Books, Monographs & Collaborative Studies

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  Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya: Military Strategic Culture and the Paradoxes of Asymmetric Conflict

  Robert M. Cassidy Major

  The author uses a detailed assessment of the Russian experience in Afghanistan and Chechnya to draw important conclusions about asymmetric warfare. He then uses this to provide recommendations for the U.S. military, particularly the Army. Major Cassidy points out that small wars are difficult for every great power, yet are the most common kind. Even in this era of asymmetry, the U.S. Army exhibits a cultural preference for the "big war" paradigm. He suggests that the U.S. military in general, including the Army, needs a cultural transformation to master the challenge of asymmetry fully. From this will grow doctrine and organizational change.

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  Waging Ancient War: Limits on Preemptive Force

  D. Robert Worley Dr.

  The author addresses the ways that the age of terrorism is affecting American grand strategy. He contends that terrorism has made many of the basic concepts of international relations and national security obsolete. Declaring war on a tactic—terrorism—erodes the clarity necessary for coherent strategy. Dr. Worley then develops what he calls a "guerra strategy" more appropriate for dealing with terrorism and other nonstate threats.

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  Plan Colombia: Reality of the Colombian Crisis and Implications for Hemispheric Security

  Luz E. Nagle Dr.

  The author analyzes Colombia's problems and makes recommendations regarding what it will take to achieve stated U.S. and Colombian objectives in that crisis situation. She also examines the concomitant issue of "spillover" from the Colombian crisis into the rest of the Latin American region. The results and recommendations of this analysis go well beyond prescribing a simple military solution to the complex political-economic-social-moral-security issues of this 50-year-old war. In these terms, it becomes clear that the military in general and the U.S. Army in particular must change in order to operate more effectively in the full spectrum of current and future conflict.

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  Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy

  Stephen D. Biddle Dr.

  America's novel use of special forces, precision weapons, and indigenous allies has attracted widespread attention since its debut in Northern Afghanistan last fall. It has proven both influential and controversial. Many think it caused the Taliban's sudden collapse. For them, this "Afghan Model" represents warfare's future, and should become the new template for US defense planning. Critics, however, see Afghanistan as an anomaly - a non-repeatable product of local conditions. This briefing examines the Afghan Model's actual role in the fall of the Taliban using evidence collected from a combination of 45 participant interviews, terrain inspection in Afghanistan, and written documentation from both official and unofficial sources. The results suggest that neither of the main current interpretations is sound: Afghanistan offers important clues to warfare's future, but not the ones most people think. The campaign of 2001-2 was a surprisingly orthodox air-ground theater campaign in which heavy fire support decided a contest between two significant land armies. Of course, some elements were quite new. Precision firepower was available in unprecedented quantity and proved crucial for success; special operations forces served as the main effort in a theater of war. In an important sense, though, the differences were less salient than the continuities: the key to success in both Afghanistan and traditional joint warfare was the close interaction of fire and maneuver, neither of which was sufficient alone and neither of which could succeed without sizeable ground forces trained and equipped at least as well as their opponents. In Afghanistan, our allies provided these ground forces for us; where others can do so, the Afghan Model can be expected to prevail. Hence Afghanistan is not unique. But not all future allies have armies trained and equipped to their enemies' standards. Without this, neither the bravery of our special forces nor the sophistication of our PGMs can ensure an Afghan-like collapse in a resolute opponent—and this implies a very different set of policies for the armed forces and the Nation than many of those now prominent in the public debate on the war.

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  European Adaptation to Expeditionary Warfare: Implications for the U.S. Army

  Andrew M. Dorman Dr.

  The author briefly examines the European response to the changing security environment and the opportunities presented by the European Security and Defense Policy Expeditionary Force. As he correctly observes, the establishment of a European expeditionary force will be no easy matter, will require substantial investment, and will take years to complete. However, it is the right course for Europe to take. The European Union (EU) cannot manage emerging security issues using Cold War legacy forces because they are too ponderous to deploy. A lighter, more nimble expeditionary force is critical to EU policy. The author also points out that the United States must remain involved in the EU initiatives. Europe cannot go it alone and will need advice and perhaps even material support if it is to realize its ambitious agenda.

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  South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances

  Michael R. Chambers Dr.

  This volume consists of revised versions of papers presented at conference sponsored by the Asia/Pacific Research Center and the Center for International Security and Cooperation of Stanford University, and the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute on January 4-5, 2002. While there are numerous ways to approach the question of "whither South Asia?" the conference organizers decided to focus on the future of strategic balances and alliances in the region, with 2020 as the target date. This choice of topic allowed the conference participants to talk not only about the patterns of amity and enmity within the region, but also about the role of extraregional powers and issues such as social and economic trends, domestic political conditions, strategic culture, and the role of nuclear weapons. These factors can affect the relative power of countries as well as their relations of friendship and hostility.

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  South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances

  Michael R. Chambers Dr.

  This volume consists of revised versions of papers presented at conference sponsored by the Asia/Pacific Research Center and the Center for International Security and Cooperation of Stanford University, and the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute on January 4-5, 2002. While there are numerous ways to approach the question of "whither South Asia?" the conference organizers decided to focus on the future of strategic balances and alliances in the region, with 2020 as the target date. This choice of topic allowed the conference participants to talk not only about the patterns of amity and enmity within the region, but also about the role of extraregional powers and issues such as social and economic trends, domestic political conditions, strategic culture, and the role of nuclear weapons. These factors can affect the relative power of countries as well as their relations of friendship and hostility.

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  Colombia's Conflicts: The Spillover Effects of a Wider War

  Richard Millett Mr.

  This monograph is the first in a new Special Series of monographs that stems from the February 2001 and the March 2002 conferences--co-sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center of the University of Miami--that dealt with the "Implementation of Plan Colombia." It provides a careful examination of the so-called "spillover" problems generated by Colombia's three simultaneous wars against illegal drug traffickers, insurgents, and self-appointed paramilitary groups. All seek, in one way or another, violently to change or depose the state. All use the uncontrolled "gray areas" in Colombia and its neighboring states to sustain, conduct, and replenish their nefarious operations without risk of significant interference. And, all these violent illegal entities constitute threats to stability and security that extend beyond Colombia and Latin America to Europe and the United States. Colombia is therefore a paradigm of the failing state that has enormous implications for U.S. foreign policy and military asset management for now and into the future.

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  Dragon on Terrorism: Assessing China's Tactical Gains and Strategic Losses Post-September 11

  Mohan Malik Dr.

  The U.S. relationship with China and the global war on terrorism are the two most significant strategic challenges faced by the Bush administration. Both are vital and complex; the way the administration manages them will shape American security for many years. While there is a growing literature on both key strategic issues, little analysis has been done on the intersection of the two. This monograph fills the gap as the author assesses how the war on terrorism has affected China. He concludes that the war on terrorism radically altered the Asian strategic environment in ways that negated China's foreign policy gains of the last decade and undermined its image as Asia's only great power. He then offers a range of recommendations for a more stable relationship with China.

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  Growing U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia

  Elizabeth Wishnick Dr.

  The author assesses U.S. security interests and military activities in Central Asia. She notes that strengthening the Central Asian states against terrorism and assisting their transition to stable and prosperous nations are difficult and fraught with danger. In particular, there is the risk that the U.S. military presence in the region and security assistance to repressive regimes might taint America. If not astutely managed, this strategy could have the opposite of the intended results and generate increased instability, spark anti-Americanism, and antagonize Russia and China. To avoid this, Dr. Wishnick advocates a multilateral strategy that integrates the military, political, and economic elements of national power and prods the Central Asian regimes toward reform.

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  Avoiding Vietnam: The U.S. Army's Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia

  Conrad C. Crane Dr.

  As American operations against terrorism spread around the globe to places like Afghanistan and the Philippines, an increasing tendency has been for commentators to draw parallels with past experience in Vietnam. Even soldiers on the ground have begun to speak in such terms. The author analyzes the Army's response to that defeat in Southeast Asia and its long-term impact. Contrary to the accepted wisdom that nations which lose wars tend to learn best how to correct their mistakes, he argues that Americans tried to forget the unhappy experience with counterinsurgency by refocusing on conventional wars. While that process eventually produced the powerful force that won the Persian Gulf War, it left an Army with force structure, doctrine, and attitudes that are much less applicable to the peace operations and counterterrorism campaign it now faces. The author asserts that the Army must change in order to operate effectively in the full spectrum of future requirements, and it is time to reexamine the war in Vietnam. He also draws attention to the service's "Lessons Learned" process, and provides insights as to how the experience gained in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM should be analyzed and applied.

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  China's Growing Military Power: Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities

  Andrew Scobell Dr. and Larry M. Wortzel Dr.

  This volume, comprised of papers originally presented at a conference held at Carlisle Barracks in September 2001, helps to put the Hainan Island incident in the broader context of China's strategic aspirations and its growing military capabilities. This conference's co-sponsors were the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and the U.S. Army War College. For the fourth consecutive year, the War College's Strategic Studies Institute is publishing the proceedings. The nine chapters in this volume, all written by leading experts, cover a diverse set of important topics: East Asian perspectives on China's security ambitions, the status of the Chinese ballistic missile program and regional reactions to U.S. missile defense initiatives, and China's ever-improving conventional military capabilities.

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  China's Growing Military Power: Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities

  Andrew Scobell Dr. and Larry M. Wortzel Dr.

  This volume, comprised of papers originally presented at a conference held at Carlisle Barracks in September 2001, helps to put the Hainan Island incident in the broader context of China's strategic aspirations and its growing military capabilities. This conference's co-sponsors were the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and the U.S. Army War College. For the fourth consecutive year, the War College's Strategic Studies Institute is publishing the proceedings. The nine chapters in this volume, all written by leading experts, cover a diverse set of important topics: East Asian perspectives on China's security ambitions, the status of the Chinese ballistic missile program and regional reactions to U.S. missile defense initiatives, and China's ever-improving conventional military capabilities.

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  Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine--Again!

  Antulio J. Echevarria II

  The author cuts through the myriad interpretations surrounding the concept and gets back to the original idea as conceived by its author, the Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz. In going back to the original concept, Lieutenant Colonel Echevarria reveals that Clausewitz intended the center of gravity to function much as its counterpart in the mechanical sciences does, that is, as a focal point. He thus argues, quite persuasively, that the Clausewitzian center of gravity is not a strength, nor a weakness, nor even a source of strength. A center of gravity is the one element within a combatant's entire structure or system that has the necessary centripetal force to hold that structure together. This is why Clausewitz wrote that a blow directed against a center of gravity will have the greatest effect. The author concludes with recommendations for revising Joint and Service doctrine so that they will reflect a more accurate and coherent definition of a center of gravity. He also offers some considerations for the war planner when applying the concept.

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  Transformation Concepts for National Security in the 21st Century

  Williamson Murray Dr.

  This book represents some of the thinking by students at the U.S. Army War College, considering the nature and direction of transformation. They consider how the transformed joint services of the United States should employ force in the 21st century. The services are exploring concepts such as Effects Based Operations and Rapid Decisive Operations to move swiftly and strike vigorously to secure victory in the coming decades. At the same time the nation and its armed forces are developing new concepts of homeland security to defend the country in the war on terrorism. Officers who participated in the Advanced Strategic Art Program (ASAP) during Academic Year 2002 wrote the individual chapters.

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  Transformation Concepts for National Security in the 21st Century

  Williamson Murray Dr.

  This book represents some of the thinking by students at the U.S. Army War College, considering the nature and direction of transformation. They consider how the transformed joint services of the United States should employ force in the 21st century. The services are exploring concepts such as Effects Based Operations and Rapid Decisive Operations to move swiftly and strike vigorously to secure victory in the coming decades. At the same time the nation and its armed forces are developing new concepts of homeland security to defend the country in the war on terrorism. Officers who participated in the Advanced Strategic Art Program (ASAP) during Academic Year 2002 wrote the individual chapters.

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  A 21st Century Security Architecture for the Americas: Multilateral Cooperation, Liberal Peace, and Soft Power

  Joseph R. Nunez Colonel

  This monograph is a constructive response to the question of "How can the United States best develop security cooperation within the Americas?" The author develops the necessary background to make the persuasive argument that it is time for the United States to employ strategic restraint and reassurance of allies to develop a new security architecture that is effective and efficient, not to mention reflective of our values and interests. The threats and challenges articulated are no longer state versus state on a path to eventual war, but more internal, where weak institutions struggle to deal with terrorism, natural disasters, governmental corruption, insurgency, crime, and narcotrafficking. Further complicating matters is that many of these problems transcend borders. The author argues that the United States is the only country that can provide the new direction for security cooperation, but must rely upon Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile to develop the consensus for change and materially contribute to the creation of standing multinational units. Issues such as state sovereignty and the role of the Organization- of American States must figure significantly in the overarching security structure, and that these new brigade-sized units must be able to rapidly deploy to handle missions immediately, not after the fact in an ad hoc and disorganized manner.

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  Hizballah: Terrorism, National Liberation, or Menace?

  Sami G. Hajjar Dr.

  The author reviews the history of Hizballah since its inception in 1982, and examines its role in the recent political turmoil of Lebanon and the region. Not only is Hizballah's role central in the dispute over the Sheb'a Farms enclave between Lebanon and Israel, it is part of an entangled set of linkages involving Syria, Iran, the United States, the European Union, and the Palestinians. The challenge that Hizballah poses to U.S. policy in the Middle East involves complicated strategic issues, not merely problems of terrorism that could be dealt with by countermeasures.

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  Pax NATO: The Opportunities of Enlargement

  Raymond A. Millen LTC

  The author examines NATO's extraordinary performance and incisive initiatives during the immediate post-Cold War years. He scrutinizes the impact of enlargement on the Alliance, not only from a military but also a geopolitical perspective. He is quick to point out that, without the needed reforms, new members will bring more fat than muscle to the Alliance. However, the process of enlargement has served to harmonize Central and Eastern Europe with Western Europe in a remarkable manner. That achievement alone has made enlargement worthwhile. He goes beyond the next round of enlargement and makes a case for a reorientation of NATO enlargement towards the Middle East and North African regions. They may never receive the full security umbrella of NATO, but they can enjoy the shade.

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  The Future of Transcaspian Security

  Stephen J. Blank Dr.

  This monograph explores the unprecedented opportunities that are now before the United States and recommends actions that the Government and armed forces, especially, but not only the U.S. Army, should undertake to consolidate and extend the newly emerging military partnership and cooperative security regime that are now developing. Because the opportunities being presented to the United States and NATO were never possible before to this degree, the proper way to exploit them will become a subject of debate.

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  Tweaking NATO: The Case for Integrated Multinational Divisions

  Raymond A. Millen LTC

  As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) adapts to the emerging strategic environment, it must consider innovative organizational structures that will allow it to harness the potential of its European partners. NATO's enduring deficiencies and their detrimental effect on military capabilities are examined. The decade following the end of the Cold War has revealed a far different world than envisioned. As the United States ruefully discovered, the reduced threat did not diminish security obligations. NATO's European members hoped otherwise and paid insufficient attention to military capabilities. NATO enlargement exacerbates the existing problems. NATO's integrated military structure does not easily accommodate the new members, which still suffer from the effects of the Soviet system. Simply put, their nascent market economies and unsophisticated militaries represent great obstacles to NATO interoperability. Establishment of integrated multinational divisions as a solution to NATO's salient problems is explored. Streamlining the Alliance to a single active corps of ten divisions and the establishment of a robust logistical supply group permits greater utility of limited manpower and equipment. Under this structure, all Alliance members can focus modernization on select units and become active participants in all NATO operations. This bold approach creates challenges for the Alliance, but the tremendous benefits outweigh the short-term risks. To remain relevant, the Alliance must seek innovations. Otherwise, it will become a Cold War relic.

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  Tweaking NATO: The Case for Integrated Multinational Divisions

  Raymond A. Millen LTC

  As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) adapts to the emerging strategic environment, it must consider innovative organizational structures that will allow it to harness the potential of its European partners. NATO's enduring deficiencies and their detrimental effect on military capabilities are examined. The decade following the end of the Cold War has revealed a far different world than envisioned. As the United States ruefully discovered, the reduced threat did not diminish security obligations. NATO's European members hoped otherwise and paid insufficient attention to military capabilities. NATO enlargement exacerbates the existing problems. NATO's integrated military structure does not easily accommodate the new members, which still suffer from the effects of the Soviet system. Simply put, their nascent market economies and unsophisticated militaries represent great obstacles to NATO interoperability. Establishment of integrated multinational divisions as a solution to NATO's salient problems is explored. Streamlining the Alliance to a single active corps of ten divisions and the establishment of a robust logistical supply group permits greater utility of limited manpower and equipment. Under this structure, all Alliance members can focus modernization on select units and become active participants in all NATO operations. This bold approach creates challenges for the Alliance, but the tremendous benefits outweigh the short-term risks. To remain relevant, the Alliance must seek innovations. Otherwise, it will become a Cold War relic.

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  China and Strategic Culture

  Andrew Scobell Dr.

  The author examines the impact of strategic culture on 21st century China. He contends that the People's Republic of China's security policies and its tendency to use military force are influenced not only by elite understandings of China's own strategic tradition, but also by their understandings of the strategic cultures of other states. Gaining a fuller appreciation for how Chinese strategists view the United States and Japan, our key ally in the Asia-Pacific, will better enable us to assess regional and global security issues.

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  Facing the Hydra: Maintaining Strategic Balance while Pursuing a Global War against Terrorism

  Conrad C. Crane Dr.

  The author analyzes the impact of the war on terrorism and the requirements of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review on the many essential missions conducted by the U.S. Armed Forces. Focusing primarily on the Army, he highlights the requirements associated with combat operations against terrorists, accelerating transformation and the new emphasis on homeland security and force protection. At the same time, he points out that the Army and the other Services must remain involved worldwide in day-to-day assurance, dissuasion, and deterrence activities; execution of peace operations and other smaller-scale contingencies; and remaining ready for other major combat operations. The author asserts that these obligations require the Army to reshape and expand its force structure. Failure to do so places critical missions at risk around the world could lead to replacement of operational "victory" in the war on terrorism with strategic failure, as regional instability increases around the world.

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  Nonstate Actors in Colombia: Threat and Response

  Max G. Manwaring Dr.

  Colombia's deeply rooted and ambiguous warfare has reached crisis proportions in that Colombia's "Hobbesian Trinity" of illegal drug traffickers, insurgents, and paramilitary organizations are creating a situation in which life is indeed "nasty, brutish, and short." The first step in developing a macro-level vision, policy, and strategy to deal with the Colombian crisis in a global context is to be clear on what the Colombian crisis is, and what the fundamental threats implicit (and explicit) in it are. Political and military leaders can start thinking about the gravity of the terrorist strategy employed by Colombia's stateless adversaries from this point. It is also the point from which leaders can begin developing responses designed to secure Colombian, Hemispheric, and global stability. The author seeks to explain the Colombian crisis in terms of nonstate threats to the state and to the region--and appropriate strategic-level responses.