a contributor to the fragility of the Colombian state. Continuing the analogy, Flynn argues that U.S. and Colombian emphasis on combating illicit drug cultivation and trafficking leads to several undesirable side effects.
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Fighting the Hobbesian Trinity in Colombia: A New Strategy for Peace
Joseph R. Nunez Colonel
The author analyzes the drug intervention conundrum of Colombia. He then summarizes the reasons for the violent and anarchic situation that frustrates those wishing to make peace and expand democracy. After introducing what he calls the Hobbesian trinity, the author discusses alternatives to intervention and notes the complexity of the human rights challenge. He suggests a new strategy for improving human security, government accountability, democratic reform, and peace prospects. The author argues that the current approach is heading the wrong way, moving away from peace and fomenting greater instability. He concludes that there is a window of opportunity for the United States to support Colombia in a new way in its war against this anarchic trinity. But this will involve overcoming political factions responsible for the current policy that he argues is ineffective.
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Plan Colombia: The Strategic and Operational Imperatives
Gabriel Marcella Dr.
The United States is committed to helping Colombia fight its struggle against the violence and corruption engendered by the traffic in narcotics. This report examines the strategic theory within Plan Colombia, the master plan which the government of Colombia developed to strengthen democracy through peace, security, and economic development. The author argues that the United States and the international community must support this beleaguered nation. He cautions, however, that the main responsibility for success lies with the Colombians. They must mobilize the national resources and make the sacrifices to win back the country from the narco-traffickers, the insurgents, and the paramilitaries. To that end, Plan Colombia is a well-conceived strategy that must be sustained for the long term.
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Political Control over the Use of Force: A Clausewitzian Perspective
Suzanne C. Nielsen Lieutenant Colonel
The author addresses the issues regarding the ideal relationship between the commander and the statesman in time of war and the balance between political control and military operational expertise by examining what Carl von Clausewitz has to say about civil- military relations and the use of force. She looks in depth at Clausewitz s arguments, reviews his theoretical approach, and discusses four key implications of the basic idea that political purposes govern war. In conclusion, the author suggests that Clausewitz has issued both statesmen and commanders a challenge. Commanders must appreciate the necessity of subordinating military means to political ends, and statesmen must think as strategists as they make decisions about the relationship between ends and means and the achievement of their goals.
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U.S. Army and the Asia-Pacific
Andrew Scobell Dr.
The United States has key economic and security interests in the Asia-Pacific region. In recent decades, the Asia-Pacific has experienced rapid economic growth, a wave of democratization, and the emergence of a web of regional and sub regional multilateral institutions. All these developments have contributed to enhancing the pace and prosperity of the region. The author highlights the significant and ongoing contribution of the U.S. Army in deterring war, executing smaller-scale contingencies, and shaping the security environment. He advocates a robust, pro- active Army presence for the foreseeable future. Such a presence will ensure the promotion and protection of U.S. national interests in the region.
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